IN RE WHITSEY/KNIGHT MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
________________________________________
In the Matter of BAYINNA WHITSEY and
THERETIUS KNIGHT, Minors.
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2004
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250405
Muskegon Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 91-018349-NA
YIN YIN ROSS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
QUITMAN WHITSEY and THERETIUS
KNIGHT,
Respondents.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Gage and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor children upon her execution of a voluntary release of her parental
rights. We affirm.
Respondent-appellant argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights
based upon her voluntary release because it did not follow the procedures set forth in MCL
710.29(5) when determining whether respondent-appellant was releasing her rights knowingly
and voluntarily. We disagree. This Court reviews the trial court’s investigation of whether a
respondent’s voluntary release of parental rights is made voluntarily and knowingly for an abuse
of discretion. In re Blankenship, 165 Mich App 706, 714; 418 NW2d 919 (1988).
Petitioner sought the involuntary termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c), (g) and (j), alleging that respondent-appellant continued to use
controlled substances and failed to maintain stable employment, housing and consistent
visitation. At the termination hearing, respondent-appellant told the trial court that she believed
that her parental rights were going to be terminated and signed a release of her parental rights. In
doing so, respondent-appellant conceded that the trial court would be able to find a statutory
basis for the termination of her parental rights and that the termination would not be clearly
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contrary to the best interests of the children after the termination hearing. In re Toler, 193 Mich
App 474, 477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992). However, respondent-appellant’s decision to consent to
the termination of her parental rights did not transfer the proceeding from the juvenile code to the
adoption code and the trial court was not required to follow the requirements set forth in MCL
710.29. Id.
A review of the record reveals that the trial court carefully and extensively investigated
respondent-appellant’s understanding of her parental rights and properly determined her
willingness to release those rights. The trial court first questioned respondent-appellant and read
the release form to her, asking if she understood and agreed with each paragraph. Respondentappellant agreed with and admitted that she understood each paragraph that the trial court read.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting respondent-appellant’s
voluntary release of parental rights.
Respondent-appellant also argues that the trial court should not have terminated her
parental rights because it did not take into account the best interests of the child who was over
five years of age at the time of the termination pursuant to MCL 710.29(6). We disagree. As
discussed above, the trial court was operating under the juvenile code and was not obligated to
follow the statutory requirements of MCL 710.29(6). Although the trial court did not expressly
address the issue of the children’s best interests pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(5), termination was
required in this case because the evidence did not show that termination of respondentappellant’s parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In
re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the trial court did not err
in terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights to the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
I concur in the result only.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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