PEOPLE OF MI V CONNEZE REDMOND
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 264330
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 05-003284-01
CONNEZE REDMOND,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Neff and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of felon in possession of a firearm,
MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to five to
ten years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction and two years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm defendant’s convictions, and his
sentence for the felony-firearm conviction. We vacate defendant’s sentence for the felon in
possession of a firearm conviction and remand this matter for resentencing with respect to that
offense only.
I
On appeal, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because he was denied his
constitutional right to counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings. We disagree. This issue
presents a constitutional question, which this Court reviews de novo. People v LeBlanc, 465
Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). “The Sixth Amendment safeguards the right to counsel
at all critical stages of the criminal process for an accused who faces incarceration.”1 People v
Williams, 470 Mich 634, 641; 683 NW2d 597 (2004), citing Maine v Moulton, 474 US 159, 170;
106 S Ct 477; 88 L Ed 2d 481 (1985). “The phrase ‘critical stage’ refers to ‘a step of a criminal
proceeding, such as arraignment, that [holds] significant consequences for the accused.’” People
1
“The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 641; 683 NW2d 597
(2004), citing Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963).
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v Willing, 267 Mich App 208, 228; 704 NW2d 472 (2005), quoting Bell v Cone, 535 US 685,
695-696; 122 S Ct 1843; 152 L Ed 2d 914 (2002).
The United States Supreme Court “has uniformly found constitutional error without any
showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the
accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.” United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 659 n
25; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984). The uncertainty of the prejudice suffered by a
defendant who is unrepresented during a critical stage makes the outcome of the defendant’s trial
unreliable. French v Jones, 332 F3d 430, 438 (CA 6, 2003). However, if the circumstance at
issue is not deemed to be a “critical stage of the proceeding,” the absence of counsel does not
mandate a presumption of prejudice under Cronic, and any alleged error is instead considered in
light of the actual prejudice. Hudson v Jones, 351 F3d 212, 218 (CA 6, 2003).
Following the instruction of the jury after closing arguments, the parties stipulated that
any specific evidence or instructions could be sent to the jury upon its request without prior
notification to the attorneys. However, the court noted that the attorneys would be notified if a
jury request exceeded the scope of the stipulation. The jury subsequently sent the court two
notes asking if it could see certain evidence admitted at trial and if it could see Joaquin Van
Horn’s testimony and witness statement. Although the requested evidence was provided to the
jury, the court explained,
. . . [I]f [Van Horn’s testimony and witness statement is] absolutely required for a
verdict, you may after consulting with each other and trying to recall the pertinent
parts of that statement request it. But our reporter takes down what is said in
shorthand. There is no transcript of it. It can be made, but it will take some time,
it may be available for you tomorrow. I don’t know the length of it. I don’t know
exactly how much time; it may be late this afternoon or tomorrow, probably not
until tomorrow.
After the trial court addressed the jury’s questions, defense counsel claimed that she was
not present in the courtroom for this instruction because the court clerk failed to timely notify her
of the jury’s requests, and consequently, defendant was unrepresented when the instructions were
provided. After noting that defense counsel had arrived late and that the court clerk had
attempted to call defense counsel at least once or twice, the trial court responded that the jury
was merely provided with the standard instruction regarding the availability of Van Horn’s
testimony and witness statement.
The initial question is whether defense counsel was absent during a critical stage of the
proceedings, such that prejudice is presumed under Cronic. Hudson, supra at 216. To determine
whether a trial court’s communication with a deliberating jury constitutes a critical stage of the
proceedings, this Court must determine the nature of the communication. Compare French,
supra (the trial court’s new, nonstandard supplemental instruction constituted a critical stage of
the proceedings) with Hudson, supra (rereading the instructions originally given to the jury did
not constitute a critical stage of the proceedings).
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In French, in which the court found a presumption of prejudice, the trial judge delivered
a nonstandard supplemental instruction to a deadlocked jury. French, supra at 432, 438.
Defense counsel did not have an opportunity to respond to the jury’s note that prompted the
supplemental instruction, and defense counsel was not present when the judge gave the
instruction. Id. at 438.
Here, in response to the jury’s request to see the transcript of Van Horn’s testimony and
witness statement, the trial court informed the jury that it should continue deliberating and that
the transcript could be made available sometime later. Defendant concedes that the court’s
limited response to the jury request was not error in and of itself. Defendant argues only that the
presence of defense counsel may have led to “a different, more comprehensive response,” and
may have significantly affected the jury’s deliberations.
Given that the trial court’s instruction merely encouraged the jury to continue their
deliberations and did not involve any substantive law, the instruction did not hold any significant
consequences for defendant. Willing, supra at 228. Therefore, defendant was not denied counsel
during a critical stage of the proceedings.
Further, defendant has failed to show actual prejudice. As the prosecution concedes, the
trial court’s ex parte communication with the jury was improper. See MCR 6.414(B); People v
France, 436 Mich 138, 142; 461 Mich 621 (1990). However, a trial court’s ex parte
communication with a jury does not require automatic reversal, but rather “centers on a showing
of prejudice.” Id. To determine prejudice, the communication must first be categorized as either
substantive, administrative, or housekeeping. Id. Here, because the instruction at issue merely
encouraged the jury to continue its deliberations and explained that a transcript could be made
available at some later time, the instruction was an administrative communication. Id. at 143.
Moreover, although defense counsel noted that she was not present when the court
provided the instructions at issue to the jury, she failed to object to these instructions after the
trial court made her aware of them. Thus, given that, “[t]he failure to object when made aware
of the communication will be taken as evidence that the administrative instruction was not
prejudicial,” Id. at 143, the ex parte communication did not prejudice defendant. We find no
error requiring a reversal of defendant’s convictions.
II
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor’s reference to his prior felony conviction
should have resulted in a mistrial. We disagree. This Court reviews preserved issues of
prosecutorial misconduct de novo “to determine if the defendant was denied a fair and impartial
trial.” People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). Where a defendant is
charged with felon in possession of a firearm in addition to other charges arising from the same
incident, “‘adequate safeguards’ can be erected to ensure that a defendant . . . suffers no unfair
prejudice if a single trial is conducted for all the charges.” People v Green, 228 Mich App 684,
691; 580 NW2d 444 (1998), citing People v Mayfield, 221 Mich App 656, 659-660; 562 NW2d
272 (1997). Specifically, these “safeguards” include: “(1) the introduction by stipulation of the
fact of the defendant’s prior conviction, (2) a limiting instruction emphasizing that the jury must
give separate consideration to each count of the indictment, and (3) a specific instruction to
consider the prior conviction only as it relates to the felon-in-possession charge.” Green, supra
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at 691, citing Mayfield, supra at 660, citing United States v Mebust, 857 F Supp 609, 613 (ND
Ill, 1994).
The parties stipulated that although the jury would be informed of an unspecified prior
felony conviction, the jury would not be informed that the prior felony conviction was carrying a
concealed weapon. However, during closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury, “You heard
a stipulation . . . that [defendant] has previously been convicted of a possession of a firearm
[offense].” The trial court subsequently instructed the jury that it must disregard any statement
specifying the prior felony conviction and that any statement of this nature was “stricken from
any evidence.”
We conclude that “adequate safeguards” in the instant case ensured that defendant was
not prejudiced or denied a fair trial given that a limiting instruction was provided after the jury
was informed of the specified prior felony conviction even though the parties had stipulated
otherwise. It should be noted that the trial court not only told the jury that it could not consider
and must disregard the reference to the specific prior felony conviction, but went one step farther
than the safeguards in Green require and told the jury that it was not required to accept the
stipulation as fact. Therefore, although the prosecutor’s reference during closing argument was
improper, “adequate safeguards” ensured that defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial.
Id. at 691; Thomas, supra at 453.
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court failed to provide a substantial and compelling
reason for its upward departure from the appropriate sentencing guidelines. We agree. “[A]
sentence that is outside the appropriate guidelines sentence range, for whatever reason, is
appealable regardless of whether the issue was raised at sentencing, in a motion for resentencing,
or in a motion to remand.” People v Kimble, 470 Mich 305, 310; 684 NW2d 669 (2004).
Therefore, although defendant did not challenge the trial court’s departure from the appropriate
sentencing guidelines range at sentencing, in a motion for resentencing, or in a motion to
remand, this issue is appealable and is reviewed for plain error. Id. at 312, citing People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
A trial court may depart from a sentencing guidelines range provided it has a substantial
and compelling reason and it states this reason on the record. MCL 769.34(3); People v
Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 439; 636 NW2d 127 (2001). A substantial and compelling reason
must be objective and verifiable. People v Abramski, 257 Mich App 71, 74; 665 NW2d 501
(2003). “Objective and verifiable” means that the facts considered must be “actions or
occurrences that are external to the minds of the judge, defendant, and others involved in making
the decision, and . . . [are] capable of being confirmed.” Id. An objective and verifiable reason
must “keenly” or “irresistibly” grab the court’s attention and be of “considerable worth.’”
People v Hendrick, 472 Mich 555, 563; 697 NW2d 511 (2005), quoting People v Babcock, 469
Mich 247; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). Moreover, the court may not depart from the guidelines range
based on an offense or offender characteristic already accounted for in determining the
appropriate sentence range unless the “court concludes that the characteristic was given
inadequate or disproportionate weight.” People v Havens, 268 Mich App 15, 18; 706 NW2d 210
(2005), citing MCL 769.34(3)(b).
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Defendant’s sentencing guidelines range was 12 to 34 months for his felon in possession
of a firearm conviction. However, the trial court sentenced defendant to five to ten years’
imprisonment for this conviction. In determining defendant’s sentencing guidelines range,
defendant was assessed ten points for PRV 2, which takes into account prior convictions for
attempted carrying a concealed weapon and a controlled substance offense, and ten points for
PRV 6, which takes into account that “[t]he offender is on parole, probation, or delayed sentence
status or on bond awaiting adjudication or sentencing for a felony,” pursuant to MCL
777.56(1)(c). Defendant was also assessed 25 points for OV 1, which takes into account that
“[a] firearm was discharged at or toward a human being” pursuant to MCL 777.31(1)(a), and 100
points for OV 3, which takes into account that “[a] victim was killed” pursuant to MCL
777.33(1)(a).
In departing from the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, the court explained:
. . . [T]here was no doubt by the jury conviction that this [d]efendant did possess
a firearm, that he was a felon when he possessed the firearm and the altercation
and argument between these young men in the park that night caused the death
and not specifically this [d]efendant’s bullet maybe at that time, but a sixteen year
old died as a result of the incident and there’s also no question that [defendant],
you are at this point twenty-seven years old and had been previously convicted by
plea of attempt carrying a concealed weapon [sic] as well as drug charges and that
the presentence report, as you have read, states that you have a very poor success
on probation.
This crime occurred a very short time after another incident at the - - at age
twenty-seven it’s not your first opportunity at all to learn from your police
contacts. To the contrary, the police contacts that you have had, the convictions
that you have and, the time frame of those convictions, the choice to be involved
in carrying a weapon and involved in this type of and incident is objective and
verifiable and shows this Court that you are a special danger, an added danger to
the community, other than what’s been shown simply by the guidelines or simply
by the conviction of felony[-]firearm and felon in possession of a firearm.
Initially, we note that the presentence investigation report supports the trial court’s
findings that a teenager died as a result of this altercation, that defendant had previously been
convicted of attempted carrying of a concealed weapon and a controlled substance charge, and
that defendant had absconded from probation supervision. However, as noted above, the
sentencing guidelines applicable to defendant and defendant’s convictions already take into
account defendant’s prior weapons conviction as well as defendant’s decision to carry a weapon
during this altercation in which another individual died. The trial court’s remarks at sentencing
do not address whether the characteristics accounted for in the sentencing guidelines were given
“inadequate or disproportionate weight,” Havens, supra at 18, to support the court’s upward
departure.
Further, although “a defendant’s conduct while on probation can be considered as a
substantial and compelling reason for departure from the legislative sentencing guidelines,”
Hendrick, supra at 565, according to the record before us, defendant was not under probation
supervision at the time he committed the instant offenses. Because it is unclear from the trial
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court’s statements whether the court relied on appropriate factors to support an upward departure
from the sentencing guidelines, we remand this case for resentencing.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentence for felony-firearm, but vacate
defendant’s sentence for felon in possession of a firearm and remand for resentencing. We do
not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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