LAWRENCE LONG V DORRIS BAKER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LAWRENCE LONG, Conservator and Guardian
for ANDREW LONG, a Legally Incapacitated and
Protected Person,
UNPUBLISHED
December 2, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 241020
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-020009-NO
DORRIS BAKER,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MORRIS POUJOU, JR., CITY OF DETROIT,
DETROIT EDISON COMPANY, JOHN DOE #1,
JOHN DOE #2, JANE DOE #1, and JANE DOE
#2,
Defendants.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Gage and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Dorris Baker appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order denying her
motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand. This appeal is being decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This case arises out of a pedestrian/automobile accident in the evening hours of October
21, 1998. Andrew Long was crossing South Fort Street near Conway in the city of Detroit when
he was struck by a car driven by defendant, Morris Poujou, Jr. At the time of the accident, the
streetlights near the intersection were not in operation. Andrew suffered serious and permanent
injuries.
Plaintiff filed suit naming as defendants Poujou, the city of Detroit, and Detroit Edison
Company. Poujou entered into a settlement with plaintiff, Detroit Edison was dismissed with
prejudice, and the trial court granted the city’s motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint naming as defendants the city, and city employees Dorris Baker and four
“Doe” employees. The complaint alleged that the city negligently failed to maintain or repair the
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streetlights, and that Baker and the Doe individuals were grossly negligent in failing to activate,
maintain, or repair the streetlights in a timely manner. The complaint alleged that Long’s
injuries were “a direct and proximate result” of defendants’ negligence.
Baker moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). She
argued that she was entitled to governmental immunity because her actions were not the
proximate cause of Long’s injuries. Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 462; 613 NW2d 307
(2000). Baker contended that Poujou’s act of hitting Long proximately caused Long’s injuries.
In response, plaintiff argued that evidence showed that the city was aware of longstanding
problems with the functioning of the streetlights in the area, and that a genuine issue of fact
existed as to whether Baker’s actions proximately caused Long’s injuries.
The trial court denied Baker’s motion, stating that the fact that the streetlights were not
operating at the time of the accident could be the proximate cause of the accident because the
accident would not have occurred had the streetlights been operating. The trial court found that a
question of fact existed regarding causation. The trial court denied Baker’s motion for
reconsideration, but granted plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. In that
complaint plaintiff alleged that Baker’s actions were grossly negligent and were “the direct and
proximate” cause of Long’s injuries.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Auto
Club Group Ins Co v Burchell, 249 Mich App 468, 479; 642 NW2d 406 (2001).
Governmental employees are immune from liability for injuries they cause during the
course of their employment if they are acting within the scope of their authority, if they are
engaged in the discharge of a governmental function, and if their “conduct does not amount to
gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage.” MCL 691.1407(2). Gross
negligence is defined as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for
whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1407(2)(c). To be the proximate cause of an injury, the
conduct must be “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury or damage . . .
.” Robinson, supra.1 If the facts bearing on proximate cause are not disputed and if reasonable
minds could not differ, the issue of probable cause is one of law for the court. Rogalski v
Tavernier, 208 Mich App 302, 306; 527 NW2d 73 (1995). Evidence of ordinary negligence does
not create a question of fact regarding gross negligence. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 122123; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
We reverse the trial court’s order denying Baker’s motion for summary disposition and
remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of Baker. Baker, a
government employee, could be held liable for Long’s injuries only if her conduct was grossly
negligent and was the proximate cause, i.e., the “one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause”
of the injuries. MCL 691.1407(2)(c); Robinson, supra. The most immediate, direct cause of
1
This case was filed in June 2000, and Robinson, supra, was decided in July 2000. Our
Supreme Court recently clarified that Robinson, supra, applies retroactively. Ewing v Detroit,
468 Mich 886; 661 NW2d 235 (2003).
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Long’s injuries was Poujou’s act of hitting him with his vehicle. Contrary to plaintiff’s
assertion, any failure on Baker’s part to activate, repair, or maintain the streetlights was not “the”
sole proximate cause of Andrew’s injuries. Neither Poujou nor the police officer who responded
to the accident testified that the lack of street lighting was the proximate cause of Long’s
injuries. Poujou stated only that had the streetlights been functioning, he would have had a better
opportunity to stop his vehicle. The police officer stated that had the streetlights been
functioning visibility would have been better for both Poujou and Long. Reasonable minds
could not differ as to whether Baker’s conduct was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial
lack of concern for whether Long could be injured. MCL 691.1407(2)(c); Maiden, supra. The
facts bearing on proximate cause are not disputed, and reasonable minds could not differ as to
whether Baker’s conduct was “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of Long’s
injuries. Baker was entitled to summary disposition. Robinson, supra; Rogalski, supra.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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