DENISE LANE V CHARLES COSBY II
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DENISE LANE,
UNPUBLISHED
December 13, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 235806
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 94-001198-DS
CHARLES COSBY II,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Saad and R.B. Burns*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a custody order concerning the parties’ daughter,
Chelsea Ann Lane. The order granted the parties joint legal custody but granted sole physical
custody to defendant. We remand for further proceedings.
This Court must affirm custody orders and judgments of the trial court unless the trial
court “made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse
of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.” MCL 722.28.
“[C]ustody disputes are to be resolved in the child’s best interests.” Eldred v Ziny, 246
Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001). In making a child custody determination, a trial
court must make specific findings of fact regarding each of twelve factors used in determining
the best interests of the child. MCL 722.23; McCain v McCain, 229 Mich App 123, 124; 580
NW2d 485 (1998). The factors are not necessarily given equal weight. McCain, supra at 131.
Here, the trial court initially concluded that an established custodial environment existed
with plaintiff, and this conclusion is not challenged on appeal. Under MCL 722.27(1)(c), if an
established custodial environment exists, the court must not change this environment unless
“there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.”
Plaintiff contends that no such clear and convincing evidence was presented and that physical
custody of the child should remain with her. Specifically, plaintiff takes issue with the court’s
findings on several of the twelve best-interest factors from MCL 722.23.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Plaintiff asserts that the court placed too much emphasis on the parties’ respective
incomes in evaluating factor (c), the parties’ financial capabilities. However, the court properly
considered facts indicating that plaintiff has been unable to support the child financially, while
defendant has been the child’s sole provider for over one year. Thus, the court did not err in
finding that this factor favored defendant.
Plaintiff next claims that the trial court failed to indicate why it found defendant better
able to provide the child with a stable and satisfactory environment, factor (d). The court,
however, noted that plaintiff had “always relied on others to provide her with a place to live” and
that she had recently lost her home when she ended a relationship with a romantic partner. By
contrast, the court found that defendant had a more permanent place of residence and provided
plaintiff and the child with a home when plaintiff lost hers. These findings were not against the
great weight of the evidence, and the court did not err in finding that this factor favored
defendant.
Plaintiff next challenges the court’s findings with regard to factor (e), the permanence of
the custodial home, noting that she provided the child with a permanent custodial home when she
was living with her boyfriend for eight years. We conclude, however, that the court did not err
in finding plaintiff’s living arrangement more unstable than defendant’s, given that plaintiff and
the child lost their living space when plaintiff separated from her earlier romantic partner,
whereas defendant had established a more permanent home adjacent to his relatives.
Plaintiff next mentions the court’s findings with regard to factor (g), arguing that,
contrary to the court’s statement, she has never been treated for depression. She further contends
that with respect to this factor, “the parties are equal or Defendant may have a slight advantage . .
. .” However, plaintiff concedes on appeal that she was indeed depressed in 2000,1 and evidence
of her prior alcohol abuse was introduced at trial. Moreover, unlike with other factors, the court
did not make an explicit statement favoring one party over the other with respect to factor (g).
Accordingly, no error requiring reversal occurred with respect to this factor.
Lastly, plaintiff challenges the court’s findings with respect to factor (h), the child’s
home, school, and community record. Plaintiff contends that “the parties are near equal or equal
on this issue.” The court found defendant better able to provide a continuation of a good
educational environment for the child. We find no error with respect to this finding. Indeed,
although plaintiff had once been the person who assisted the child with schoolwork, defendant’s
mother has since filled that role. Chelsea is currently attending a school near defendant’s home.
If plaintiff were to be awarded custody, the child would have to change schools and, at trial,
plaintiff was unable to provide information on the proposed new school. Thus, the evidence on
this factor supports the court’s decision.
In light of the factual circumstances discussed above, we cannot conclude that the trial
court “committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue” in
1
We cannot find error requiring reversal merely because the court stated that “plaintiff has been
treated for depression” rather than stating “plaintiff has been afflicted with depression.”
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determining that clear and convincing evidence supported the award of physical custody to
defendant.
However, our inquiry cannot stop here. Indeed, plaintiff contends on appeal that the trial
court failed to consider awarding joint physical custody. Under MCL 722.26a(1), when there are
“custody disputes between parents, the parents shall be advised of joint custody. At the request
of either parent, the court shall consider an award of joint custody, and shall state on the record
the reasons for granting or denying a request.”
Although plaintiff did not specifically request joint custody in her pleadings, the trial
court had sufficient notice that plaintiff wanted the court to consider joint custody. Indeed,
plaintiff specifically noted at the hearing that if the court did not award her sole physical custody,
she wanted joint custody to be considered. Nevertheless, the court did not specifically consider
the issue of joint custody on the record as required by MCL 722.26a(1).2 Accordingly, clear
legal error occurred, and the court must consider the issue of joint physical custody on remand.3
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
jurisdiction.
We do not retain
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Robert B. Burns
2
We note that in its opinion denying plaintiff’s motion for rehearing, the court stated that it “did
address the request [for joint custody] by denying it for the reasons stated in the Opinion and the
analysis of the factors under the Child Custody Act.” We cannot agree with the assertion that the
issue of joint custody had already been addressed. Indeed, in its opinion the court made no
explicit findings regarding the issue of joint custody versus sole custody and did not explain why
one was favored over the other.
3
In response to plaintiff’s arguments on appeal regarding the legal test for determining joint
custody versus the legal test for determining sole custody, we note that joint and sole custody are
merely two possible outcomes in any child custody dispute, which is decided on the basis of the
child’s best interests. See Eldred, supra at 142; see also MCL 722.26a(1)(a). In making a
determination between sole or joint physical custody, there is no rigid, formulaic test that must
be applied. See generally McCain, supra at 130. The court must make a determination based on
the evidence presented and a consideration of the welfare of the child. Id. In considering joint
custody, the court must also consider “[w]hether the parents will be able to cooperate and
generally agree concerning important decisions affecting the welfare of the child.” MCL
722.26a(1)(b).
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