PEOPLE OF MI V ARTHUR JAMES BRIDGES JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 13, 2008
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 277758
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-027887-FH
ARTHUR JAMES BRIDGES, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Bandstra and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12,
to serve a prison term of 76 months to 25 years. We affirm.
I. FACTS
On August 1, 2006, Sergeant Gregory Potts of the Bay City Police Department engaged
in a “buy/bust” investigation of defendant with the help of Saginaw’s Police Department and a
confidential informant.
The confidential informant was given a recording device in order to record her telephone
and face-to-face conversation with defendant. She made a call to defendant to set up a meeting.
The confidential informant was searched and provided with marked $50 bills to use in the drug
purchase. Potts drove the confidential informant to the meeting location designated by
defendant. The confidential informant approached defendant and entered defendant’s vehicle.
Defendant told the confidential informant to throw the money on the floor and then gave her a
package of plastic that she believed to contain cocaine; the contents of which were later
confirmed to be cocaine. The confidential informant exited defendant’s vehicle and returned to
Potts’s unmarked vehicle. Defendant began to exit the parking lot, at which time Potts notified
other officers that the purchase had been completed. Multiple officers in police vests arrived on
the scene and ordered defendant to stop. Defendant drove his vehicle around the officers and
exited the parking lot. Officers pursued defendant in unmarked cars until marked police cars
arrived in the area. Defendant was pulled over and arrested shortly thereafter.
A scale and a cellular phone were seized from defendant’s vehicle; the phone was
identified as the phone the confidential informant called. The marked $50 bills were not found
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on defendant or along his traveled path. The pursuing officers did not witness defendant throw
anything from his windows; however, while in pursuit, the officers had lost sight of defendant’s
vehicle for a short period of time.
Defendant’s trial began on March 13, 2007. Defense counsel raised numerous motions
alleging error on defendant’s behalf. Defendant repeatedly objected to the descriptions of those
issues. The court instructed defendant to stop interrupting and making faces. Defendant then
requested an interlocutory appeal, and the court once again instructed defendant to stop talking.
Defendant stated that he wanted a “fair” trial, at which time the court warned if he interrupted
one more time, defendant would be gagged. The court then denied all motions raised by
defendant as either being frivolous or untimely and only for the purpose of delay.
Defendant then requested his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The court
initially denied defendant’s request, but then proceeded with inquiry regarding defendant’s
knowledge of self-representation. Defendant ignored the court’s questions and stated that he was
confused. Defendant then asked the court to state its jurisdiction. The court removed the
defendant and placed him in holding. Shortly thereafter, defendant returned to the courtroom to
proceed with the court’s questioning. Defendant objected to the adjournment of the proceeding
and objected to the challenge of accuracy and validity of his habitual offender status. At this
point, the court denied defendant’s request for self-representation. The court felt that defendant
did not make an unequivocal waiver and would likely disrupt the proceedings and make the
administration of justice difficult, if not impossible to proceed in the case. Defendant objected to
the court’s denial, requesting to no longer be present in the court and left, telling the court that it
was “biased, prejudiced and unfair.” Defendant now appeals.
II. REQUEST FOR SELF-REPRESENTATION
Defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his
request to represent himself at trial. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s factual findings regarding a defendant’s request for selfrepresentation for clear error, People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640; 683 NW2d 597 (2004), and
the ultimate decision regarding a defendant’s request for self-representation for an abuse of
discretion, People v Hicks, 259 Mich App 518, 521; 675 NW2d 599 (2003).
B. Analysis
A criminal defendant’s right to represent himself is explicitly guaranteed by both the
Michigan Constitution and statute. Const 1963, art 1, § 13; MCL 763.1. However, this right is
not absolute and a court must determine that: (1) the defendant’s request is unequivocal; (2) the
defendant is asserting his right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily; and (3) the defendant’s
self-representation will not disrupt, unduly inconvenience, and burden the court. People v
Russell, 471 Mich 182, 190; 684 NW2d 745 (2004). The trial court has a duty to inform the
defendant of the charge and penalty he faces, advise him of the risks of self-representation, and
offer him the opportunity to consult with retained or appointed counsel. MCR 6.005(D). In the
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instant matter, the trial court denied defendant’s request to represent himself, finding that the
request was not unequivocal, and that defendant was likely to create a disturbance if his request
was granted.
We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. Defendant’s request for self-representation
was not unequivocal. While defendant did repeatedly inform the court that he wished to
represent himself, he also indicated repeatedly that he intended to rely on appointed counsel for
assistance. It is true that this Court has previously held that a request for self-representation can
still be unequivocal even where accompanied by a request for standby counsel. People v Hicks,
259 Mich App 518, 528; 675 NW2d 599 (2003). This does not mean, however, that the request
for standby counsel cannot be considered when determining whether a request for selfrepresentation is unambiguous and definite. See id. at 530 n 4.
The requirement that the request for self-representation be unequivocal is rooted in the
desire to prevent gamesmanship:
Moreover, one of the by-products of the recent developments in the law
relative to the assignment of counsel in all but a few of the cases of indigent
defendants, has been an awareness by the prison population and a very
considerable number of persons who may in the course of time add to the prison
population, of the possibility of manipulating the basic rule in a fashion such as to
produce a record of confusion on the subject, and to give the accused the
opportunity to claim a reversal in the event of conviction on the ground that his
rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments had been infringed. [United States v
Plattner, 330 F2d 271, 276 (CA 2, 1964). See also People v Anderson, 398 Mich
361, 367; 247 NW2d 857 (1976).]
In the instant case, defendant’s handling of the request created “a record of confusion on the
subject,” even if the intent do so is not inferred. Defendant did not raise his request to represent
himself until after asserting numerous frivolous defenses and engaging in frequent interruptions
of the court and his own counsel. In addition, when the trial court attempted to engage in the
required colloquy to determine whether defendant effectively requested the right of selfrepresentation, he responded to the questions with argument to both the jurisdiction of the court
and the validity of the charges, with statements that he was confused and could not hear the
judge, and with repeated references to the help he expected to receive from appointed counsel.
Given that a trial court should “‘“indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver”’” of the
right to counsel, People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412, 428; 519 NW2d 128 (1994) (citations
omitted), under these circumstances the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request to
represent himself at trial. The record shows that the request was not unequivocal and that
substantial disruption to the proceedings could have ensued had defendant represented himself.
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly denied his request for selfrepresentation because of inquiries into his legal competence and knowledge. In order to
determine whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily asserted his right to
waive assistance of counsel, the trial court should consider the defendant’s general competence,
rather than legal competence. Id. at 432. However, defendant’s argument is not persuasive
because even if the trial court’s inquiry was improper, a defendant is not entitled to self-
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representation if the trial court determines, as it did here, that it would result in a disruption of
the proceedings. Russell, supra at 190.
The record reflects that defendant created numerous disruptions before the selection of
the jury and presentation of proofs, as evidenced by his incessant interruptions at both the
hearing before trial and the first two days of trial. For example, defendant continued to assert
that his speedy trial rights had been violated even after the trial court had already ruled on that
issue and explained its ruling several times. Defendant’s interruptions were so numerous and
distracting that the trial court threatened to gag him. In addition, when the trial court refused
defendant’s request to represent himself at trial, defendant declared the trial court was racist,
prejudiced, and unfair, and thereafter refused to return to the courtroom. Therefore, defendant’s
assertion that he was disruptive only because of the denial of his right to represent himself is
belied by the record, since he interrupted the court, was argumentative, and behaved in a
generally disruptive fashion well before the request for self-representation was made and denied.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant next contends that the trial erred by allowing the admission of a CD with the
recorded conversation between defendant and the confidential informant. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Pattison, 276 Mich App 613, 615; 741 NW2d 558 (2007).
B. Analysis
Defendant contends that the practice of recording a conversation between a confidential
informant and a suspect, without first obtaining judicial authorization, is strictly precluded by
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 USC 2510 et seq.
However, defendant’s understanding of the act is flawed. While it is true that judicial
authorization is required for nonconsensual electronic surveillance, the act further states:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color
of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is
a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception. [18 USC 2511(2)(c).]
In People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 40; 475 NW2d 684 (1991), the Michigan Supreme
Court held that warrantless participant monitoring does not violate a defendant’s rights under the
federal or state constitutions. The recording at issue in this case was obtained with the
knowledge and consent of the confidential informant. Judicial authorization was not necessary
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the CD into evidence.
IV. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEARCH
Defendant further asserts that the police lacked probable cause to stop and search his
vehicle and that his conviction must be overturned.
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A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s determination that probable cause existed is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Wirth, 87 Mich App 41, 44; 273 NW2d 104 (1978).
B. Analysis
“Probable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within an officer’s
knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being
committed.” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849 (1996).
Defendant relies on People v Wing, 43 Mich App 722; 204 NW2d 690 (1972), to support
his argument that the police lacked probable cause to stop and search his vehicle. In Wing, this
Court held that the trial court had erred by admitting heroin that had been seized from
defendant’s car into evidence when the circumstances of the arrest were as follows: (1) there
was a plan for an informant to buy drugs from the defendant; (2) performance of the plan had
occurred to the point where a sale by the defendant to the informant might have occurred; (3) the
police officer thought he saw the informant nod after exiting the defendant’s vehicle; and (4)
there was no prearrangement for the informant to signal police when the sale was completed. Id.
at 724-725. In Wing, the defendant’s conviction was overturned because the conviction could
not be sustained without the heroin as evidence. Id. at 725.
Defendant’s reliance on Wing is misplaced given the substantial factual distinctions
between the two cases. In the instant case, the cocaine that serves as the underlying basis for
defendant’s conviction was obtained from the confidential informant, not defendant’s vehicle.
More importantly, pursuit of defendant and the subsequent search of his vehicle resulted from
the informant’s verbal confirmation to the police of the sale, rather than a head signal that may or
may not have occurred and was not prearranged. The informant’s verbal indication that a drug
sale had occurred as planned, coupled with the production of a substance the police believed to
be cocaine allegedly obtained from defendant, provided sufficient probable cause to pursue
defendant, arrest him, and search his vehicle.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Bill Schuette
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