SCOTT W PERRIEN V GARR TOOL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SCOTT W. PERRIEN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 229388
Isabella Circuit Court
LC No. 98-000365-NZ
GARR TOOL, JOHN LEPPIEN, ROBERT
POBANZ, and RAYMOND K. WILCOX,
Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants,
and
ATT INVESTIGATIONS, INC., HOWARD
MASTROBERTI and STT, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Jansen and R. J. Danhof*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted two orders granting summary disposition to defendants
based on plaintiff’s non-joinder of claims in a previous action in Gratiot County and on res
judicata. Defendant Garr Tool1 cross-appeals, challenging the court’s award of attorney fees as a
discovery sanction. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition and affirm the
award of discovery sanctions.
Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition to Garr Tool
under MCR 2.116(C)(8), finding plaintiff failed to join his claims in the Gratiot County action,
and thus was barred by MCR 2.203, the compulsory joinder rule. Plaintiff also challenges the
trial court’s grant of summary disposition for the remaining defendants, under MCR 2.116(C)(7),
based on res judicata, relating back to the Gratiot County action, and on the trial court’s
interpretation of Gratiot County Judge Randy L. Tahvonen’s scheduling conference order.
Plaintiff argues that res judicata and compulsory joinder do not apply to the causes of action
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
1
“Garr Tool” in this opinion collectively refers to Garr Tool and defendants Leppien, Pobanz,
and Wilcox, who are officers and employees of Garr Tool.
-1-
presently alleged because they are separate and distinct from the claims raised in the Gratiot
County action. We agree.
We review de novo the trial court’s grant of summary disposition based on plaintiff’s
failure to state a claim, MCR 2.116(C)(8). Trost v Buckstop Lure Co, 249 Mich App 580, 583;
644 NW2d 54 (2002). The application of res judicata and the construction of a court rule are
both questions of law, also reviewed de novo. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co,
460 Mich 372, 379; 596 NW2d 153 (1999); CAM Construction v Lake Edgewood Condominium
Ass’n, 465 Mich 549, 553; 640 NW2d 256 (2002). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the
legal sufficiency of a claim solely by the pleadings, and the motion need not be supported with
documentary evidence. Beaudrie v Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 129; 631 NW2d 308 (2001). The
motion should be granted only when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that
no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich
109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
At the time the Gratiot County case was brought, MCR 2.203(A)(1) provided: 2
In a pleading that states a claim against an opposing party, the pleader
must join every claim that the pleader has against that opposing party at the time
of serving the pleading, if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the action and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Thus, for compulsory joinder to apply, two requirements must be met: the pleader must have a
claim, and the pleader must join the claim if it arises out of the “same transaction or occurrence.”
The trial court concluded that plaintiff was required to join the claims because plaintiff asserted
the claims arose out of the same transaction when he made a related discovery request in the
Gratiot County action, because plaintiff became aware of the potential claims during the
pendency of the original matter, and because Judge Tahvonen’s order set a six-month time limit
on any claims to be joined.
However, we conclude that the first requirement is not met because plaintiff’s cause of
action did not accrue at the time of the underlying pleading, nor did it arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence. Plaintiff’s request to explore the possibility that his telephone records
were being fraudulently acquired came after the original claims and counter-claims had been
filed: during the discovery process. Consequently, that claim could not be alleged in the initial
complaint because not all the elements had yet occurred. MCL 600.5827; see also Stephens v
Dixon, 449 Mich 531, 539; 536 NW2d 755 (1995). Accrual of a cause of action may be
postponed until the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the existence of the cause of
action. Stephens, supra at 540. The court also incorrectly interpreted Judge Tahvonen’s
scheduling order. The order did not require plaintiff to amend his complaint to include specific
claims; rather, it set a maximum time limit: the parties could not join claims after that date.
Because plaintiff’s new claims had not yet accrued, plaintiff could not be required to join them.
2
The 1999 amendment does not change this portion of the rule, now found at MCR 2.203(A).
-2-
Second, the trial court erred in concluding that the claims arose from the “same
transaction or occurrence.” Ordinarily, the issues raised by the pleadings are an important guide
to the subjects presented for adjudication, even where raised as cross-claims or counter-claims.
McCormick v Hartman, 306 Mich 346, 351; 10 NW2d 910 (1943); Jones v Chambers, 353 Mich
674, 679; 91 NW2d 889 (1958). The transaction that precipitated plaintiff’s present cause of
action was the allegedly fraudulent surveillance and misappropriation of personal records after
his employment relationship with Garr Tool had been dissolved. This is quite different from the
claims underlying the Gratiot County case, where plaintiff’s alleged misconduct while employed
by Garr Tool, along with his “secret business,” formed the basis of the action.
Furthermore, the trial court misconstrued the purpose of discovery and apparently viewed
plaintiff’s discovery request as an admission rather than a procedure designed to gather
information to clarify the issues. Domako v Rowe, 438 Mich 347, 360; 475 NW2d 30 (1991).
Plaintiff’s assertion during discovery that the telephone records were relevant to his claim of
business interference was an attempt to preserve his legal claims; his opinion, at that time
unsupported by facts, should not be taken as a legal conclusion that his claims required joinder.
The trial court based its decision, in part, on the doctrine of bar, which precludes relitigating the same cause of action between the same parties, citing Rogers v Colonial Fed Sav &
Loan Ass’n, 405 Mich 607; 275 NW2d 499 (1979). See also Union Guardian Trust Co v Rood,
308 Mich 168, 172; 13 NW2d 248 (1944). However, plaintiff was not re-litigating the same
cause of action; any decision concerning misconduct in surveillance or misappropriation of
plaintiff’s records would not be inconsistent with the result of the Gratiot County action,
regardless of its outcome. Given the distinct differences in subject matter (business interference
versus fraudulent investigation) and the time each claim accrued (during the employment
relationship versus the 1996 investigation), we conclude that the claims were not required to be
joined because they did not arise out of the “same transaction or occurrence.”
Likewise, the trial court improperly granted summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7) to the remaining defendants based on res judicata and the same misinterpretation of
Judge Tahvonen’s scheduling order. The facts required to prove the first action – for example,
that Garr Tool made disparaging remarks about plaintiff and otherwise interfered with his
business contacts – are substantively different from those required to prove the second action –
that defendants fraudulently obtained plaintiff’s telephone records and otherwise invaded his
privacy. Furthermore, the outcomes of the two claims were not dependent on each other; that is,
a trier of fact would not have to find defendants violated plaintiff’s privacy in order to find that
they had interfered with his business, and it could find that plaintiff’s records were
misappropriated even if there was no interference with his business. Thus, the two claims were
not sustained by the same facts or evidence. Huggett v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 232 Mich
App 188, 197-198; 590 NW2d 747 (1998). We therefore find the grant of summary disposition
was inappropriate.
On cross-appeal, defendant Garr Tool argues that the trial court’s imposition of discovery
sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.313(D)(1) was premature and contrary to law. We disagree.
Interpretation of court rules present a question of law that we review de novo. CAM
Construction, supra at 553. Ordinarily, discovery may be had “regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” MCR
-3-
2.302(B). We apply the rules of statutory construction to interpret the relevant court rules. CAM
Construction, supra at 553.
The court rules on discovery rules relate to the same subject and share a common purpose
and, therefore, should be read together as one law. State Treasurer v Schuster, 456 Mich 408,
417; 572 NW2d 628 (1998). Discovery is a sequential process that involves the reasonable
diligence of all parties in ensuring its effectiveness and imposes sanctions for failure to do so.
Therefore, construction should give effect to each rule, without repugnancy, absurdity, or
unreasonableness. Michigan Humane Society v Natural Resources Comm, 158 Mich App 393,
401; 404 NW2d 757 (1987).
A party served with a discovery request must specifically respond or object to each
request and, in the event of an objection, “the reasons for objection must be stated. If objection
is made to part of an item or category, the part must be specified.” MCR 2.310(C)(2). If the
discovery request is not answered, if the answer is evasive of incomplete, or if an objection is
made, then the requestor may move for an order compelling discovery. MCR 2.313(A). If the
requesting party is granted a motion to compel, the clear language of MCR 2.313(A)(5) allows
recovery of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order. Even if the requestor does not
move for an order to compel, a court can order sanctions for a party’s failure to answer a
discovery request. MCR 2.313(D)(1).
In this case, the trial court granted plaintiff’s costs as sanctions under MCR 2.313(D)(1),
essentially finding that defendants’ vague response was equivalent to a failure to respond.
Defendant argues that, unlike subsection (A) of that rule, subsection (D) does not expressly
equate a vague response with no response. However, we need not here decide if both subrules
permit imposing sanctions where a party has responded evasively because the trial court could
just as well have awarded sanctions under MCR 2.313(A). See Detroit v Presti, 240 Mich App
208, 214; 610 NW2d 261 (2000) (“This Court will not reverse a trial court’s order if it reached
the right result for the wrong reason.”).
Thus, contrary to Garr Tool’s position, MCR 2.313(A)(5)(a) allows a trial court to order
the party whose conduct necessitated the motion to compel discovery to pay the moving party
the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order.3 Plaintiff sought and was granted a
motion to compel discovery, and at the same time was awarded “sanctions.” From the record, it
is apparent that the amount awarded was based on the court’s determination of reasonable
expenses; also, at the hearing, the court referred to the award as “costs” rather than “sanctions.”
We agree with the lower court’s ruling that defendants’ responses were “vague and interposed to
stall discovery.” Accordingly, the award was appropriate under MCR 2.313(A), irrespective of
whether it is called “sanctions” or “costs”; we need not determine if they were also appropriate
under MCR 2.313(D).
3
In contrast, MCR 2.313(B) allows sanctions for failure to comply with an existing discovery
order. That subrule does not apply in this case because the sanctions were awarded at the same
time the order to compel was issued. Therefore, Garr Tool’s reliance on Brenner v Kolk, 226
Mich App 149, 158-159; 573 NW2d 65 (1997) is misplaced because that decision addresses
MCR 2.313(B).
-4-
We reverse the lower court’s grants of summary disposition for all defendants. The
court’s award of expenses is affirmed. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.