PEOPLE OF MI V EDWARD WILLIAM HOUSTON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 233953
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 00-044188-FC
EDWARD WILLIAM HOUSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., Zahra and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II), MCL
750.520c(1)(a), stemming from an incident in which he allegedly digitally penetrated and
touched the breasts of an eleven-year-old girl who was spending the night. The trial court
sentenced defendant to ten to forty years’ imprisonment for the CSC I conviction and thirty-eight
months to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the CSC II conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements he
made to police after a polygraph examination. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress evidence on legal grounds for clear error. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269,
273; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). This Court will not reverse the trial court’s findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves this Court with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.
Statements made before, during, or after a polygraph examination are not automatically
inadmissible at trial. People v Ray, 431 Mich 260, 268; 430 NW2d 626 (1988). The
admissibility of a post-polygraph examination statement is reviewed to determine whether the
defendant’s waiver of rights could be considered knowing and voluntary. Id. at 276. In
determining whether a defendant’s statement was knowing and voluntary, we apply an objective
standard and examine the totality of the circumstances. People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 181;
577 NW2d 903 (1998).
-1-
Defendant argues that his post-polygraph examination statements were involuntary
because he believed that he was required to waive his Miranda1 rights before taking the
examination. At the hearing, defendant testified that he did not recall, but he thought that the
officer might have told him that he was required to waive his Miranda rights before taking the
examination. Conversely, an officer testified that defendant was never told that he was required
to waive his right to counsel before taking the examination. Furthermore, defendant signed an
acknowledgement that he understood that he had the “right to talk with and have the assistance
of a lawyer at any time during the polygraph test or questioning” and that he had the right to stop
the test at any time and exercise that right. The trial court found that the officer’s testimony was
credible and did not believe defendant’s testimony. We defer to the trial court’s superior ability
to assess the credibility of the witnesses and conclude that the trial court’s finding of credibility
was not clearly erroneous in this regard. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 278; 545
NW2d 18 (1996).
Defendant also argues that he was coerced by the officer’s promise that he would get
probation and counseling if he signed the statement, but would go to jail and lose his children if
he refused to sign the statement. An officer testified that probation or counseling may have been
discussed during the interview, but defendant was not threatened or made any promises before he
made the statement. The trial court believed the officer and found that defendant’s statements
were not made due to any threats or promises. Once again, we defer to the trial court’s superior
ability to assess the credibility of the witnesses. We will not disturb the trial court’s credibility
determination in regard to this issue. McElhaney, supra at 278.
Finally, defendant argues that his statement was involuntary because he was not
readvised of his Miranda rights after the testing portion of the polygraph examination and before
he made his statement. Defendant was advised of his Miranda rights before taking the polygraph
examination and signed a waiver which expressly extended to post-examination questioning.
Defendant was advised that he could stop the interview at any time and did not have to answer
any of the questions. The only intervening circumstances between defendant signing the waiver
and the post-examination questioning was the less than two-hour time period that included the
pre-examination questions, the examination, and the post-examination questions. The same
officer who advised defendant of his rights administered the examination, conducted postexamination questioning, and took defendant’s statement. Furthermore, defendant took the
examination at his own request and never requested the assistance of counsel during the
examination or interview. Under such circumstances, the officer was not required to readvise
defendant of his rights before asking him questions after the testing portion of the polygraph
examination. See Ray, supra at 276-278; People v Hicks, 185 Mich App 107, 114; 460 NW2d
569 (1990). Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did
not clearly err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the statement defendant
made after his polygraph examination.
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.