BRIAN K WALLINGTON V CITY OF MASON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BRIAN K. WALLINGTON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
CITY OF MASON, ELM INVESTMENTS, INC.,
ELM INVESTMENTS I, INC., MILLENIUM
DIGITAL MEDIA SYSTEMS, and MISS DIG
SYSTEM, INC.,
No. 263758
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 03-001882-NO
Defendants,
and
WOLVERINE ENGINEERS AND SURVEYORS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Saad and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Wolverine Engineers and Surveyors (defendant Wolverine) appeals by leave granted an
order denying its motion for partial summary disposition. This dispute arises out of injuries
plaintiff sustained during the course of his employment. We reverse and remand for further
appropriate proceedings.
Elm Investments I, Inc. (defendant Elm) entered into a contract with the city of Mason
(defendant Mason) for the construction of a water main. Defendant Elm was named the general
contractor and defendant Wolverine the “consulting engineer” for the project. Defendant Elm
subcontracted with Underground Drilling and Boring, Inc. (Underground Drilling) for the latter
to dig a trench and install the water main. Plaintiff was an employee of Underground Drilling.
During the course of installing the water main, plaintiff was injured when the walls of the trench
in which he was working caved-in and buried him under several feet of dirt. Plaintiff claimed he
was injured because there was no appropriate shoring or bracing in the area where he was
working.
Defendant Wolverine argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
disposition on plaintiff’s negligence claims to the extent they derive from the contract between
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defendant Elm and defendant Mason (Water Main Contract). We agree. We review summary
disposition rulings de novo. Joliet v Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30, 35; 715 NW2d 60 (2006). A motion
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) entitles the movant to summary disposition where there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Nastal v Henderson & Assoc, 471 Mich 712, 721; 691 NW2d 1
(2005). Also, the existence of a duty in a negligence action is a question of law we review de
novo. See Dyer v Trachtman, 470 Mich 45, 49; 679 NW2d 311 (2004).
To sustain a negligence action, a plaintiff must establish duty, breach, causation, and
damages. Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473 Mich 63, 71-72; 701 NW2d 684 (2005). “It is axiomatic
that there can be no tort liability unless defendants owed a duty to plaintiff.” Fultz v UnionCommerce Assoc, 470 Mich 460, 463; 683 NW2d 587 (2004) (citation omitted). Duty in a
negligence action may arise by contract. Joyce v Rubin, 249 Mich App 231, 244; 642 NW2d 360
(2002). But a tort action may arise from the failure to perform a contract only where there exists
a legal duty that is “separate and distinct” from the contractual obligation. Rinaldo’s Constr
Corp v Michigan Bell Tel Co, 454 Mich 65, 83-84; 559 NW2d 647 (1997). Consequently, a
court must
analyze tort actions based on a contract and brought by a plaintiff who is not a
party to that contract by using a “separate and distinct” mode of analysis.
Specifically, the threshold question is whether the defendant owed a duty to the
plaintiff that is separate and distinct from the defendant’s contractual obligations.
If no independent duty exists, no tort action based on a contract will lie. [Fultz,
supra at 467.]
Pursuant to Fultz, we conclude the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant
Wolverine summary disposition. Plaintiff was not a party to the Water Main Contract. But
plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Wolverine stem entirely from the latter’s ostensible
duties under this contract. Plaintiff has failed to allege or present evidence of a duty defendant
Wolverine owed him independent of the contract. Id. at 468. Under plaintiff’s theory of the
case, defendant Wolverine owed plaintiff no “separate and distinct” duty. Rather, the substance
of plaintiff’s allegations is defendant Wolverine’s failure to act in a variety of ways under the
terms of the contract. “[N]o tort liability arises for failing to fulfill a promise in the absence of a
duty to act that is separate and distinct from the promise made.” Id. at 470.
In Fultz, our Supreme Court observed that the viability of tort actions based on a contract
had traditionally been analyzed under a “nonfeasance/misfeasance dichotomy,” where the latter
was and the former was not held to impose a duty in tort. Id. at 465-466. The Court rejected this
in favor of the “separate and distinct” inquiry. Id. at 467. It noted the traditional principle that
where “one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior obligation to do so, a duty
may arise to perform the act in a nonnegligent manner.” Id. at 465. And in reconciling this
principle with its “separate and distinct” analysis, the Court reasoned as follows:
Like the plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Osman [v Summer Green Lawn
Care, Inc, 209 Mich App 703; 532 NW2d 186 (1995), overruled in part on other
grounds Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455 n 2; 597 NW2d 28 (1999)]
was injured when she fell on a patch of ice. Also, like the defendant here, the
defendant in Osman had contracted to provide snow removal services to the
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premises owner. In that case, however, the defendant had breached a duty
separate and distinct from its contractual duty when it created a new hazard by
placing snow
on a portion of the premises when it knew, or should have known or
anticipated, that the snow would melt and freeze into ice on the abutting
sidewalk, steps, and walkway, thus posing a dangerous and hazardous
condition to individuals who traverse those areas.
***
In this case, . . . defendant[’s] . . . failure to carry out its snow-removal
duties owed to . . . [the parking lot owner] created no new hazard to plaintiff.
Thus, plaintiff alleges no duty owed to her by defendant . . . separate and distinct
from its contract with [the parking lot owner. Defendant] . . . could not logically
breach a duty that it did not owe. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that
defendant . . . was responsible for plaintiff’s injuries solely on the basis of the
contract . . . . [Id. at 468-469 (citations omitted).]
This reasoning further indicates that plaintiff’s action on the contract cannot be
maintained. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant Wolverine actively engaged in misconduct.
Instead it asserts that Wolverine failed to properly fulfill its duties under the contract. Plaintiff’s
arguments on appeal all concern this alleged failure. Yet this failure created “no new hazard” for
which defendant Wolverine would independently owe a duty of care. Id. at 469. Plaintiff’s
claims all stem from defendant Wolverine’s alleged want of action. Yet independent of the
contract, plaintiff has proffered no duty, the breach of which, defendant Wolverine could be held
liable.
We conclude the trial court erred in failing to grant summary disposition as to plaintiff’s
negligence and gross negligence claims to the extent they relied upon defendant Wolverine’s
duties under the contract. It is unclear, however, whether plaintiff could otherwise allege a
“separate and distinct” duty sufficient to hold defendant Wolverine liable. The parties have not
addressed this argument. Accordingly, while we find it clear that Wolverine should have been
granted summary disposition on plaintiff’s claims to the extent they relied on the Water Main
Contract, we cannot conclude from this record that defendant Wolverine is necessarily entitled to
full summary disposition.
We therefore reverse the denial of the partial summary disposition motion at issue and
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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