IN RE GRIFFIN BURGESS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of GRIFFIN BURGESS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 23, 2003
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
ANN BURGESS a/k/a ANN OLNEY-BURGESS,
No. 248342
Jackson Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 98-088189-NA
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her son under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), (j) and (l). We affirm. This case is being decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the three grounds for termination were
established by clear and convincing evidence, MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633;
593 NW2d 520 (1999).
Respondent, whose parental rights to three older children had previously been terminated,
first argues that the evidence that she has been steadily employed for two years as a nurses’ aide,
has the economic ability to support her son, keeps her house clean and has worked hard to turn
her life around, established that she has successfully rehabilitated. We find, however, that,
although these are positive changes, the evidence clearly established that respondent failed to
successfully address the major concerns that led to the termination of her parental rights to her
older children, i.e., her pattern of involvement with potentially abusive men that could harm her
children and her inability to provide proper care and nurturing to her children.
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MCL 712A.19b(3)(i)
First, we find that respondent’s involvement with two men with abusive histories since
she began domestic abuse therapy, one during the prior proceedings and Griffin’s father after the
prior termination, clearly established that she has not successfully changed her pattern of
involvement with potentially abusive men. Respondent’s conduct and testimony clearly
established that she continued to fail to recognize the potential risk of harm to her children by
involving herself with potentially abusive men.
We also find that the caseworker’s testimony in the present case concerning the “very
minimal” interaction between respondent and her son during their visits, coupled with her past
failure to provide proper care, emotional support and nurturing to her older children, especially
her infant daughter, suggested that respondent also lacked the current capacity to provide her son
with proper care and emotional support. We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred by
finding that respondent had a long-term problem in terms of her ability to interact and properly
care for her children.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)
As the preceding discussion shows, there was evidence that respondent failed to protect
her older children from abuse, she repeatedly involved herself with potentially abusive men and
she was unable to recognize the risk of harm to her children of associating with abusive men.
This evidence suggests that respondent would likely fail to protect her son from harm through
her continued involvement with potentially abusive men. Further, as already discussed, the
evidence also showed that respondent would likely not be able to properly nurture or provide
emotional support to her son because she failed to do so with her older children and she had only
minimal interaction with her son. In view of this evidence, we find that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that there was a reasonable likelihood, based on respondent’s capacity and
conduct, that her son would be harmed if returned to her home. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
MCL 712A.19b(3)(l)
Lastly, termination under subsection (3)(l) was appropriate if “[t]he parent’s rights to
another child were terminated as a result of proceedings under [MCL 712A.2(b)] or a similar law
of another state.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(l). In the prior proceedings, the court adjudicated
respondent’s older children as neglected and the preceding discussion shows that respondent’s
parental rights to her older children were terminated due to her failure to protect her children
from abuse, her continued involvement with abusive men and her inability to properly care for or
nurture/parent her children.
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Respondent next argues that the trial court erred because termination of her parental
rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests. We disagree. Although respondent’s
testimony established that she had adequate income and would provide suitable housing for her
son, the evidence also established that she did not have the ability to provide proper nurturing
and emotional support to her son and she would likely fail to protect him from harm through her
continued involvement with abusive men. In view of this evidence, we find that the evidence did
not establish that termination of respondent’s parental rights was clearly not in the child’s best
interests. In re Trejo, supra, p 354.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
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