JOSEPH M PELLERITO V RICHARD MOORE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH M. PELLERITO and LAWRENCE P.
ZATKOFF,
UNPUBLISHED
December 27, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
INGLESIDE-GROSSEDALE PARK
ASSOCIATION, LAKE BOULEVARD RELIEF
DRAINAGE DISTRICT, JOHN DOE, MARY
ROE, and DEAN BIRCHILL,
No. 231109
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 99-001325-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Neff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this nuisance action, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the trial court order dismissing
their claims. We affirm.
The dispute in this case arises from the application of two city ordinances to InglesideGrossedale Park (the park) located on the waterfront of Lake St. Clair in the city of St. Clair
Shores. Plaintiffs live near the park, which is owned by defendant Ingleside-Grossedale Park
Association. Plaintiffs brought this nuisance action complaining of activities occurring in the
park. Plaintiffs alleged that the St. Clair Shores Waterfront Parks Ordinance, 20.150 et seq., sets
the park hours of operation from sunrise to sunset, and that defendants are not abiding by the
ordinance. Defendants asserted that another ordinance, the Private Parks Ordinance, 20.350 et
seq., also applies and allows for the issuance of permits for use of the park after regular hours.
The trial court determined that both ordinances can be read together and applied to InglesideGrossedale Park, providing park hours from sunrise to sunset, as provided by the Waterfront
Parks Ordinance, and the issuance of permits for after-hours use, as provided by the Private
Parks Ordinance.1
1
The parties entered into a settlement agreement which resolved all issues except the application
of the two ordinances as they concern the Ingleside-Grossedale Park hours.
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Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in applying the Private Parks Ordinance to
Ingleside-Grossedale Park. Plaintiffs contend that (1) the trial court ignored legislative intent,
(2) the trial court’s interpretation renders most of the ordinance nugatory, (3) the ordinance is
inconsistent with zoning restrictions on the surrounding property, (4) application of the
ordinance to similarly situated parks would yield incongruous results, and (5) the ordinance is
inconsistent with the park hours sign.
Issues concerning the interpretation and application of statutes are questions of law that
this Court decides de novo. Danse Corp v Madison Heights, 466 Mich 175, 177-178; 644 NW2d
721 (2002); Lincoln v General Motors Corp, 461 Mich 483, 489-490; 607 NW2d 73 (2000). If
the language of the statute is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed to expand what the
Legislature clearly intended to cover. Miller v Mercy Memorial Hosp Corp, 466 Mich 196, 201;
644 NW2d 730 (2002). The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and
give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Nicholas v Meridian Charter Tp Bd, 239 Mich App 525,
530; 609 NW2d 574 (2000). “The first criterion in determining intent is the language of the
statute.” Id. The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning plainly expressed. Id. If
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is generally not
necessary or permitted. Id.
“The rules governing the construction of statutes apply with equal force to the
interpretation of municipal ordinances.” Gora v Ferndale, 456 Mich 704, 711; 576 NW2d 141
(1998). Two statutes that relate to the same subject or share a common purpose are in pari
materia and must be read together as one law, even if they contain no reference to one another
and were enacted on different dates. Jackson Community College v Dept of Treasury, 241 Mich
App 673, 681; 621 NW2d 707 (2000). If the statutes lend themselves to a construction that
avoids conflict, that construction should control. Id.. The construction should give effect to each
without repugnancy, absurdity or unreasonableness. Michigan Humane Society v Natural
Resources Comm, 158 Mich App 393, 401; 404 NW2d 757 (1987). The rules of statutory
construction also provide that a more recently enacted law has precedence over the older statute.
Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 139; 468 NW2d 479 (1991); Travelers Ins v U-Haul of
Michigan, Inc, 235 Mich App 273, 280; 597 NW2d 235 (1999).
The parties do not appear to dispute that Ingleside-Grossedale Park is both a waterfront
park and a private park. According to the plain language of § 1(a) of the Waterfront Parks
Ordinance, waterfront parks are open from sunrise to sunset. Section thirty of the subsequentlyenacted Private Parks Ordinance states plainly that “[n]o person shall enter, be, or remain in any
private park after park closing hours unless a permit has been obtained.” The plain language of
both ordinances can be applied in conjunction without any need for judicial construction. The
Waterfront Parks Ordinance sets park hours and does not expressly prohibit after-hours permits.
The after-hours permit provision of the Private Parks Ordinance acknowledges that park hours
exist and does not attempt to change them. We conclude that the trial court’s construction of the
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ordinances avoids conflict and gives effect to each ordinance “without repugnancy, absurdity or
unreasonableness.” Michigan Humane Society, supra at 401.2
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
2
Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, it is neither necessary nor proper to examine the legislative
history of the Private Parks Ordinance because the language of the ordinance clearly states that it
applies to all private parks in the city of St. Clair Shores. We find no merit to plaintiffs’
argument that applying the ordinance to Ingleside-Grossedale Park renders the rest of the
ordinance nugatory because, despite the provisions that do not practically apply to InglesideGrossedale Park, the ordinance is still applicable to other private parks in the city. The question
whether any portion of the Private Parks Ordinance, other than the after-hours permit provision,
is applicable to Ingleside-Grossedale Park is beyond the scope of this appeal. Similarly,
plaintiffs’ argument that other provisions of the Private Parks Ordinance conflict with zoning
restrictions is not persuasive because only the after-hours permits provision is at issue.
Plaintiffs’ discussion of the effects of the Private Parks Ordinance on other similarly situated
parks is not germane. We confine our consideration to the question whether the portion of the
Private Parks Ordinance which provides for after-hours permits is applicable despite the
Waterfront Parks Ordinance’s provision of park hours. Resolution of this issue does not require
us to consider whether other portions of the Private Parks Ordinance are applicable to InglesideGrossedale Park or other similarly situated parks. Lastly, the placement of signs displaying park
hours consistent with the Waterfront Parks Ordinance does not render the Private Parks
Ordinance inapplicable to Ingleside-Grossedale Park.
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