PEOPLE OF MI V JAMI NATURALITE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 14, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 250534
Chippewa Circuit Court
LC No. 00-007049-FH
JAMI NATURALITE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Griffin and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of extortion, MCL 750.213, and was sentenced as a
fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment. He1 appeals as
of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it did not
permit him to ask his accomplice, who entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to
testify truthfully against defendant, the length of sentence that could have been imposed for the
crime with which the accomplice was originally charged.2
We review an evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. People v Katt, 468 Mich 272,
278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). There is an abuse of discretion only “‘when the result is “so palpably
and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of
will, not the exercise of judgment but [the] defiance [of it] . . . .”’” People v Hine, 467 Mich
242, 250; 650 NW2d 659 (2002). However, because of the constitutional entitlement to confront
and cross-examine witnesses, the standard for finding an abuse of discretion is more rigorous
when the issue is the cross-examination of an accomplice witness concerning a grant of
1
Defendant is a male, although he refers to himself as “Miss Naturalite.”
2
We note that the comments made by defendant, who acted in propria persona, after the ruling
excluding the question, could be taken as acquiescing in the trial court’s ruling and, therefore,
due to an affirmative waiver, review of this issue is barred. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App
101, 111; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Because we resolve the issue on an alternative ground, we need
not address this ground for affirmance.
-1-
immunity given to secure the witness’s testimony. In such cases, it is clear error for the trial
court to deny the defendant the opportunity to elicit this information. People v Minor, 213 Mich
App 682, 684-685; 541 NW2d 576 (1995).
In this case, defendant was not denied that opportunity. Evidence was presented to the
jury that the accomplice received, as part of the plea bargain, a “delayed sentence” of twelve
months, and that, as explained by the accomplice, a delayed sentence essentially means no
sentence at all, contingent on his good behavior. This fact distinguishes the present case from
People v Bell, 88 Mich App 345; 276 NW2d 605 (1979), in which the defendant was denied the
opportunity to establish that the offense to which the accomplice was permitted to plead was one
for which the sentence could be limited to probation.
The fact that defendant was able to present evidence of the minimal nature of the
punishment the accomplice received under the plea agreement also serves to distinguish this case
from People v Mumford, 183 Mich App 149; 455 NW2d 51 (1990), in which the defendant was
not permitted to establish the gross disparity between the penalty for the charge the accomplice
originally faced, and that to which he was allowed to plead under the plea bargain. Similarly, it
distinguishes the instant case from Minor, supra, in which the defendant was not allowed to
inform the jury that the witness was granted immunity by the prosecution. In all of these cases,
the defendants were denied the opportunity to advise the jury that the witness, in exchange for
testifying, received extraordinarily lenient treatment that could have been a motivation to provide
untruthful testimony. Because this fact was presented to the jury in the instant case, the rule of
these cases was not violated.3
Next, defendant argues that the jury instruction concerning the elements of extortion was
improper. Specifically, he argues that the instruction that a threat may be conveyed in “general
or vague terms” had the potential to mislead the jury as to the elements of the crime – in
particular, whether a threat was made to publicly accuse the judge of having committed a crime –
and whether the extortionary letter (which was addressed to a third party) was meant to be seen
by the judge. We disagree.
We review claims of error as to criminal jury instructions de novo. People v Hubbard
(After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 487; 552 NW2d 493 (1996). In doing so, we read the
instructions as a whole, not piecemeal, and the key question is not whether they were absolutely
perfect, but whether “they fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected the
defendant’s rights.” People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 124; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
Under this standard, we find no error in the instruction. Taken as a whole, the
instructions clearly conveyed the elements of the crime and, in particular, the requirements that
defendant threatened to accuse the judge of a crime and intended that the judge give money or
take other action against his will. Therefore, the instructions were proper.
3
In light of this holding, we need not consider whether any error in limiting the crossexamination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the rule of Minor, supra at 685.
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
-3-
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