ELAINE JACKSON V VINCENT TOLOMEI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ELAINE JACKSON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
VINCENT TOLOMEI and DANIEL TOLOMEI,
No. 270404
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-043688-NI
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Neff and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants,
Vincent Tolomei (“Vincent”) and Daniel Tolomei (“Daniel”). We reverse and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff was injured in an auto collision, the undisputed facts of which are that plaintiff
had turned out of a turnaround onto Mound Road when Vincent’s car,1 traveling on Mound
Road, struck her car. The trial judge granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition of
plaintiff’s claim, reasoning that Vincent’s failure to stop at a red light at the intersection of Eight
Mile and Mound Road was not a proximate cause of the accident solely because the intersection
is located 50 feet north of the turnaround where the collision occurred. Plaintiff argues on appeal
that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning proximate cause because of the close
proximity between the intersection and the turnaround. We agree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Morreal v State, Dept of Community Health, __ Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (Docket No.
270350, issued October 12, 2006). A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) should be
granted when, after considering the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and other
documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Royal
Prop Group, LLC v Prime Ins Syndicate, Inc, 267 Mich App 708, 713; 706 NW2d 426 (2005).
A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to
1
Daniel is the owner of the vehicle, but was not present when this collision took place.
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the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. Heckmann v
Detroit Chief of Police, 267 Mich App 480, 486; 705 NW2d 689 (2005). This Court is liberal in
finding a genuine issue of material fact. Trentadue v Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co, 266
Mich App 297, 306; 701 NW2d 765 (2005). Circumstantial evidence may present a factual
issue. Bergen v Baker, 264 Mich App 376, 387; 691 NW2d 770 (2004).
In a negligence action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty, the
defendant breached that duty, the breach was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, and that
plaintiff suffered damages. Vanguilder v Collier, 248 Mich App 633, 635; 650 NW2d 340
(2001). The Motor Vehicle Code allows for the imposition of liability for injury caused by
ordinary negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle: “The owner of a motor vehicle is liable
for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence
consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common
law.” MCL 257.401(1).
Statutes and the common law dictate the duties of automobile drivers in Michigan.
Under MCL 257.611(1) a driver must not disobey the instructions of a traffic control device
unless otherwise directed by a police officer. MCL 257.649(6) requires that:
Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, the driver of a vehicle
approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop . . . . After
having stopped, the driver shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has
entered the intersection from another highway or which is approaching so closely
on the highway as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when the
drier would be moving across or within the intersection.2
In the absence of a relevant statute or ordinance, a driver must exercise the degree of care
and caution that a reasonably prudent person would exercise under the same or similar
circumstances regardless of whether such driver has the right-of-way. Placek v City of Sterling
Heights, 405 Mich 638, 669-670; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); Lamp v Reynolds, 249 Mich App 591,
596; 645 NW2d 311 (2002). A plaintiff who sustains injuries in an automobile accident must
have exercised ordinary care to avoid the injury at issue. Reed v Goodin, 285 Mich 614, 619;
281 NW 377 (1938), overruled in part Felgner v Anderson, 375 Mich 23, 51; 133 NW2d 136
(1965) (court abrogating assumption of the risk doctrine). In an action for injuries sustained in
an accident at an intersection, negligence may be found by the court as a matter of law, but
generally, it is a question of fact for the jury. Ingram v Henry, 373 Mich 453, 457; 129 NW2d
879 (1964); Rector v Clark, 344 Mich 276, 278; 73 NW2d 916 (1955).
In addition to establishing that a driver breached a duty he owed the plaintiff, the plaintiff
need also establish causation between the alleged wrongful act and the resulting damages by
proving that the defendant’s conduct was both the cause in fact and proximate cause of the
2
By statute, a driver traveling at an unlawful speed forfeits the right-of-way. MCL 257.649(5).
However, there is no evidence in this case that Vincent was traveling at an unlawful speed.
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plaintiff’s damages. Holton v A+ Ins Associates, Inc, 255 Mich App 318, 326; 661 NW2d 248
(2003). Cause in fact requires a plaintiff to show that her injuries would not have occurred but
for the defendant’s negligence. Zdrojewski v Murphy, 254 Mich App 50, 63; 657 NW2d 721
(2002). Proximate cause requires a finding that the conduct at issue was a foreseeable, natural,
and probable cause of the plaintiff’s injury and damages. Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 471
Mich 540, 546; 685 NW2d (2004).
In the instant case, plaintiff claims that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Vincent’s conduct was a proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff contends that the
evidence is sufficient to support an inference that Vincent ran the red light at the Eight Mile and
Mound Road intersection in violation of MCL 257.611(1). We agree. Both plaintiff and a
witness to the accident, Kaisha Ingram (“Ingram”), stated that they saw multiple lanes of traffic
completely stopped at the intersection, although neither of them could see the color of the light at
the intersection. Ingram explained that two of southbound Mound Road’s three lanes were filled
with traffic that had approached the intersection, slowed down, and come to a complete stop.
Ingram, like plaintiff, was watching the southbound traffic on Mound Road because Ingram was
preparing to turn onto southbound Mound Road from the adjacent parking lot.
Vincent stated that he had a green light at the intersection and that there was no traffic
around him. The trial judge found that a trier of fact might believe plaintiff and the disinterested
witness rather than Vincent about the color of the light, but the judge concluded that Vincent’s
running the red light at the intersection could not be a proximate cause of the accident because
the turnaround was located 50 feet south of the intersection. We disagree and hold that, looking
at the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff and drawing all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff’s favor, reasonable minds could differ over whether Vincent’s conduct was a proximate
cause of the collision between him and plaintiff. Royal Prop Group, LLC, supra, p 713; Bergen,
supra, p 387.
Individuals rely on traffic signals to regulate the flow of traffic and it is reasonable for an
individual to assume that traffic would stop where the signal was red. Bucholtz v Deitel, 59
Mich App 349, 352; 229 NW2d 448 (1975). Vincent’s own statements, along with statements by
plaintiff, Ingram, and another witness to the accident, Melissa Holman (“Holman”), establish that
plaintiff was already proceeding with her turn when Vincent ran into her. The point of impact on
plaintiff’s car and the point of impact on Vincent’s car both indicate plaintiff was turning when
Vincent ran into her. A reasonable trier of fact might conclude, based on the evidence, that
Vincent ran the red light at the intersection, that plaintiff had reasonably relied on the red light to
regulate traffic such that she could safely complete her turn, and that Vincent’s conduct was
therefore a proximate cause of the collision.
Vincent contends that under MCL 257.649(6), he possessed the right-of-way on Mound
Road; he asserts that regardless of the light’s color at the intersection, plaintiff’s pulling out from
the stop sign at the turnaround when she did not possess the right-of-way resulted in plaintiff’s
conduct being the proximate cause of the collision. We disagree and find that, given the
proximity of the turnaround to the light, reasonable minds could differ on the issue of whether
Vincent’s conduct was a proximate cause of the accident.
The trial judge found the distance between the turnaround and the traffic light was too
great to support a conclusion that running the light proximately caused the collision. However,
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Vincent stated that he was traveling 35 to 40 miles per hour when he crossed the intersection.
Both plaintiff and Vincent stated that the distance from the intersection to the turnaround was
approximately 50 feet. Using the mathematical calculation 40 miles per hour x 5280 feet per
mile / 3600 seconds per hour, if Vincent had been traveling at 40 miles per hour, in one second
he would have traveled 59 feet. If traveling at 35 miles per hour, he would have traveled 51 feet
in one second. By Vincent’s own admission as to his rate of speed, an extremely short time
passed from when Vincent crossed the intersection and first saw plaintiff turning until the time
he reached plaintiff’s vehicle at the turnaround 50 feet south of the intersection. We find that the
one second of travel time between the traffic light and the turnaround is not too great a distance
to preclude a finding of proximate causation by a reasonable trier of fact.
We conclude that summary disposition was improper. A reasonable trier of fact might
find, given the proximity between the intersection and the turnaround, that if Vincent ran the red
light in violation of MCL 257.611(1), he breached the required standard of reasonable care by
putting plaintiff in a situation where she had one second or less to react to his conduct. Royal
Prop Group, LLC, supra, p 713; Scalise v Boy Scouts of America, 265 Mich App 1, 10; 692
NW2d 858 (2005). The color of the light was therefore relevant, and a genuine issue of material
fact remains.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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