JENNIFER HUNTER V OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE OF FLA INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JENNIFER HUNTER,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE OF FLORIDA, INC.,
No. 249947
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-803041-NO
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ROGER McDANIEL,
Defendant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., White and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order denying her motion for costs and attorney fees. We
affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument under MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging defendants violated the Elliot Larsen Civil
Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101. After a trial, a jury found that plaintiff was sexually
harassed and/or constructively discharged because of her gender, but it awarded no damages.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly refused to award her attorney fees and costs under
MCL 37.2802, part of the state Civil Rights Act. We disagree. We review a trial court’s
decision whether to make such an award for an abuse of discretion. Meyer v Center Line, 242
Mich App 560, 575; 619 NW2d 182 (2000).
The trial court correctly held that Meyer precluded it from awarding plaintiff attorney
fees and costs under MCL 37.2802. As part of its dispositive rationale, the Meyer panel stated
that a party “must be a ‘financially successful or prevailing party’ to be entitled to an award of
fees and costs under MCL 37.2802.” Meyer, supra, 242 Mich App at 576, quoting Dresselhouse
v Chrysler Corp, 177 Mich App 470, 483; 442 NW2d 705 (1989). The Meyer Court further
stated that a plaintiff “must receive at least some relief on the merits of plaintiff’s claim, such as
an award of damages, an injunction, or a declaratory judgment on a favorable consent decree or
settlement” to be considered a prevailing party. Id.
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Plaintiff is correct that Meyer did not provide an all-inclusive list of what would
constitute “some relief” that could be considered to render a plaintiff a prevailing party. But the
use of the phrase “such as” plainly indicates that relief must be comparable to the examples used
by the Meyer panel of the type of relief necessary for a plaintiff to be considered a prevailing
party. The common feature of these examples of circumstances in which a plaintiff may be
considered a prevailing party is that they all involve the provision of some tangible relief for
plaintiff. The judgment in this case provided no tangible relief to plaintiff given that, although it
stated that defendant was “liable” to plaintiff, it awarded no damages or other relief to her. Thus,
because plaintiff was not a financially successful or prevailing party in this case, Meyer required
the trial court to deny her request for attorney fees and costs under MCL 37.2802.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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