LINDA LEONARD V HARTFIELD ENTERPRISES INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LINDA LEONARD,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 249381
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-042397-NO
v
HARTFIELD ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a
HARTFIELD LANES,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Kelly and H Hood*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting defendant summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse and remand.
On November 17, 2000, at approximately 8:00 p.m., plaintiff and her husband arrived at
defendant’s bowling establishment where they met a group of eight to ten people to celebrate a
friend’s birthday. The group had bowled several frames on the lane before plaintiff arrived.
Plaintiff approached the lane, wearing her own bowling shoes, and carrying her own bowling
ball. Plaintiff slipped and fell, injuring her left elbow and arm.
Upon notification of plaintiff’s fall, defendant’s general manager completed an incident
report. Although Plaintiff attributed her fall to an oily or waxy substance on the lane approach,
the general manager did not feel or see any unusual substance and did not order that the area be
cleaned. Plaintiff’s friends continued to bowl in the same lane without incident after plaintiff
was injured.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary disposition.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Rose v Nat’l
Auction Group, Inc, 466 Mich 453, 461; 646 NW2d 455 (2002). When reviewing a decision
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), “we consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.” Id. Summary disposition is appropriately granted, “if there is no genuine
issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Id.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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“To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) a
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causation, and (4)
damages.” Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000) (footnote
omitted). The duty owed by a property owner to a visitor is dependent on the status of the
visitor, and a person who enters another’s property for commercial or business purposes is
considered an invitee. O’Donnell v Garasic, 259 Mich App 569, 573; 676 NW2d 213 (2003). A
premises owner owes to an invitee a duty of reasonable care from unreasonable risks of harm
caused by dangerous conditions on the property. Mann v Shusteric Enterprises, Inc, 470 Mich
320, 328; 683 NW2d 573 (2004). An owner is liable for an injury resulting from a dangerous
condition on the premises if the condition was caused by the “active negligence” of the
defendant or its employees, or the defendant or its employees either knew of the condition or
should have known about the condition. Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 419; 634 NW2d
347 (2001). Notice may be inferred from evidence that the dangerous condition existed for such
a duration of time in which a reasonably prudent owner would have discovered the hazard. Id.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider as evidence the
presumption that the maintenance records that defendant “destroyed” after the trial commenced
should be construed to show that defendant failed to inspect and clean the lane approach area on
the day of plaintiff’s injury. There was evidence that a former employee with no connection to
the events in question took the records upon leaving his employ with defendant. Immediately
after plaintiff’s fall, defendant’s general manager prepared an incident report detailing the
circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s injury and identifying the time of the last inspection of the
lane approach area and the name of the employee who performed the inspection. Given the trial
court’s ruling that plaintiff’s claim was speculative, we can infer that the trial court found that
defendant had a reasonable excuse for failing to produce the maintenance records and that such
records would have contained cumulative information that was present in the incident report.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to apply the presumption.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in finding that the evidence as a whole was
insufficient to sustain plaintiff’s claim. There was no evidence that an unsafe condition on the
lane approach was the result of the negligence of one of defendant’s employees, that defendant
was aware of the alleged dangerous condition, or that defendant should have been aware of the
alleged dangerous condition. Plaintiff was uncertain of the exact substance that caused her to
slip and fall. While wax or oil on the approach area could have caused plaintiff to fall, it is also
possible that plaintiff could have fallen from a substance on the bottom of her bowling shoes or
from crossing the foul line onto the oily or waxy lane. Specifically, plaintiff failed to prove that
the slippery substance had been on the lane approach for a time period long enough to require
defendant’s employees to discover it. The incident report indicated that the lane approach areas
were inspected and cleaned at approximately 4:00 p.m., and plaintiff’s accident occurred at
approximately 8:00 p.m. There was additional evidence that an employee cleaned the approach
area a second time shortly before plaintiff fell, and before and after plaintiff’s fall, plaintiff’s
friends bowled in the same area without incident. There must exist more than the mere
possibility that defendant’s action or inaction caused plaintiff’s injury. See Latham v Nat’l Car
Rental Sys, 239 Mich App 330, 342; 608 NW2d 66 (2000).
Despite the arguably speculative nature of plaintiff’s claim, we find that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff’s friend testified during her deposition that plaintiff
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slipped “well before,” “roughly a couple feet” before the foul line. Another bowler, who was
using the lane adjacent to the lane plaintiff used, testified that plaintiff had stepped over the foul
line onto the lane before she fell. Plaintiff denied having crossed the foul line and maintained
that she fell on the lane approach. Because the lane itself is oiled or conditioned, and the lane
approach is not, the location of plaintiff’s fall is material. There exists a genuine issue of
material fact about whether plaintiff slipped and fell on the lane approach or the lane itself, and
we hold that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary disposition. We reverse and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
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