PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER EDDINGS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249419
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-002131-01
MAURICE FERRELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249421
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-002131-02
CHRISTOPHER EDDINGS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Kelly and H. Hood*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this consolidated appeal, defendant, Maurice Ferrell, appeals as of right his jury
convictions of felony murder, MCL 750.316, second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,1 assault with
intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b. We affirm. Defendant, Christopher Eddings, appeals as of right his jury
convictions of felony murder, MCL 750.316, and assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL
750.89. We affirm.
1
At the sentencing hearing, defendant Ferrell’s motion to dismiss his conviction of seconddegree murder was granted in light of his conviction of felony murder.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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On appeal, defendant Ferrell first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support
his felony murder conviction because a rational jury could not find the elements of assault with
intent to rob while armed proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the charged predicate
felony of the felony murder charge was larceny or attempted larceny, not assault with intent to
rob. And, after review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. See People v Bowman, 254
Mich App 142, 151; 656 NW2d 835 (2002).
A felony murder conviction requires the prosecutor to prove: (1) the killing of a human
being, (2) with the intent to kill, intent to do great bodily harm, or intent to create a very high risk
of death or great bodily harm while having knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the
likely result, (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or aiding in the commission of any of
the felonies delineated in MCL 750.316(1)(b), which includes larceny or attempted larceny.
People v Hutner, 209 Mich App 280, 282-283; 530 NW2d 174 (1995). Larceny is the actual or
constructive taking of another person’s goods or property, carrying them away, with a felonious
intent, and without the consent and against the will of the owner. People v Cain, 238 Mich App
95, 120; 605 NW2d 28 (1999), citing People v Anderson, 7 Mich App 513, 516; 152 NW2d 40
(1967). Attempt to commit a crime requires proof of an attempt to commit a crime and any act
beyond mere preparation in furtherance of the commission of the intended offense. MCL
750.92; People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149, 164; 631 NW2d 694 (2001).
Here, the evidence presented included both preliminary examination testimony, which
was admitted pursuant to MRE 801(d)(1)(A), and eyewitness trial testimony. In particular,
Vincent Turner testified at the preliminary exam that he heard defendant Eddings say on the day
before the murder that he wanted to “hit a lick,” or rob the victim, David Young. See People v
Chavies, 234 Mich App 274, 281-282; 593 NW2d 655 (1999). At trial, Atron Wilson and Royce
Mackey testified to seeing defendant Ferrell enter a vehicle with defendant Eddings and Yolanda
Gipson near the location of the shooting on the night of the shooting. Gipson testified at the
preliminary exam that she drove defendants to Kentfield, the street where Young resided, and
observed a man shoveling snow. See id. She parked her car a few houses down from Young’s
house, and defendants exited her car. She then heard gunshots and saw defendants jogging back
toward her car. As defendants entered the vehicle, Gipson saw defendant Ferrell place
something in his coat. Gipson drove away.
At trial, Young’s neighbor, Brittany Jones, testified that, on the evening of the murder,
she looked through a window of her house and observed Young shoveling snow in his driveway.
Shortly thereafter, Jones saw defendant Ferrell pointing a gun at Young. She testified that
Young had his hands in the air, was backing away and told defendant Ferrell to put down the
gun. Jones also testified that she told her mother that defendant Ferrell was “robbing” Young in
his backyard and told the emergency telephone operator that her neighbor was being “robbed.”
Jones testified that she heard gunshots. She also testified that she had no doubt that defendant
Ferrell was the gunman because she had seen his face. Another of Young’s neighbors, Doretha
Burks, testified at trial that, while she was outside shoveling snow, she saw a gunman holding a
gun to Young’s head. She also testified that she saw Young with his hands in the air backing
away from the gunman and later heard gunshots. Gipson testified at the preliminary exam that
defendant Eddings could not give her $5 before they went for the ride that night. However, after
the events on Kentfield, she drove defendants to Margarita where defendant Eddings purchased
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marijuana and later gave Gipson $3. From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found
the elements of the predicate felony of larceny proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Next, defendant Ferrell argues that the prosecutor improperly used her peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner to exclude young jurors in favor of an older jury. We
disagree. "[U]nless it is clear from the record that the prosecution is using its peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory fashion, a defendant who fails to raise the issue or otherwise
develop an adequate record of objections forfeits appellate review of the issue." People v
Vaughn, 200 Mich App 32, 40; 504 NW2d 2 (1993). Defendant failed to object to the
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges during voir dire and to develop an adequate record to
provide us with the facts necessary to determine the merits of this claim. Moreover, it is not
clear from the record that the prosecutor used her peremptory challenges in a discriminatory
fashion. Therefore, defendant Ferrell forfeited this issue for appellate review. Furthermore,
defendant Ferrell waived this issue for appellate review because defense counsel conveyed
satisfaction with the impaneled jury, and the record contains no indication that defense counsel
was unsatisfied with the jury or consented to the composition of the jury in order not to alienate
prospective jurors. See People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000); People
v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 466-467; 552 NW2d 493 (1996).
On appeal, defendant Eddings argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his
felony murder conviction under an aiding and abetting theory. After considering the evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution, we disagree. See Bowman, supra.
In People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 178-179; 477 NW2d 473 (1991), this Court
articulated the requirements for finding a defendant liable for a killing under an aiding and
abetting theory:
In order to convict one charged as an aider and abettor of a first-degree felonymurder, the prosecutor must show that the person charged had both the intent to
commit the underlying felony and the same malice that is required to be shown to
convict the principal perpetrator of the murder. Therefore, the prosecutor must
show that the aider and abettor had the intent to commit not only the underlying
felony, but also to kill or to cause great bodily harm, or had wantonly and
willfully disregarded the likelihood of the natural tendency of this behavior to
cause death or great bodily harm. Further, if it can be shown that the aider and
abettor participated in a crime with knowledge of his principal's intent to kill or to
cause great bodily harm, he was acting with wanton and willful disregard
sufficient to support a finding of malice. [Citations omitted.]
The state of mind of an aider and abettor may be inferred from the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the case. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Factors that may be considered include a close association between the defendant and the
principal, the defendant's participation in the planning or execution of the crime, and evidence of
flight after the crime. Id. at 757-758 (citations omitted). Malice can be inferred from a
defendant’s use of a deadly weapon or from a defendant’s knowledge that the principal
possessed a deadly weapon. Id. at 760.
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Here, as discussed above, Turner testified that defendant Eddings talked about “hitting a
lick,” or robbing, Young the night before the shooting. Wilson and Mackey testified that they
observed defendant Ferrell, defendant Eddings and Gipson in a car together in the area of the
shooting the evening of the shooting. Gipson admitted that she drove defendant Ferrell and
defendant Eddings to Young’s street, where they exited her vehicle and returned just after she
heard gunshots. Jones testified to seeing defendant Ferrell with a gun pointed at Young as
Young was backing away. Jones and Burks testified to hearing gunshots. Moreover, Burks
testified that she saw another person at the end of her driveway wearing a black mask at the
approximate time of the robbery and shooting. Gipson testified that before the events on
Kentfield, defendant Eddings did not have money but after the occurrence, he did. From this
evidence, a rational jury could infer that both defendants entered into a common plan to kill
Young to steal his money and that each participant was assigned a specific task in accomplishing
their criminal objective, i.e., defendant Ferrell as the principal and defendant Eddings as the
look-out during its commission. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted. See id. at 759-760.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Harold Hood
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