PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT K FITZNER
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 3, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 233210
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-005163
ROBERT K. FITZNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Sawyer and Saad, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals his jury trial conviction of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and
felony firearm, MCL 750.227b.1 The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of twenty-five to
fifty years in prison for the second-degree murder conviction and a consecutive term of two
years in prison for the felony firearm conviction. We affirm.
This case arises out of an altercation at a rave2 party in Detroit, at which defendant shot
and killed the victim after he pistol-whipped the victim in the face.
I. First-Degree Murder Charge
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict
on the first-degree murder charge. Defendant maintains that this allowed the jury to reach a
compromise verdict because the prosecutor failed to prove premeditation or deliberation. We
disagree.
“In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider in the light
most favorable to the prosecutor the evidence presented by the prosecutor up to the time the
motion is made and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Schultz, 246 Mich App
695, 702; 635 NW2d 491 (2001).
1
Defendant appeals as of right.
2
This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that a “rave” party is marked by dancing, music and
drugs, often in an abandoned warehouse and typically “after hours.”
-1-
“To prove first-degree premeditated murder, the prosecution must establish that the
defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and
deliberate.” People v Mette, 243 Mich App 318, 330; 621 NW2d 713 (2000); MCL 750.316. As
this Court observed in People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 642; 588 NW2d 480 (1998):
Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the
defendant to take a second look. The elements of premeditation and deliberation
may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing. [Citation
omitted.]
In People v Abraham, 234 Mich App 640; 599 NW2d 736 (1999), this Court further explained:
Premeditation and deliberation may be established by evidence of “(1) the
prior relationship of the parties; (2) the defendant's actions before the killing; (3)
the circumstances of the killing itself; and (4) the defendant's conduct after the
homicide.” [Id. at 656, quoting People v Schollaert, 194 Mich App 158, 170; 486
NW2d 312 (1992).]
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that there was
sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to submit the first-degree murder charge to
the jury.
A witness at the scene, David Dmytryszny, testified that defendant’s friend, Anthony
Mullinax, exchanged hostile words with Dmytryszny and the victim that night, in defendant’s
presence. Another witness testified that defendant appeared to have a verbal confrontation with
the victim between fifteen and twenty minutes before the fatal shooting and that defendant
appeared somewhat angry.
Regarding the shooting itself, a forensic pathologist testified that the victim was struck in
the face with a blunt object and that the victim was shot from behind, with the muzzle of the gun
in direct contact with the back of the victim’s head. This is consistent with the testimony of
Kirsten Ellenbrook, who testified that, after the shooting, she overheard defendant admit that he
pistol-whipped the victim and then shot him. Further, while defendant asserted a defense of
accident and argued that the gun discharged once when he hit the victim on the back of the head,
four shell casings from defendant’s gun were found in the vicinity of the shooting. Ellenbrook
also testified that defendant changed his clothes after the shooting and she heard defendant say
that, after he left the scene of the incident, defendant disassembled and disposed of the gun.
In sum, a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant and Mullinax argued with the
victim twice during the evening and that defendant had a confrontation with the victim just
minutes before the shooting. Further, the jury could conclude that, after pistol-whipping the
victim’s face, defendant moved behind the victim, placed the gun on the back of the victim’s
head, and deliberately pulled the trigger. This is supported by defendant’s actions after the
shooting when he immediately disposed of certain incriminating evidence.3 Viewed in a light
3
Evidence showed that, around the same time defendant shot the victim, Mullinax shot the
(continued…)
-2-
most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and
deliberation to submit the first degree murder charge to the jury.
Notwithstanding this evidence that would support a conviction for the greater offense, the
jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder. Were we to find that the trial court erred by
submitting the first-degree murder charge to the jury, the error would be reviewed under the
harmless error standard. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 482; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). However,
because we find no error in the trial court’s submission of the first-degree murder charge to the
jury, the verdict was not a result of jury compromise and we need not address this issue further.
II. Sentence
Defendant’s claims that the trial court abused its discretion in its upward departure from
the sentencing guidelines.
Under MCL 769.34(3), “[a] court may depart from the appropriate sentence range
established under the sentencing guidelines . . . if the court has a substantial and compelling
reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure.”4 This Court
“review[s] for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision that objective and verifiable factors
constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departing from the guidelines’ recommended
minimum sentence.” People v Armstrong, 247 Mich App 423, 424; 636 NW2d 785 (2001).
Here, the parties agree that the trial court properly scored defendant’s prior record and
offense variables and that his scores placed defendant in the guidelines range of twelve to twenty
years in prison for his murder conviction. The trial court found substantial and compelling
reasons to depart upward from the guidelines range and sentenced defendant to a minimum of
twenty-five years in prison. Defendant concedes that the factors the trial court considered were
objective and verifiable, but says that the factors were either already taken into consideration in
scoring the offense variables or were impermissible factors to consider in departing upward from
the guidelines range.
Defendant asserts that the trial court should not have considered the fact that he attended
the party while carrying a gun because this was already contemplated in offense variables one
and two. Under MCL 769.34(3)(b):
The court shall not base a departure on an offense characteristic or
offender characteristic already taken into account in determining the appropriate
sentence range unless the court finds from the facts contained in the court record,
including the presentence investigation report, that the characteristic has been
given inadequate or disproportionate weight.
(…continued)
victim’s friend, Dmytryszny, above the ear.
4
“Our Supreme Court has held that substantial and compelling reasons must be based on
objective and verifiable factors.” People v Izarraras-Placante, 246 Mich App 490, 497; 633
NW2d 18 (2001).
-3-
Defendant received a score of twenty-five points for aggravated use of a weapon under OV 1,
MCL 777.31, which provides that “[a] firearm was discharged at or toward a human being or a
victim was cut or stabbed with a knife or other cutting or stabbing weapon.” The court also gave
defendant five points for OV 2, MCL 777.32, which states that “[t]he offender possessed or used
a pistol, rifle, shotgun, or knife or other cutting or stabbing weapon.”
While the mere possession or use of a firearm is taken into account by the
aforementioned offense variables, the trial court found especially compelling that defendant
carried a loaded .45 caliber pistol to a party at which drugs were used and that defendant carried
the gun in order to “be[] the toughest guy at the party . . . .” as demonstrated by the fact that
defendant pulled out the gun at “a slightest hint of trouble.”5 Because these troubling and
aggravating circumstances went beyond the mere discharge or possession of a weapon as
contemplated under OV 1 and OV 2 and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant further contends that the trial court abused its discretion because “[t]he fact
that the weapon had been discharged in the course of an argument had already been considered
in the scoring of offense variable six.” Under OV 6, MCL 777.36, the parties agree that
defendant “had unpremeditated intent to kill, the intent to do great bodily harm, or created a very
high risk of death or great bodily harm knowing that death or great bodily harm was the probable
result.” However, defendant apparently takes issue with the trial court’s assertion that it found
this crime particularly senseless because defendant pistol-whipped the victim after the victim
“looked the wrong way at” defendant or his friend. We discern no abuse of discretion with
respect to this factor. The brutal and unprovoked nature of defendant’s assault justified the trial
court’s consideration and, as the trial court correctly observed, defendants actions “carr[y] with it
. . . a viciousness and a kind of bullying [from which] the community must be protected.” Thus,
it is clear that the trial court found that the offense variables did not adequately account for the
egregious circumstances in this case.
Also, defendant alleges that the trial court should not have considered the fact that he left
the scene after the shooting. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, however, the trial court did not
conclude that defendant’s sentence should exceed the guidelines range because he subjectively
lacked remorse. Rather, the trial court made clear that, given defendant’s explanation that his
gun accidentally discharged while he was pistol-whipping the victim, defendant not only made
no effort to attend to or assist the victim, he fled the scene, leaving the victim to die in an
abandoned building. Moreover, the trial court emphasized that, after he ran from the scene,
defendant disposed of his clothing and the gun and changed his appearance to avert suspicion.
As the court correctly observed, this reflects “a kind of a coldness that is of concern.” Clearly,
this is not an impermissible factor for the trial court to consider in its upward departure.
5
Defendant also takes issue with the trial court’s finding that defendant took the gun to the party
in order to be “tough.” This was a logical inference from the evidence at trial and a permissible
credibility determination; the record reflects that guns were not permitted at the party and, as the
trial court made clear, it did not believe defendant’s explanation that he brought a loaded pistol
to the party in order to sell it. Rather, as the court noted, defendant’s decision to pull out the
loaded weapon with such slight provocation evidenced his true purpose in carrying the gun that
night.
-4-
Finally, defendant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by considering his
release from FIA in its upward departure. This does not constitute an abuse of discretion. While
the trial court did not assess defendant points for his prior record, it took into account his
troubled past as evidenced by his recent discharge from a residential program through FIA and
his commission of this crime within a short time thereafter. Not only was this an objective and
verifiable factor, it suggests defendant’s inability and unwillingness to conform his conduct to
societal rules.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that “objective and verifiable factors
constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departing from the guidelines’ recommended
minimum sentence.” Armstrong, supra at 424.6
Defendant correctly notes that the trial court failed to state its reasons for departure on the
required departure evaluation form. Armstrong, supra at 426. Therefore, we affirm defendant’s
conviction and sentence, but remand for the ministerial task of completing the guidelines’
departure form. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
6
Defendant claims that the trial court should have taken into account his family support and lack
of drug use as positive factors in considering his sentence. Defendant and his counsel had the
opportunity to emphasize positive factors at his sentencing hearing and the record reflects that
the trial court was aware of the contents of defendant’s presentence report, that it reviewed letters
of support sent on defendant’s behalf and that it was aware that defendant’s family attended
defendant’s trial. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s assessment of defendant or
this record.
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
