PEOPLE OF MI V ALTHEA MICHELLE MCKENZIE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 18, 2003
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 237202
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-176909-FH
RICHMOND MAURICE MCKENZIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 237815
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-176908-FH
ALTHEA MICHELLE MCKENZIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Griffin and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated appeals involve what appears to be a fairly large drug operation. In
Docket No. 237815, following a jury trial, defendant Althea McKenzie was convicted of
possession with intent to deliver between 5 and 45 kilograms of marijuana, MCL
333.7401(2)(d)(ii), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony
firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced her as a second felony offender, MCL
769.10, to 13 months’ to 10 ½ years’ imprisonment for the marijuana conviction and 2 years’
imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. She now appeals as of right. In Docket No.
237202, following a jury trial, defendant Richmond McKenzie was convicted of intent to deliver
between 5 and 45 kilograms of marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(d)(ii), felon in possession of a
firearm, 750.224f, and two counts of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced
him to 23 months’ to 7 years’ imprisonment for the marijuana conviction, 1 to 5 years’
imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, and 2 years’ imprisonment
each for the felony-firearm convictions. He now appeals as of right. We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
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After receiving information that a drug operation was being conducted at defendants’
house, officers from the Southern Oakland Narcotics Information Consortium (SONIC),
conducted several days of surveillance of the house, and thereafter obtained a search warrant.
On January 26, 2001, officers executed the search warrant. Defendant Althea McKenzie was at
the house at the time the search was conducted, but defendant Richmond McKenzie was not at
the house at that time. He alleges that he was in Arizona. During the search, officers found large
amounts of marijuana and money, as well as firearms, throughout the house, including the master
bedroom, which contained personal items belonging to defendant Richmond McKenzie.
Docket No. 237815
Defendant Althea McKenzie raises two issues on appeal. She first argues that the trial
court erred in failing to suppress evidence obtained under an invalid search warrant. In
reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear
error. People v McGhee, 255 Mich App 623, 626; 662 NW2d 777 (2003); People v Burrell, 417
Mich 439, 448; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). We review de novo the trial court’s final decision at a
motion to suppress hearing. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 116; 631 NW2d 67 (2001),
citing People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 269; 547 NW2d 280 (1996). However, great deference
is given to a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. People v Russo, 439 Mich 584, 603; 487
NW2d 698 (1992), citing Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).
A magistrate’s finding of probable cause will be affirmed if “a reasonably cautious person could
have concluded that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause.” Russo,
supra.
The basis for a magistrate’s determination of probable cause is limited to the facts and
circumstances set forth in the affidavit. MCL 780.653; People v Sundling, 153 Mich App 277,
312; 395 NW2d 308 (1986). Probable cause sufficient to issue a search warrant exists when the
totality of facts and circumstances set forth in the affidavit “would lead a reasonable person to
believe that the evidence of a crime or the contraband sought is in the place requested to be
searched.” People v Brannon, 194 Mich App 121, 132; 486 NW2d 83 (1992). The affidavit and
search warrant should be reviewed in a common sense and realistic manner. Russo, supra at
604. To issue a warrant, the magistrate need not find probable cause that a specific person was
personally involved in illegal activities, only that evidence sought will be found in the place to be
searched. People v Whitfield, 461 Mich 441, 445; 607 NW2d 61 (2000).
Here, officers received information that drugs would be found at defendants’ house and
thereafter conducted surveillance of the home. Defendant contends that the source of
information (SOI’s) tip may not support probable cause because the affidavit did not
affirmatively state that the SOI’s information was based on personal knowledge. When relying
on an unnamed source for probable cause, an affidavit must affirmatively state that the
information is based on personal knowledge and that the information is reliable and credible.
MCL 780.653. However, if an independent police investigation confirms the informant’s tip, the
tip may support probable cause even without an affirmation of the informant’s reliability or
personal knowledge. People v Harris, 191 Mich App 422, 425-426; 479 NW2d 6 (1991).
Independent verification can compensate for a failure to set forth a basis for the informant’s
knowledge. People v Gentry, 138 Mich App 225, 228-229; 360 NW2d 863 (1984), quoting
Illinois v Gates, supra.
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We find the affidavit was sufficient to support the finding of probable cause. The
affidavit was provided by an experienced narcotics officer with the South Oakland Narcotics
Information Consortium (SONIC). The affidavit stated that the affiant had received information
from an SOI that the residents at 38210 Nine Mile Road were trafficking in narcotics and that
“Maurice McKenzie” was involved in the operation. The affiant stated that he believed the
SOI’s information to be “reliable and credible based upon the information provided by the SOI
and affiant’s independent investigation.” The affidavit also described the independent
investigation undertaken to verify the SOI’s tip. Two days before the issuance of the warrant,
officers removed five bags of garbage that had been abandoned at the curbside of defendants’
house and found two large plastic wrappers containing remnants of marijuana. It was averred
that the large plastic wrappers are commonly used to package large amounts of marijuana.
Officers also found several proofs of residence for Richmond Maurice McKenzie at the address.
The affidavit further stated that Richmond McKenzie had been arrested and convicted of
distribution of marijuana in 1986. Finally, while conducting surveillance of the home for two
days before the warrant request, officers observed numerous vehicles arrive and leave the home
within short periods of time, which is indicative of drug activities. The affiant concluded that
based on the totality of the facts and relying on the affiant’s extensive experience and training in
narcotics investigations, the affiant believed narcotics and contraband would be located at the
residence.
Viewing all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, the independent police
investigation sufficiently confirmed the SOI’s tip to support probable cause. See People v Hall,
158 Mich App 194, 198; 404 NW2d 219 (1987). Therefore, a sufficient basis existed for the
magistrate to find probable cause and the trial court did not err in failing to suppress the
evidence.
Defendant Althea McKenzie next argues that the trial court erred in failing to declare a
mistrial. The denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v
Alter, 255 Mich App 194, 205; 659 NW2d 667 (2003). A mistrial should only be granted for an
irregularity that is prejudicial to the defendant’s rights, and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.
People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). “The appropriate test to
determine whether the trial court’s comments or conduct pierced the veil of judicial impartiality
is whether the trial court’s conduct or comments ‘were of such a nature as to unduly influence
the jury and thereby deprive the appellant of his right to a fair and impartial trial.’” People v
Collier, 168 Mich App 687, 698; 425 NW2d 118 (1988), quoting People v Rogers, 60 Mich App
652, 657; 233 NW2d 8 (1975).
At trial, through the testimony of an officer, the prosecutor moved to admit into evidence
the actual bags of marijuana that officers confiscated from defendants’ house. The prosecutor
gave the testifying officer a package containing the bags and asked the officer to open the
package and verify that the bags being introduced into evidence actually contained marijuana.
During this process, the trial judge stated, “Would you close that stuff up. It’s giving me a
headache.” The comment was then followed by laughter in the courtroom. Based solely on this
comment, both defendants moved for mistrial. With regard to defendant Althea McKenzie, a
primary factual issue at trial was whether she had knowledge of the marijuana being present in
the house. According to the defense, the judge’s comments created the inference that, because of
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the strong smell, it would be impossible to live in proximity to the marijuana without being
aware of its presence.
Defendant relies on People v Hudgins, 125 Mich App 140; 336 NW2d 241 (1983), for
the principle that reversal is required when a judge makes comments in front of the jury
expressing the judge’s disapproval of drug use. Defendant, however, misstates the holding in
Hudgins. In Hudgins, this Court specifically held that the judge’s statements regarding
disapproval of drug use were not improper: “The mere disapproval of the charged illegal act does
not deny a defendant a fair trial.” Id. at 148. This Court did hold, however, that reversal is
required when a judge directly connects the conduct to the defendant. Id.
Here, the judge merely expressed a desire to be relieved from a distracting and unpleasant
odor, rather than any personal approval or disapproval of drug use. The comment, while
inappropriate, did not connect the drugs to this defendant, nor did it reflect any opinion regarding
defendant Althea McKenzie’s knowledge. Because the trial judge “never expressed his own
opinion on the merits of the issue, nor did he persist in commenting on the matter,” the judge did
not breach his duty of impartiality. People v Missouri, 100 Mich App 310, 339; 299 NW2d 346
(1980). Furthermore, considering the substantial evidence at trial supporting Althea McKenzie’s
knowledge of the drug operations, there is no reason to believe that the judge’s comment had any
influence on the jury. Before the judge’s comment, the testifying officer had already testified
regarding the characteristic odor of marijuana that emanated from the bags in evidence. He also
stated that when conducting the search of defendants’ house, he could detect the distinct odor of
marijuana when he walked into defendants’ basement. After the judge’s comment, several other
officers who assisted in conducting the search testified that the odor of marijuana was strong in
the house. Under the circumstances, the judge’s comment did not unduly influence the jury.
Regardless, the trial court instructed the jury that comments made by the court were not
evidence and should be disregarded. Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and proper
instructions are presumed to cure most errors. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d
229 (1998). Therefore, any alleged error was cured by the trial court’s instruction.
Docket No. 237202
Defendant Richmond McKenzie raises three issues on appeal. He first argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal. “When reviewing a trial
court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict, this Court reviews the record de novo to
determine whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor, viewed in the light most favorable
to the prosecutor, could persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Aldrich, supra at 123. “Circumstantial evidence and
the reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
elements of a crime.” People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 100; 505 NW2d 869 (1993).
Defendant primarily argues that because he was in Arizona on the day the information
charges, a rational trier of fact could not find he was in possession of the drugs or firearms on
that date. Possession of drugs can be actual or constructive. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 519
520; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Constructive possession over drugs
occurs when the defendant has the power to exercise dominion and control “either directly or
through another person.” People v Burgenmeyer, 461 Mich 431, 439; 606 NW2d 645 (2000).
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“The ultimate question is whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
government, the evidence establishes a sufficient connection between the defendant and the
contraband to support the inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the
substance.” Wolfe, supra at 521, quoting United States v Disla, 805 F2d 1340, 1350 (CA 9,
1986). Intent to deliver can be inferred from the facts and circumstances, including the quantity
and packaging, Wolfe, supra, and because of the difficulty in proving intent, minimal
circumstantial evidence is required, People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 518; 583 NW2d 199
(1998).
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that defendant exercised
dominion and control over the drugs and intended to sell them. Over twenty pounds of
marijuana was found in visible locations throughout defendant’s home. Defendant’s clothing
and personal belongings were found in the master bedroom along with marijuana and firearms.
Receipts for men’s clothing, dated January 9 and bearing defendant’s name, as well as other
documents bearing defendant’s name, were found in the master bedroom. Marijuana was found
in a vehicle insured by defendant. Further, scales used for weighing, a tally sheet, and packaging
material consistent with a drug trafficking operation, were found in the home. The basement of
the house, which contained an office area where defendant kept his business documents, smelled
strongly of unburned marijuana and contained nearly fifteen pounds of marijuana. This
evidence, viewed as a whole, is sufficient to permit the inference that defendant continued to
reside at the house and was involved in a complex marijuana delivery operation.
Even though defendant alleges he was in Arizona on the date charged in the information,
the jury could still reasonably infer that defendant continued to exercise control over the
narcotics during his absence. Defendant need not physically possess the drugs to be convicted of
possession. People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 271; 536 NW2d 517 (1995). The fact that the
drugs were pervasive throughout defendant’s home along with his personal possessions suggests
that defendant maintained control over the drugs. People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 421; 646
NW2d 158 (2002). As Judge Posner stated, “[i]t would be odd if a dealer could not be guilty of
possession, merely because he had the resources to hire a flunky to have custody of the drugs.”
United States v Manzella, 791 F2d 1263, 1266 (CA 7, 1986). Similarly, it would be odd if a
dealer could avoid conviction merely because he had the resources to take a vacation. Therefore,
the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict with regard to the
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver charge.
The above analysis also applies to defendant’s felon in possession charge. Possession of
a firearm can be actual or constructive and can be proved by circumstantial evidence. See
People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 469; 446 NW2d 140 (1989) (discussing constructive possession of
a short-barreled shotgun).
The fact that the firearms were discovered in visible locations throughout the house co
owned by defendant provided sufficient evidence to allow the inference that defendant
constructively possessed the firearms. Two firearms were found under the bed in the master
bedroom of the home. Defendant’s personal belongings, including clothing, personal
identifications, and business documents, were found in the master bedroom and throughout the
remainder of the house. Therefore, the trial court properly denied directed verdict with regard to
the felon in possession of a firearm charge.
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With regard to the felony-firearm charges, we find it necessary to initially note that
defendant did not specifically list the felony-firearm charges in his statement of the question
presented. However, he did assert that the trial court erred in failing to direct verdict in his favor,
and he referred to the felony-firearm charges in the analysis of his brief. Therefore, we conclude
that while inarticulately stated, defendant has sufficiently raised this issue with regard to the
felony-firearm charges. Moreover, with regard to these charges, we conclude that the trial court
erred in failing to grant a directed verdict in defendant Richmond McKenzie’s favor.
A review of the relevant law persuades us that the possession element of felony-firearm is
defined more narrowly that the possession element for the purpose of drug possession or felon in
possession, and therefore merits separate treatment. See People v Elowe, 85 Mich App 744, 748;
272 NW2d 596 (1978)(discussing the statutory meaning of possession for the purposes of
felony-firearm).
The crimes of felon in possession and felony-firearm have two different aims. Felon in
possession is an ongoing status crime, which is intended to protect the public from having guns
at the disposal of persons convicted of felonies. People v Swint, 225 Mich App 353, 374; 572
NW2d 666 (1997). Because the Legislature has determined that convicted felons are dangerous,
mere dominion and control over a firearm by a convicted felon constitutes a danger to society.
See MCL 750.224f. Defendant’s conviction in this case of felon in possession, therefore,
accords with the purpose of the felon in possession statute when, as here, the firearm was
temporarily inaccessible to defendant on the date charged, even though it could be found that it
was still under his dominion and control.
The crime of felony-firearm, on the other hand, is not intended to punish the mere
ownership of a firearm by a person who commits a felony. Burgenmeyer, supra at 436. Instead,
because access to a firearm during the commission of a crime increases the risk to bystanders and
victims, felony-firearm is intended only to punish a person who carries or possesses a firearm
during the commission of a felony. MCL 750.227b; People v Terry, 124 Mich App 656, 660;
335 NW2d 116 (1983). “[A] person ‘carries or has in his possession’ a firearm during a felony
when the person has physical possession of the weapon or when the weapon is available and
accessible to the person during the felony.” Terry, supra at 656.
Our Supreme Court most recently discussed the element of possession as it relates to
felony-firearm in Burgenmeyer, supra. There, undercover officers bought cocaine from the
defendant’s roommate on August 7, 1990. Id. at 433. Later that day, officers arrested both the
defendant and his roommate after the two left their house together. At the time he was arrested,
the defendant was in possession of $700 in marked bills from the controlled cocaine buy, but was
not carrying drugs or firearms. Id. Police obtained a warrant and searched the defendant’s house
just after midnight on August 8, 1990, and found cocaine and firearms in close proximity to each
other. Id. at 422. The Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions of possession of cocaine and
felony-firearm, noting that at the time the defendant possessed the cocaine in his house, thereby
committing the drug felony, the firearm was nearby and accessible. Id at 440. “The drugs and
the weapons were close enough that a jury reasonably could conclude that the defendant
possessed both at the same time, as the prosecutor charged.” Id.
In this case, as in Burgenmeyer, officers found drugs in close proximity to the firearms.
However, this case is distinguishable from Burgenmeyer. Here, evidence at trial suggested that
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defendant was in Arizona between January 19 and January 30.1 The information charged that
defendant committed the crimes on January 26, yet the prosecution presented no evidence that
defendant had reasonable access to a firearm on or near that date.
“A drug-possession offense can take place over an extended period, during which an
offender is variously in proximity to the firearm and at a distance from it. In a case of that sort,
the focus would be on the offense dates specified in the information.” Burgenmeyer, supra at 439
(emphasis added). In Burgenmeyer, the Court determined that defendant physically possessed
cocaine while a firearm was accessible, thereby committing felony-firearm on August 7, 1990,
even though the information charged that the crime was committed on August 8, 1990. The
Court found that this time difference was close enough to affirm the conviction. Id. at 440.
Here, however, the information charged that defendant committed the crimes on January
26, when defendant was alleged to have been in Arizona. The prosecution failed to produce any
evidence that defendant had reasonable access to the firearms on the date charged in the
information. Therefore, under the circumstances, we find the trial court erred in failing to direct
verdict in defendant Richmond McKenzie’s favor on the felony-firearm charges.
Defendant also argues that his conviction of felony-firearm predicated on the felon in
possession of a firearm charge violates his double jeopardy protections. Although we have
found that the trial court erred in failing to direct verdict on the felony-firearm charges, which
renders this issue moot, we will briefly address the issue. “A double jeopardy challenge
involved a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Dillard, 246 Mich App
163, 165; 631 NW2d 755 (2001). “Where multiple punishment is involved, the Double Jeopardy
Clause acts as a restraint on the prosecutor and the courts, not the Legislature.” People v
Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 469; 355 NW2d 592 (1984), citing Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161; 97 S Ct
2221; 53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977). “The Legislature’s intent constitutes the determining factor under
both the federal and the Michigan Double Jeopardy Clauses.” Dillard, supra at 165.
In Dillard, supra, this Court specifically held that double jeopardy protections do not
preclude the conviction of felony-firearm predicated on felon in possession. Dillard, supra.
This Court is bound by the holding in Dillard.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because of the cumulative effect
of the errors occurring at trial. A claim for reversal based on several alleged errors at trial is
reviewed to determine if the cumulative effect of the errors denied defendant a fair trial. People
v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 387; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). Although the effect of one error
might not provide a basis for reversal, the cumulative effect of a number of minor errors may add
up to error requiring reversal. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1998).
“[T]he effect of the errors must have been seriously prejudicial in order to warrant a finding that
defendant was denied a fair trial.” Id. at 388.
1
This evidence was not entirely uncontested.
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Before trial, in an effort to avoid the prejudice of the jury’s learning of defendant’s prior
felony, the parties stipulated that the felon in possession charge would be referred to as
“ineligible person in possession.” During closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly referred
to defendant’s felony-firearm charge as felon in possession of a firearm. During jury
instructions, the court misstated and referred to defendant’s felon in possession of a firearm as
just that, instead of as “ineligible person in possession of a firearm.” Defendant now claims error
requiring reversal based on the prosecutor’s and the trial court’s misstatements.
With regard to the prosecutor’s misstatement, defense counsel made no objection at trial
and requested no special instruction. Because defendant failed to object to the statement, the
issue is not preserved for review. People v Dowdy, 211 Mich App 562, 570; 536 NW2d 794
(1995). Regardless, the written jury instructions, which corrected the misstatement, cured any
prejudice resulting from the inadvertent lapse. See People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279;
662 NW2d 836 (2003).
With regard to the trial court’s misstatement, defense counsel objected to the
misstatement at trial, but then waived his objection when the court provided a written jury
instruction correcting the error. “A defendant may not waive objection to an issue before the
trial court and then raise the issue as an error on appeal.” Aldrich, supra at 111.
Defendant also claims that the trial judge prejudiced the defense when, during an
officer’s testimony, he asked the officer to close up the bags of marijuana, stating: “Would you
close that stuff up. It’s giving me a headache.” This claim of error was addressed supra as it
related to defendant Althea McKenzie, and has already been determined to be without merit.
Defendant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow
defendant to elicit testimony that defendant voluntarily surrendered to police. Defendant
contends that voluntary surrender is probative evidence of an innocent conscience, as much as
flight can be evidence of a guilty conscience. However, defendant failed to provide any
authority to support the position that evidence of voluntary surrender is admissible to prove
innocence.
A trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v Taylor, 252 Mich App 519, 521; 652 NW2d 526 (2002). In general, all
relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not. MRE 402. “Evidence is relevant
if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Taylor, supra; MRE 401.
Although evidence of flight may be admissible to show a defendant’s guilty conscience,
the converse is not necessarily true. Without supporting authority provided by defendant, we
find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the evidence. Regardless, the
jury ultimately learned of defendant’s voluntary surrender. Therefore, any possible error in the
trial court’s decision was harmless.
Defendant finally claims that the prosecutor improperly attempted to shift the burden of
proof at trial to defendant. At trial, in an effort to refute the theory that defendants were running
a profitable drug operation, defendant explicitly advanced an alternate theory to explain his large
home and significant amounts of cash. In opening statements, defense counsel stated that
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defendant’s legitimate business operations explained the family’s wealth. In closing arguments,
defense counsel stated that cash found in the master bedroom was procured through a home
refinancing and winnings from casino gambling, not drug activities.
Defendant’s assertion that the prosecutor attempted to shift the burden all relate to the
prosecutor’s comments on inferences created by the defense theory. “[W]here a defendant
testifies at trial or advances, either explicitly or implicitly, an alternate theory of the case that, if
true, would exonerate the defendant, comment on the validity of the alternate theory cannot be
said to shift the burden of proving innocence to the defendant.” People v Fields, 450 Mich 94,
115; 538 NW2d 356 (1995). When the defense relies on a particular theory, the prosecutor is not
prohibited from commenting on the improbability of the theory or evidence. People v Jones, 468
Mich 345; 662 NW2d 376 (2003). All of the complained-of comments by the prosecutor were
made in response to or in reference of defendant’s theory of the case. “Although a defendant has
no burden to produce any evidence, once the defendant advances evidence or a theory, argument
on the inferences created does not shift the burden of proof.” Fields, supra at 94. Under the
circumstances, the prosecutor’s comments do not constitute error requiring reversal.
Because we find no individual errors that require reversal, defendant’s argument that the
cumulative effect of the alleged errors requires reversal is without merit.
In sum, with regard to Docket No. 237815, we find that the trial court did not err in
failing to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the valid search warrant. We further find
that the trial court did not err in failing to declare a mistrial based on the trial judge’s comment
regarding the smell of the marijuana at trial. Therefore, we affirm defendant Althea McKenzie’s
convictions and sentences. With regard to Docket No. 237202, we find the trial court did not err
in failing to direct verdict in favor of defendant Richmond Maurice McKenzie regarding the
possession with intent to deliver marijuana and felon in possession charges. Further, we find no
error requiring reversal of those convictions. Thus, we affirm defendant Richmond Maurice
McKenzie’s convictions and sentences on those charges. However, we find the trial court did err
in failing to direct verdict in favor of defendant Richmond Maurice McKenzie with regard to the
two felony-firearm charges. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision in that regard and
remand to the trial court for vacation of defendant Richmond Maurice McKenzie’s felony
firearm convictions and entry of an order directing verdict in his favor on those charges.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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