EUGENE BROWN V CITY OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EUGENE BROWN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 249735
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-114482 CZ
CITY OF DETROIT, BENNY NAPOLEON,
WALTER SHOULDERS, and the DETROIT
BOARD OF POLICE COMMISSIONERS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor
of defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue as to any material fact). We affirm.
Plaintiff is an officer with the Detroit Police Department (DPD) whose history of
shootings in the line of duty attracted widespread media attention beginning in May 2000. On
April 30, 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants City of Detroit, Detroit Board of
Police Commissioners, Benny Napoleon, and Walter Shoulders, alleging 1) defamation, 2) false
light invasion of privacy, 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), 4) deprivation of
due process under the Michigan Constitution, 5) equal protection violation under the Michigan
Constitution, and 6) discrimination under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL
37.2101 et seq. Defendant Napoleon was police chief at the time in question and defendant
Shoulders was a deputy chief who headed a committee reinvestigating plaintiff’s shootings. The
litigants refer to the committee’s internal report as the Shoulders Report.
Defendants moved for summary disposition, and the trial court granted the motion,
dismissing plaintiff’s defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and IIED claims under MCR
2.116(C)(10). The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s equal protection and civil rights claims
because plaintiff waived those claims by failing to argue and brief them. Finally, the trial court
dismissed plaintiff’s due process claim on collateral estoppel grounds, ruling that the claim was
barred by the disposition of plaintiff’s federal case. See Brown v Detroit, 259 F Supp 2d 611
(ED Mich, 2003).
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We review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion brought under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. Downey v Charlevoix Co Bd of Co Rd
Comm’rs, 227 Mich App 621, 625; 576 NW2d 712 (1998). The pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions, and any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties must be
considered by the court when ruling on a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10). MCR
2.116(G)(5); id., 626. When reviewing a decision on a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10), we “must consider the documentary evidence presented to the trial court ‘in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc (After
Remand), 463 Mich 534, 538-539; 620 NW2d 836 (2001), citing Harts v Farmers Ins Exchange,
461 Mich 1, 5; 597 NW2d 47 (1999).
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his due process claim on the
basis of collateral estoppel. On appeal, plaintiff has failed to argue the merits of his claim of
error. Furthermore, plaintiff does not cite legal authority to support his claim of error. To
properly present an appeal, an appellant must argue the merits of the issues he identifies in his
statement of the questions involved. Richmond Twp v Erbes, 195 Mich App 210, 220; 489
NW2d 504 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds, Bechtold v Morris, 443 Mich 105, 108109; 503 NW2d 654 (1993). A party may not merely announce his position and leave it to this
Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims or unravel and elaborate for him his
arguments. Wilson v Taylor, 457 Mich 232, 243; 577 NW2d 100 (1998). An appellant’s failure
to properly address the merits of his assertion of error constitutes abandonment of the issue. Yee
v Shiawassee County Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). Because
plaintiff has abandoned this issue, we need not address the issue and decline to do so.
Plaintiff’s next issue concerns governmental immunity. According to plaintiff, defendant
Shoulders was not shielded by governmental immunity1 because his conduct amounted to gross
negligence and he was not a high level governmental authority. The applicability of
governmental immunity is a question of law which this Court reviews de novo on appeal. Baker
v Waste Mgt of Michigan, Inc, 208 Mich App 602, 605; 528 NW2d 835 (1995).
Plaintiff’s suggestion that defendant Shoulders is only protected by governmental
immunity if he is a high level authority is incorrect. The governmental immunity statute, MCL
691.1407, provides that “immunity from tort liability” extends to “each officer and employee of
a governmental agency” if the following conditions are met:
1
The trial court determined that plaintiff waived its governmental immunity arguments with
respect to defendants City of Detroit, Napoleon, and the Detroit Board of Police Commissioners.
To the extent that plaintiff argues on appeal that defendants City of Detroit, Napoleon, and the
Detroit Board of Police Commissioners were not shielded from plaintiff’s claims by
governmental immunity, this argument has been abandoned because plaintiff’s arguments on
appeal are limited to the application of governmental immunity to defendant Shoulders. An
appellant who fails to properly address the merits of his assertion of error has abandoned the
issue. Yee, supra, 406.
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(a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer. is acting or reasonably believes
he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
governmental function.
(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct does not amount
to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used
in this subdivision, ‘gross negligence’ means conduct so reckless as to
demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. [MCL
691.1407(2).]
Plaintiff’s argument on appeal relates only to MCL 691.1407(2)(c). Plaintiff contends
that defendant Shoulder’s conduct constituted gross negligence and that the trial court
disregarded plaintiff’s evidence of gross negligence. In fact, while the trial court ultimately
granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s tort claims for reasons we will
discuss below, the trial court, mindful of its duty to consider the evidence in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party in considering a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), held that a reasonable juror could have found that defendant’s conduct constituted
gross negligence. The trial court specifically observed: “[Plaintiff] contends that Defendants
orchestrated a campaign of misinformation to brand him a killer cop, going so far as to invent
stories about him. We believe that a reasonable juror could find that such conduct evinces a
substantial disregard for injury.” We therefore conclude that the record simply does not support
plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred in disregarding plaintiff’s evidence of gross
negligence.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his defamation claim under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Because plaintiff is a police officer and the allegedly defamatory statements
concerned his conduct as a police officer, plaintiff is a public figure. Tomkiewicz v Detroit
News, Inc, 246 Mich App 662, 671, 676; 635 NW2d 36 (2001). A public figure claiming
defamation must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the publication was a defamatory
falsehood and that it was made with actual malice through knowledge of its falsity or through
reckless disregard for its truth. MCL 600.2911(6); see also Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App
611, 624; 617 NW2d 351 (2000).
This Court defines actual malice in the following way:
Actual malice is defined as knowledge that the published statement was false or
as reckless disregard as to whether the statement was false or not. Reckless
disregard for the truth is not established merely by showing that the statements
were made with preconceived objectives or insufficient investigation.
Furthermore, ill will, spite or even hatred, standing alone, do not amount to actual
malice. Reckless disregard is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man
would have published or would have investigated before publishing, but by
whether the publisher in fact entertained serious doubts concerning the truth of the
statements published. [Kefgen, supra, 624 (citations and internal punctuation
omitted).]
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Whether evidence is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law.
Id., 624-625. On a motion for summary disposition, the court must determine whether the
evidence is sufficient for a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. Id., 625 (citation omitted). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that:
produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth
of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty
and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. . . . Evidence may be
uncontroverted, and yet not be clear and convincing. . . . Conversely, evidence
may be clear and convincing despite the fact that it has been contradicted. [Id.
(citations and quotations omitted).]
We conclude that plaintiff failed to establish actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. Plaintiff claims on appeal that defendant Shoulders manufactured evidence in the
Shoulders Report and that Shoulders had “serious doubts regarding the truth of his findings and
published statements in the ‘Shoulders Report.’” Our review of the record does not reveal any
evidence that would establish that defendant Shoulders’ investigation was so lacking that
defendant Shoulders either knew the statements in the report were false or had serious doubts
regarding whether statements in the report were false. “A general allegation of malice is
insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Glazer v Lamkin, 201 Mich App 432,
436; 506 NW2d 570 (1993). We therefore find that the trial court did not err in dismissing
plaintiff’s defamation claim based on plaintiff’s failure to establish a genuine issue of material
fact regarding whether defendant Shoulders acted with actual malice. For the same reason, we
also reject plaintiff’s claims that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition of plaintiff’s false light invasion of privacy and IIED claims. Both claims also
require a showing of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Ireland v Edwards, 230
Mich App 607, 624; 584 NW2d 632 (1998). Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual
malice, these claims were properly subject to dismissal along with plaintiff’s defamation claim.
Plaintiff finally argues that the trial court erred because it did not read the Shoulders
Report firsthand. Neither party submitted a copy of the Shoulders Report as documentary
evidence supporting or opposing summary disposition. Once the moving party has supported its
claim for summary disposition, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present documentary
evidence establishing the existence of a material fact. Willis v Deerfield Twp, 257 Mich App
541, 550; 669 NW2d 279 (2003). If plaintiff desired for the trial court to read the Shoulders
Report, he should have submitted it as documentary evidence. Moreover, in denying plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration, the trial court indicated that plaintiff had detailed the contents of the
Shoulders Report and it had accepted as true plaintiff’s version of the report. Furthermore, the
trial court had the benefit of the news articles that plaintiff alleged published the contents of the
Shoulders Report. Whatever the Shoulders Report contained that plaintiff did not present in one
form or another to the trial court presumably was not published and therefore would be irrelevant
for purposes of plaintiff’s defamation claim. The trial court did not err in failing to read a
document that neither party submitted for its consideration.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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