BEVERLY HEIKKILA V NORTH STAR TRUCKING INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BEVERLY HEIKKILA, as Personal
Representative of the ESTATE OF SHERI L.
WILLIAMS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 7, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 246761
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 00-011135-NI
v
NORTH STAR TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendant,
and
MARC ROLLAND SEVIGNY and J. R. PHILLIPS
TRUCKING, LTD.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
NORTH STAR STEEL CO.,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
INTERNATIONAL MILL SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant/Cross-DefendantAppellee.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and White and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this negligence action, plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition in favor of defendants. Plaintiff also appeals from the trial court’s ruling
excluding the testimony of three expert witnesses. We reverse the trial court’s ruling with
respect to the grant of summary disposition, but affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling.
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This case involved a fatal accident in which plaintiff’s decedent, Sheri Williams, was
struck in the head by an object as she drove her car. Plaintiff’s theory is that a piece of slag1 had
been lodged in the tires of a truck driven by defendant Marc Rolland Sevingy (“Sevigny”), and
owned by defendant J. R. Phillips Trucking Ltd. (“Phillips”). This truck was hauling slag from a
steel mill owned by defendant North Star Steel Company (“North Star”). Although the facility
was owned by North Star, defendant International Mill Service, Inc., (“IMS”), contracted with
North Star to handle the slag-hauling portion of the job. Plaintiff claimed negligence against all
defendants.2
In granting summary disposition, the trial court ruled that plaintiff could not establish that
defendants’ actions served as the proximate cause of the decedent’s injuries. In Lysogorski v
Charter Twp of Bridgeport, 256 Mich App 297, 298-299; 662 NW2d 108 (2003), this Court
restated the standard of review applicable to a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10):
We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint,
and the court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
other evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. The entire
lower-court record must be reviewed, and if the evidence fails to establish a
genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. [Citations omitted.]
“To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must be able to prove four
elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3)
causation, and (4) damages.” Haliw v City of Sterling Hts, 464 Mich 297, 309-310; 627 NW2d
581 (2001). “Proof of causation requires both cause in fact and legal, or proximate, cause.” Id.
at 310, citing Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
In Skinner, supra at 164-165, our Supreme Court addressed the requisite degree of proof
a plaintiff must satisfy to survive summary disposition on the issue of proximate cause:
To be adequate, a plaintiff’s circumstantial proof must facilitate
reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation. In Kaminski v Grand
Trunk W R Co, 347 Mich 417, 422; 79 NW2d 899 (1956), this Court highlighted
the basic legal distinction between a reasonable inference and impermissible
conjecture with regard to causal proof:
“As a theory of causation, a conjecture is simply an
explanation consistent with known facts or conditions, but not
1
“Slag” is defined as “the more or less completely fused and vitrified matter separated during the
reduction of a metal from its ore.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1997), p 1212.
2
North Star’s indemnity claim against IMS is not at issue here.
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deducible from them as a reasonable inference. There may be 2 or
more plausible explanations as to how an event happened or what
produced it; yet, if the evidence is without selective application to
any 1 of them, they remain conjectures only. On the other hand, if
there is evidence which points to any 1 theory of causation,
indicating a logical sequence of cause and effect, then there is a
juridical basis for such a determination, notwithstanding the
existence of other plausible theories with or without support in the
evidence.”
We want to make clear what it means to provide circumstantial evidence
that permits a reasonable inference of causation. As Kaminski explains, at a
minimum, a causation theory must have some basis in established fact. However,
a basis in only slight evidence is not enough. Nor is it sufficient to submit a
causation theory that, while factually supported, is, at best, just as possible as
another theory. Rather, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence from which
a jury may conclude that more likely than not, but for the defendant’s conduct, the
plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred.
Here, there is no question that Williams’ injuries were caused when something struck her
windshield, dash board and steering wheel, and then her head, continuing through the car until it
exited through the rear window. Spencer Maniaci, who was driving behind Williams, witnessed
this, and indicated that the object was less than a foot in size, and irregularly shaped. Maniaci
believed the object that struck Williams bounced off her trunk and came to a stop near the curb.
R. Matthew Brach, one of defendants’ experts, explained that, based on the force and
trajectory of the object which struck Williams, it was doubtful that the object merely fell off a
truck. Responding to plaintiff’s counsel’s rhetorical question as to whether the object “fell from
the sky,” Brach also explained that such a conclusion was also not possible. In fact, Brach stated
that the only possibility he was aware of was that the object was thrown from the tires of
Sevigny’s truck.
Considering evidence that the object that struck Williams did so as her car passed
Sevigny’s truck, Maniaci’s testimony that he saw the object fly by Williams’ car, and Brach’s
interpretation of the trajectory that an object went through Williams’ car, from the windshield
through the rear window, we find that plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence to suggest that,
more likely than not, the object probably was thrown from the truck, as opposed to falling off the
truck, or falling from the sky, or coming from anywhere else. Skinner, supra, cautions against
allowing a jury to base its decision on conjecture, which is merely guessing between two
plausible explanations where there is nothing to suggest that either explanation has more force.
In this case, based on this evidence, the only legitimate explanation appears to be that the object
was hurled by Sevigny’s tires towards Williams’ car. Even if there were other explanations, the
trajectory and velocity of the object, as well as the timing of the accident, make it more probable
than not that the object was thrown from Sevigny’s tires.
Moreover, we find that plaintiff has satisfied her burden of showing that the object was
more likely than not a piece of slag from North Star’s facility. Corporal Brett C. Ansel, of the
Michigan State Police, investigated the accident scene. Ansel identified what he believed was
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the object that struck Williams; the object was large and it was in the roadway. However, it was
later determined that the object was composed of concrete, and not slag. Despite this, Ansel
continued to believe that Williams was struck by slag. Ansel testified that he felt Williams’
steering wheel, and felt a gritty substance that was similar in feel to the grit he felt when he
handled a piece of slag.
Plaintiff’s expert, Scott Stoeffler, provided an affidavit in which he explained that he
inspected Williams’ car and took samples for analysis. Based on his inspection of the material
he took from Williams’ car, Stoeffler opined “that more likely than not, the object that went
through Ms. Williams’ vehicle was composed primarily of carbon or alloy steel and was not a
rock, stone or piece of concrete.” This opinion bolsters plaintiff’s theory that the object was
slag, and not the concrete found at the scene.
Moreover, gouge marks found on the pavement suggest that the object was lodged in the
truck’s tires at the time the truck left North Star’s facility. Lieutenant Danny Richards of the
Michigan State Police was deposed about the gouge marks he found at the crash scene. Richards
and Ansel found gouge marks that were “about ten feet, eight inches apart.” These gouge marks
ran parallel to the centerline of the roadway, in the inside lane, and followed the path of
Sevigny’s truck. Richards testified that the gouge marks were traceable back to North Star’s
facility. Ansel also observed that the marks entered North Star’s facility. The gouges ended
where the broken glass was found in the roadway at the accident scene. The gouges also
“appeared . . . that they were very fresh.” Sevigny’s co-worker Dean Rioux saw the grooves in
the westbound travel lane of the road. According to Rioux, the marks “almost looked like they
started almost immediately as he left the North Star Gate.” And the marks did not continue
beyond where Williams’ car had gone off the road.
Thus, plaintiff has provided evidence from which a jury could conclude that an object
was wedged between Sevigny’s trailer tires. The gouge marks were made on the path Sevigny
traveled, from North Star’s facility to the location of the accident. The gouge marks were
“fresh,” and evenly spaced a distance roughly equal to the circumference of a trailer tire.
Moreover, despite the fact that no slag was found, and that the object initially believed to be the
object that struck Williams turned out to be concrete, there is evidence that suggests the object
that struck Williams was, in fact, slag.
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that plaintiff has
presented sufficient evidence to indicate a “reasonable likelihood of probability” that defendants’
actions served as the proximate cause of Williams’ death. Skinner, supra at 166. Plaintiff’s
theory of the case is more than mere conjecture or speculation as those terms are used in Skinner
as there is evidence to support this theory. Moreover, plaintiff’s theory does not appear to be
“just as possible as another theory” because there is no other theory which accounts for an object
of metal composition to be thrown with the velocity necessary to travel through Williams’ car as
it did. We note that Skinner also cautions against requiring “absolute certainty,” id., and
conclude that plaintiff has satisfied the evidentiary threshold.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Sevigny and Phillips
owed no duty to Williams, as the harm allegedly suffered was not foreseeable. Questions
regarding duty are for the court to decide as a matter of law, Harts v Farmers Ins Exchange, 461
Mich 1, 6; 597 NW2d 47 (1999), and are subject to de novo review, Benejam v Detroit Tigers,
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Inc, 246 Mich App 645, 648; 635 NW2d 219 (2001). If there is no duty, summary disposition is
proper. Howe v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 219 Mich App 150, 156; 555 NW2d 738 (1996).
However, if factual questions exist regarding what characteristics giving rise to a duty are
present, the issue must be submitted to the factfinder. Id.
“Duty” is a legally recognized obligation to conform to a particular standard of conduct
toward another. Id. at 155. A duty of care may be specific, owing to the plaintiff by the
defendant, or general, owing by the defendant to the public. Cipri v Bellingham Frozen Foods,
Inc, 235 Mich App 1, 15; 596 NW2d 620 (1999). The analysis to determine whether a duty
exists as a matter of law requires
a determination whether the relationship of the parties is the sort that a legal
obligation should be imposed on one for the benefit of another. In determining
whether a duty exists, courts examine different variables, including
“foreseeability of the harm, existence of a relationship between the
parties involved, degree of certainty of injury, closeness of
connection between the conduct and the injury, moral blame
attached to the conduct, policy of preventing future harm, and the
burdens and consequences of imposing a duty and the resulting
liability for breach.” [Graves v Warner Bros, 253 Mich App 486,
492-493; 656 NW2d 195 (2002) (internal citations omitted), citing
Krass v Tri-County Security Inc, 233 Mich App 661, 668-669; 593
NW2d 578 (1999).]
Here, the facts developed during discovery were directed primarily at the issue of foreseeability.
In discussing the hazards associated with the roadways at North Star, plaintiff relies on
the testimony of several people who were familiar with them. Sevigny found that the roadways
there were “not good” as “there’s a lot of [slag] laying all over the place.” Sevigny agreed with
plaintiff’s counsel that if he picked up a piece of slag between his tires, it would cause a
hazardous condition. Sevigny visually inspected the tires before he left; he looked at them from
behind, and he checked to make sure there was nothing between them. Sevigny also kicked the
tires to see if they were flat. Sevigny knew that other drivers use a rod to check if their tires were
flat; however, Sevigny knew of no other way, other than a visual inspection, to insure that there
was no object between his tires. After Sevigny initially loaded the truck, he noticed a piece of
slag between the wheels of his fourth axle, which he removed. Sevigny rechecked his tires after
he offloaded some slag. However, he did not check his tires after he reweighed his rig.
Therefore, Sevigny drove his truck through the facility from the slag pile to the weigh station,
and onto Front Street without checking his tires for any slag that might have been picked up
between these two points.
Other witnesses offered different opinions. Dave Sterns, a crane operator with IMS,
observed Sevigny pull a piece of slag from the truck tires while at North Star before the accident.
Sterns told the police that it was common for drivers to pick up pieces of slag while driving on
the facility grounds. But this observation was contradicted by Richard Hahey, a superintendent
at IMS, who stated it was uncommon. Sterns added that most drivers were conscientious about
checking their axles before leaving.
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James Jonasen testified that he never saw pieces of debris on the roadways at North Star.
However, Jonasen acknowledged that a large piece of slag on the roadway could be dangerous.
He stated that “a piece of material the right size could be lodged in-between tires anywhere, yes,
at any time and come out at any time.” On the other hand, Rioux testified that “there’s lots of
debris” at the facility. Ronald Cutter testified that he was aware that removal of slag was an
issue. Cutter acknowledged that the facility’s roads were typical of a foundry’s roads, in that
there was “scrap laying alongside the track and stone on the road and things.” Although Cutter
never damaged his vehicle there, he noted that IMS “always had a sweeper running through
there.” However, Cutter also admitted that “for the most part it was fairly clean.” David Suttles
corroborated Cutter’s testimony that the roads were clean. Suttles testified that the roads were in
“fairly good shape” when he drove them. During his deposition, Suttles agreed with plaintiff’s
counsel that a piece of slag six inches in diameter would pose a safety concern. However,
Suttles was unaware that anyone ever found such a piece of slag lying on the roadway.
Moreover, there was testimony about how a driver should guard against the possibility of
picking up an object between his or her tires. Rioux stated that he checks his tires every time he
loads or unloads the vehicle because the debris could cause a flat tire or a hazardous condition if
caught between the tires; Rioux believed that checking tires is “common sense.” Hahey also
indicated that the drivers in the facility check their tires. Hahey noted that a “good operator”
checks his vehicle every time he stops, to guard against “failures, oil leaks, stuff like that.” Such
a search also includes looking at tires, and checking between dual tires.
Looking at these facts, the issue of the foreseeability depends on the conditions of the
road. We find that plaintiff has created a genuine issue of fact as to the condition of the
roadway. Some of the witnesses testified that the conditions at the plant were dangerous, as slag
and debris were frequently on the roadway, creating a factual dispute as to whether it was
foreseeable that slag or other debris could become wedged between the truck drivers’ tires.
Moreover, the fact that IMS was concerned enough to sweep the premises for such slag suggests
that errant pieces of slag posed a safety hazard. In addition, the fact that Sevigny removed a
piece of slag from his tires shortly before the accident suggests that it was foreseeable that
another piece of slag could become lodged in the tires.
We decline to determine the parameters of Sevigny’s duty as a matter of law because
factual questions exist regarding what characteristics giving rise to a duty are present. We point
out that several witnesses testified that the North Star facility was kept in a clean manner, and
that Sevigny inspected his tires before he initially weighed the truck. However, there is also no
dispute that Sevigny did not check his tires after he drove through North Star’s facility before he
left. Because there is a question as to the conditions of the road, and whether Sevigny satisfied
any duty by inspecting his tires, we conclude that the issue of Sevigny’s duty, and therefore
Phillips’ duty, is properly an issue for the jury to resolve. Howe, supra at 156.
Finally, defendant agues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of three of
plaintiff’s expert witnesses: Thomas Bereza, Howard J. Bosscher and Jonathan Crane. The trial
court ruled that these witnesses’ testimony “lack[ed] the requisite evidentiary basis for want of
specialization, scientific knowledge removing the testimony from the ambit of speculation.”
Testimony is admissible under MRE 702 if (1) the witness is qualified as an expert in a pertinent
field; (2) the witness’ testimony is relevant, or “will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue”; and (3) the testimony is derived from “recognized
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scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691, 711; 456
NW2d 391 (1990).
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court decision as to whether a particular
witness qualifies as an expert. In re Wentworth, 251 Mich App 560, 562-563; 651 NW2d 773
(2002). Here, plaintiff fails to offer evidence establishing that these witnesses are qualified to
offer expert opinions. The portion of the deposition transcripts submitted by plaintiff fail to set
out these witnesses’ qualifications. Although Bosscher was a former director of safety at a
trucking company, there was nothing else to suggest what his educational or experiential
background involved. Moreover, there was nothing to suggest what Bereza’s and Crane’s
qualifications were. Plaintiff’s brief merely includes a conclusory statement that “plaintiff’s
experts were clearly qualified to testify and were versed in a recognized discipline.”
As to the second requirement, that these witnesses’ testimony “will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” plaintiff similarly fails to show how
that is the case. No evidence was presented to establish that this testimony would provide
“recognized scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge,” as is required under MRE 702.
Rather, plaintiff’s response is that these witnesses based their proffered testimony on common
sense. For this reason alone, these witnesses should not be allowed to testify as experts.
[A]s a prerequisite to the admission of expert testimony, “there must be
knowledge [by the expert] in a particular area that “belongs more to an expert
than to the common man,” i.e., if the jury is in as good a position as the expert to
determine intelligibly the issue involved without enlightenment from those with a
specialized understanding of the subject, then the expert should not be permitted
to express his opinion. [Franzel v Kerr Mfg Co, 234 Mich App 600, 621; 600
NW2d 66 (1999), quoting Cirner v Tru-Valu Credit Union, 171 Mich App 163,
168-169; 429 NW2d 820 (1988).]
In this case, the “common sense” testimony offered by these witnesses is just as much in the
purview of the jurors as with these experts. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding these expert witnesses’ testimony.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
defendants, and affirm the trial court’s evidentiary ruling regarding the challenged expert witness
testimony.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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