IN RE SOLOMON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ISSAC SOLOMON, a/k/a ISSAC
BARBER, and IVORY SOLOMON, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, f/k/a
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 21, 2006
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
EBONY LATOYA SOLOMON, a/k/a EBONY
BARBER,
No. 267588
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-442516-NA
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Meter and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for additional proceedings.
Respondent’s parental rights to four-month-old Issac Solomon and his two-year-old
sister, Ivory, were terminated at the initial disposition just four months after the children were
removed from respondent’s home upon evidence that Issac had suffered non-accidental head
injuries. Although the perpetrator of the physical abuse suffered by Issac was never positively
identified, there was evidence that the abuse may have occurred while Issac was in the care of his
then-putative father, sixteen-year-old Rodney Barber, who was at that time living at the home of
a friend whom it is not disputed disliked and had previously threatened to harm respondent.
Citing respondent’s decision to leave Issac with Barber, as well as her failure to immediately
remove the child from Barber’s care after observing scratches on the child’s face, petitioner
asserted that the children should not be returned to respondent’s care because respondent was so
irresponsible with regard to Issac’s well-being that she was not fit to care for either of the
children. The trial court agreed and, after finding jurisdiction appropriate under MCL
712A.2(b)(1) and (2), terminated respondent’s parental rights to the minor children at the initial
disposition. On appeal respondent argues that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction of the
minor children and in finding statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights. Although
we find no error in the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, we agree that the evidence presented
in this matter was insufficient to warrant termination of respondent’s parental rights at this time.
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To properly exercise jurisdiction, a trial court must find that a statutory basis for
jurisdiction” has been established by a preponderance of the evidence. In re BZ, 264 Mich App
286, 295; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to exercise
jurisdiction for clear error in light of the trial court’s findings of fact. Id. Here, the trial court did
not err in finding that a preponderance of the evidence established its jurisdiction over the minor
children under both MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). MCR 3.972(C)(1). Contrary to respondent’s
assertion, it was shown by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent’s poor judgment and
carelessness with regard to Issac’s care resulted in the child sustaining serious injuries. Because
such evidence was sufficient to show neglect of the “care necessary for [the] health” of the
children, MCL 712A.2(b)(1), and that respondent’s home was “an unfit place for the juvenile[s]
to live in,” MCL 712A.2(b)(2), we reject respondent’s assertion that the trial court erred in
exercising jurisdiction over the minor children.
We agree, however, that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory grounds for
termination of respondent’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence.
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s decision terminating parental rights. MCR
3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). A finding qualifies as clearly
erroneous when, although evidence exists to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 42; 549
NW2d 353 (1996).
The trial court determined that termination of respondent’s rights was warranted under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), and (j). Subsections 19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), and (j) each
require clear and convincing evidence that there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the children
will be harmed, injured, or abused within the foreseeable future if placed in respondent’s home,
while subsection (g) requires that there be “no reasonable expectation” that respondent could
provide proper care or custody within a reasonable time considering the children’s age. We do
not find within the instant record clear and convincing evidence that the children would be so
harmed, or that respondent could not reasonably be expected to provide proper care or custody
for the children.
Petitioner did not argue, nor did the trial court find, that respondent inflicted the abuse
suffered by Issac. Rather, it was argued and concluded that termination was indicated because
respondent left the child with his young, putative father, and failed to immediately remove the
child from such care after observing scratches on the child’s face. However, while we agree that
respondent exercised poor judgment in entrusting Issac to Barber’s care, the record developed
during the short period between removal of the children from respondent’s care and termination
of her parental rights suggests that respondent otherwise provided suitable physical and
emotional care for the children prior to their removal from her care. Indeed, the emergency room
physician who examined and discovered Issac’s injuries testified that aside from the bruise and
scratches for which respondent sought treatment of her son, Issac appeared to be happy and well
cared for. And, regarding the scratches on Issac’s face, the Child Protective Services worker
assigned to this case, Jeff Jozsa, declined at trial to characterize respondent’s failure to more
immediately react to these injuries as “medical neglect.” Jozsa further testified that he believed
respondent acted “appropriately” upon discovering that the child had been bruised. Moreover,
the evidence established that by the time of trial Barber had been excluded as the possible father
of Issac, consequently, there was no reason to believe that respondent would again entrust Issac
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to Barber’s care. Additionally, because no efforts toward reunification were made during the
four-month proceeding, little was revealed about the personalities, abilities and propensities of
respondent. Under the circumstances, and considering the absence of any history or allegation of
respondent’s neglect of the physical or emotional needs of her children while in her care, we are
left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in finding that statutory grounds
for termination of respondent’s parental rights were established. Conley, supra.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for additional
proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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