PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES DALLAS WALKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2006
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 263440
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-004500-FC
JAMES DALLAS WALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and the court sentenced him
as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to a prison term of 35 to 60 years.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
At approximately 10:45 p.m. on September 18, 2004, a man walked into the Citgo gas
station in Marshall, Michigan, and purchased a candy bar. The man returned to the gas station at
11:30 p.m., grabbed another candy bar, and brought it to the counter. He gave the cashier,
Bethany Tucker, change for the candy bar. Before Tucker could close the drawer the man
reached over the counter and grabbed the drawer. As Tucker repeatedly slammed the man’s
hand in the drawer, the man reached into his sweatshirt and pulled out a knife. The man grabbed
four $20 bills from the drawer before running out of the gas station. He left the candy bar sitting
on the counter. The robbery was videotaped by the gas station’s video surveillance system. No
fingerprints were recovered from either the candy bar or the cash register drawer.
The morning after the robbery, Tucker met with Sergeant Steve Eddy to compile a
composite drawing of the man who perpetrated the robbery. Tucker rated the accuracy of the
composite drawing a six or a seven on a scale of one to ten. She indicated that the perpetrator’s
ears were larger than the ears in the composite drawing and that the perpetrator’s mustache was
much thicker than it appeared in the drawing.
Tucker viewed a photographic lineup consisting of eight men on September 22, 2004.
Defendant was designated as number 8 in the lineup. Tucker indicated that the men designated
as numbers seven and eight resembled the perpetrator, but that the man designated as number
seven looked more like the perpetrator. Tucker viewed a custodial lineup on December 9, 2004.
The custodial lineup included defendant but did not include the man designated as number seven
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in the photographic lineup. Tucker identified defendant as the perpetrator. She identified
defendant as the perpetrator because of “[t]he way he looked, his eyes.”
Deputy Chief Bruce Elzinga testified that he had frequent contact with defendant since
defendant was a child. Elzinga viewed the videotape of the robbery and recognized the
perpetrator’s voice and hand movements as defendant’s. Elzinga believed that defendant was the
perpetrator. Sergeant Scott McDonald, who had prior contacts with defendant over the past eight
to nine years, also viewed the videotape of the robbery. He recognized defendant as the
perpetrator. Mary Leach, who dated defendant for two years, also viewed the videotape of the
robbery and recognized defendant as the perpetrator. She noted that the perpetrator wore a black
ring on his left hand. Leach indicated that defendant always wore a black ring on his left ring
finger. Kayla Leach Bramble, who had known defendant for three months, also viewed the
videotape and recognized defendant as the perpetrator.
McDonald interviewed defendant on October 11, 2004. After waiving his Miranda1
rights, defendant told McDonald that he purchased a candy bar at the Citgo gas station on the
evening of September 18, 2004. When asked whether he purchased the candy bar during the first
visit or the second visit to the gas station, defendant stated that he was not going to “confess
anything.” McDonald drove defendant to and from Jackson, Michigan, for an interview on
January 10, 2005. Defendant initiated conversation about the robbery during both legs of the
trip. He denied any involvement in the robbery and indicated that his son and another man,
Chris Weiss, committed the robbery.
Defendant testified that he was not the person seen in the videotape of the robbery and
that he did not visit the Citgo gas station on September 18, 2004. He indicated that he told
McDonald that he purchased a candy bar at the gas station in an effort to protect his son, whom
defendant described as looking like his identical twin. Defendant indicated he had only seen
Elzinga twice in the past 20 years, and not since defendant was a child.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he committed
the armed robbery. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, we
“view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hunter, 466 Mich 1, 6; 643 NW2d 218 (2002).
Identity is an essential element of every criminal prosecution. People v Oliphant, 399
Mich 472, 489; 250 NW2d 443 (1976). The credibility of identification testimony is a question
of fact for the trier of fact. People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381 (2000). In
the present case, four separate individuals identified defendant as the perpetrator of the armed
robbery at the Citgo gas station on September 28, 2004. Tucker identified defendant at the
custodial lineup, while Leach, Leach Bramble, and McDonald identified defendant after
watching the videotape of the robbery. In addition, Tucker testified that the perpetrator
purchased a candy bar at the gas station approximately 45 minutes before robbing the gas station.
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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Defendant admitted to McDonald that he purchased a candy bar at the gas station the night of the
robbery. Further, defendant was present in the courtroom throughout trial. The jury was able to
view the videotape of the robbery as well as still prints taken from the videotape to compare
defendant’s appearance to the likeness of the perpetrator. Viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the perpetrator of the armed robbery.
Defendant also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at various
times throughout the proceedings before the trial court. Because defendant failed to move for a
new trial or for a Ginther2 hearing, our review of defendant’s claims is limited to mistakes
apparent on the record. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 38; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, “a defendant must prove that
his counsel’s performance was deficient and that, under an objective standard of reasonableness,
defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” People v Mack, 265 Mich App
122, 129; 695 NW2d 342 (2005). A defendant must also prove that his counsel’s deficient
performance was prejudicial to the extent that “but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different.” Id. Counsel is presumed to have provided effective
assistance, and the defendant bears a heavy burden to prove otherwise. Id.
Defendant first contends that defense counsel failed “to investigate his assertions as to
key prosecution witnesses.” But defendant fails to identify the alleged “assertions” that his
counsel failed to investigate. A defendant may not leave it to this Court to find the factual basis
for his position. People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 464; 628 NW2d 120 (2001), quoting
People v Norman, 184 Mich App 255, 262; 457 NW2d 136 (1990). A party’s failure to properly
address the merits of his argument constitutes abandonment of the issue. People v Harris, 261
Mich App 44, 50; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). Because defendant has abandoned this specific issue,
we decline to address it. Within the context of his argument, defendant also claims that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel lacked any trial strategy. It is
apparent from the record, however, that counsel acted with the strategy of attempting to present
the jury with reasonable doubt as to whether defendant was the perpetrator of the armed robbery.
We will not substitute our judgment for counsel’s on matters of trial strategy, nor will we assess
counsel’s performance with the benefit of hindsight. People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255;
631 NW2d 764 (2001). Defendant’s argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because counsel lacked trial strategy is without merit.
Second, defendant contends that defense counsel failed to move to suppress defendant’s
statements made to police officers during his custodial interrogations. Relying on Stephan v
State, 711 P2d 1156 (Alas, 1985), he asserts that counsel should have moved to suppress the
statements because the interviewing officers failed to make a recording of the interrogations.
But this court has held that the due process clause of the Michigan constitution does not require
interviewing officers to record custodial interrogations. People v Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 626628; 683 NW2d 687 (2004); People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 183-186; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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Accordingly, any motion by counsel to suppress defendant’s statements on the basis that the
interrogations were not recorded would have been futile. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to
make a futile motion. Fike, supra at 182.
Third, defendant asserts that defense counsel should have moved to suppress defendant’s
statements because the statements were not voluntarily made. The voluntariness of a statement
is determined by looking at the totality of the circumstances. People v Tierney, 266 Mich App
687, 708; 703 NW2d 204 (2005). There is no evidence on the record to support defendant’s
argument that his statements were involuntary. Although defendant has only a ninth-grade
education, he has significant experience with the criminal justice system, was advised of his
Miranda rights before each interview, and waived those rights in writing before the interview
regarding the robbery. In addition, the record indicates that defendant agreed to speak with the
police because he wanted to protect Tammy Elkins. Nothing in the record supports a finding that
defendant’s statements were involuntary. See People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429
NW2d 781 (1988) (listing factors to consider when determining whether a statement is
voluntary). Consequently, a motion to suppress defendant’s statements on the basis that they
were involuntary would have been futile. Fike, supra at 182.
Fourth, defendant argues that defense counsel failed to present mitigating factors at the
sentencing hearing. Specifically, defendant contends that counsel failed to call individuals who
made themselves available to speak on defendant’s behalf. Defendant, however, fails to identify
these persons or the substance of their proposed statements. Because a party’s failure to properly
address the merits of his argument constitutes abandonment of the issue, Harris, supra at 50, we
decline to address this issue.
For his final argument, defendant maintains that the sentence imposed is disproportionate
to the offense and the offender and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it is not
reasonably possible that he will live to serve his sentence. Because defendant failed to properly
preserve this issue by making an objection on this ground at sentencing, our review is limited to
plain error affecting defendant's substantial rights. See People v Sexton, 250 Mich App 211,
227- 228; 646 NW2d 875 (2002). After review of the record, we find no such error.
Defendant’s sentence falls within the sentencing guidelines' recommended range and
therefore it is presumptively proportionate. People v Drohan, 264 Mich App 77, 91-92; 689
NW2d 750 (2004). Given defendant’s act of robbing a gas station attendant at knifepoint and his
history of committing theft-type assaults, defendant has failed to overcome this presumption and,
because the sentence is not disproportionate in relation to the crime, it is not cruel or unusual.
People v Williams (After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 543; 499 NW2d 404 (1993); see also
Drohan, supra at 92. Defendant’s reliance on People v Moore, 432 Mich 311; 439 NW2d 684
(1989), for the proposition that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it
is not reasonably possible that he will serve his minimum sentence, is misplaced as Moore has
implicitly been overruled. See People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 257; 562 NW2d 447 (1997).
Because defendant’s sentence fell within the recommended sentence range under the legislative
guidelines, we affirm defendant’s sentence. See MCL 769.34(10) (this Court is required to
affirm sentences within the legislative guidelines range unless the trial court erred in scoring the
sentencing guidelines or relied on inaccurate information in sentencing defendant).
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Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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