IN RE NATHANIEL WESLEY EDWARD ALEXANDER FARRIOR MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of NATHANIEL WESLEY
EDWARD ALEXANDER FARRIOR, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 9, 2003
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 246086
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-393555
RICHARD DONALD FARRIOR,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLOTTE KATHRINE FARRIOR,
Respondent.
In the Matter of NATHANIEL WESLEY
EDWARD ALEXANDER FARRIOR, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 246097
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-393555
CHARLOTTE KATHRINE FARRIOR,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
RICHARD DONALD FARRIOR,
Respondent.
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Before: Cooper, P.J., and Markey and Meter, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
In these consolidated cases, respondents appeal by right the order of the trial court
terminating their parental rights to their minor child, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g),
and (j). We affirm. These appeals are being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(A) and (E).
Respondent father contends that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner made
reasonable efforts to reunite him with the child. We disagree. Before the trial court enters the
order of disposition, it is required to state whether reasonable efforts have been made to prevent
the child’s removal from the home, or to rectify the conditions that caused the child to be
removed from the home. MCL 712A.18f. In this case, respondent father cites nothing to support
his contention that the agency failed to attempt to reunite him with the child nor does he claim he
was denied any service. On the contrary, the evidence indicates that respondent father completed
much of the parent-agency agreement, but still failed to provide a stable home and thereby failed
to rectify a primary condition leading to adjudication.
Respondent mother contends that the trial court erred in finding that the statutory grounds
for termination were demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. Again, we disagree.
Ample evidence existed on the record from which the trial court could find grounds for
termination under subsections (3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). At the time of adjudication, respondent
mother was homeless, unemployed, and had moved out of state and had abandoned the child in
Michigan. At the time of termination of respondent mother’s parental rights, respondent mother
had only recently established a home, was still unemployed, and had an unstable relationship
with respondent father, upon whom she was entirely reliant for financial support. While the child
was in foster care, she had limited contact with him and visited only sporadically. The trial court
therefore did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established
by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I), now MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo, 462 Mich
341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
A review of the evidence also establishes that termination of respondents’ parental rights
also was clearly not contrary to the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo,
supra. Therefore, the trial court did not err in terminating respondents’ parental rights.
We affirm.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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