DARLINDA M BOCHENEK V ROBERT ANDERSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DARLINDA M. BOCHENEK,
UNPUBLISHED
December 27, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CITY OF MADISON HEIGHTS, MADISON
HEIGHTS POLICE DEPARTMENT,
JASON CHAPUT, COUNTY OF OAKLAND,
and OAKLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT,
No. 237422
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-023420-NO
Defendants,
and
ROBERT ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and Jansen and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting defendant Robert Anderson’s motion for a
directed verdict regarding her claims that he committed an assault and battery and used excessive
force in arresting her. We affirm.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for
a directed verdict because there was conflicting testimony by which a reasonable juror could
differ as to whether defendant committed an assault and battery or used excessive force in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when arresting plaintiff. We disagree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict de novo. Cacevic v
Simplematic, 248 Mich App 670, 679; 645 NW2d 287 (2001). In reviewing the trial court’s
decision, we view the evidence presented up to the time of the motion in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, granting that party every reasonable inference, and resolving any
conflict in the evidence in that party’s favor to decide whether a question of fact existed. Id.
This Court recognizes the unique opportunity of the trial judge to observe witnesses and the
factfinder’s responsibility to determine the credibility and weight of the testimony. Zeeland
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Farm v JBL Enterprises, 219 Mich App 190, 195; 555 NW2d 733 (1996). A directed verdict is
appropriate only when no factual question exists upon which reasonable minds could differ.
Cacevic, supra, 248 Mich App 679-680.
An assault is “any intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to another person by
force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under circumstances which
create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present
ability to accomplish contact.” Smith v Stolberg, 231 Mich App 256, 260; 586 NW2d 103
(1998). Battery is “the willful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results
from an act intended to cause such contact.” Id.
With regard to plaintiff’s excessive force claim, the Sixth Circuit in Darrah v City of Oak
Park, 255 F3d 301 (CA 6, 2001) recently pointed out:
[W]hile the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” analysis should be
used in excessive force cases involving searches and seizures, where there is no
search and seizure, the Supreme Court has held that the substantive component of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause is the most appropriate lens with
which to view an excessive force claim. County of Sacramento v Lewis, 523 US
833, 843-844; 118 S Ct 1708; 140 L Ed 2d 1043 (1998).
A substantially higher hurdle must be surpassed to make a showing of excessive
force under the Fourteenth Amendment than under the "objective reasonableness"
test of Graham [v Connor, 490 US 386; 109 S Ct 1865; 104 L Ed 2d 443 (1989)],
in which excessive force can be found if the officer's actions, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, were not objectively reasonable. Graham, 490 US at
396-97, 109 S Ct 1865; Lewis, 523 US at 845-46, 118 S Ct 1708. The substantive
due process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment protect citizens from the
arbitrary exercise of governmental power. Lewis, 523 US at 845, 118 S Ct 1708.
The test applied by the Supreme Court to determine when governmental conduct
reaches this threshold is to ask whether the alleged conduct "shocks the
conscience." Id. at 846, 118 S Ct 1708. In Lewis, the Supreme Court explained
that whether governmental conduct shocks the conscience depends on the factual
circumstances of the case. Id. at 851-53, 118 S Ct 1708. More specifically, in
situations where the implicated government actors
are afforded a reasonable opportunity to deliberate various
alternatives prior to electing a course of action . . . , their actions
will be deemed conscience-shocking if they were taken with
"deliberate indifference" towards the plaintiff's federally protected
rights. In contradistinction, in a rapidly evolving, fluid, and
dangerous predicament which precludes the luxury of calm and
reflective pre-response deliberation ..., public servants' reflexive
actions "shock the conscience" only if they involved force
employed "maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm" rather than "in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline."
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Claybrook v Birchwell, 199 F3d 350, 359 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting Lewis, 523 US
at 852-53, 118 S Ct 1708). [255 F3d 305-306.]
Because plaintiff claims that defendant used excessive force in arresting her, we thus apply the
“shock the conscience” test to this claim. Darrah, supra, 255 F3d 306.
In addition, this Court has recognized that actions by police officers, which might
normally constitute intentional torts, are protected by governmental immunity if those actions are
justified. Butler v City of Detroit, 149 Mich App 708, 715; 386 NW2d 645 (1986). A police
officer may use reasonable force when making an arrest. Tope v Howe, 179 Mich App 91, 106;
445 NW2d 452 (1989); Brewer v Perrin, 132 Mich App 520, 528; 349 NW2d 198 (1984). The
measure of necessary force is that which an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, with the
knowledge and in the situation of the arresting officer, would have deemed necessary. Brewer,
supra, 132 Mich App 528.
In this case, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict in favor of defendant. The
record indicates that plaintiff, who had a longstanding history of emotional problems, advised the
police in her 911 call from her residence that things were “going to get ugly.” The police
immediately responded to the call. Upon arriving at her residence, the police discovered that
plaintiff had poured gasoline both inside and outside her house and was preparing to kill herself
by setting the house ablaze. When the officers on the scene ordered plaintiff to stop, she ignored
them, ran back into her house, and tried to prevent the officers from entering. Upon entering
through the back door of the house, Officers Chaput and Anderson noticed that their uniforms
were “covered in gas” and the house was filled with an “extreme odor of gas”. At that point,
Officers Chaput and Anderson grabbed plaintiff and carried her from the gasoline-soaked house
onto the edge of the deck outside the house. According to plaintiff, she was lying peacefully on
the floor waiting to be handcuffed when defendant pressed or ground his knee into her ankle
while handcuffing her. However, plaintiff admitted that she fell when the officers rushed in the
back door and was “wet” from the gasoline.
Given the facts of this case, plaintiff simply cannot show that any reasonable juror could
find that Officer Anderson committed an assault and battery or that his conduct “shocks the
conscience.” Indeed, under the circumstances, defendant’s response to the rapidly unfolding
events was heroic, sparing plaintiff’s life at great risk to his own. Therefore, we find the trial
court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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