JOHN SCHOENHERR V CITY OF GROSSE POINTE FARMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN SCHOENHERR, SHELLEY
SCHOENHERR, TIMOTHY SPINA, and
ELIZABETH SPINA,
UNPUBLISHED
November 22, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 235601
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-001835-CH
VERNIER WOODS DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
CITY OF GROSSE POINTE FARMS,
Defendant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Neff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Vernier Woods Development, Inc. (“defendant”) appeals as of right the trial
court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs in this declaratory judgment
action to preclude defendant’s planned development of a parcel of land in Grosse Pointe Farms.
We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.
I
Plaintiffs are residents of the Lothrop subdivision of Grosse Pointe Farms and live
adjacent to a subdivision parcel purchased by defendant. The parcels are all part of the Pine
Woods, a group of four parcels bordered on the east end by Lothrop Road and on the west end by
Charlevoix Road. Lothrop Estate Company platted the Pine Woods parcels in 1949 and
conveyed the parcels with common deed restrictions. Each parcel was subsequently developed
so that the homes, all of a contemporary design, were built on the east side of the parcels with the
west side left in a natural wooded state. After purchasing the Pine Woods parcel, defendant
razed the existing home on the land and obtained preliminary approval from the City of Grosse
Pointe Farms to divide the parcel into two home sites. Plaintiffs filed an action in circuit court
seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment to preclude defendant’s planned
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development, claiming that it violated deed restrictions and the general plan of development for
the Pine Woods.
The trial court granted plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order (TRO), but
later granted defendant’s motion to dissolve the TRO. Defendant thereafter moved for summary
disposition. Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion and instead granted
summary disposition in favor of plaintiffs pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2), adopting plaintiffs’ brief
and oral argument as the basis of the court’s decision.
II
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that 1) the
applicable deed restrictions prohibit defendant from dividing the Pine Woods parcel into two
home sites, 2) a reciprocal negative easement exists that precludes defendant from constructing
two single family dwellings on the Pine Woods parcel, and 3) the deed restrictions entitle other
property owners in the subdivision to review and approve proposed construction plans for
residences to be built on the Pine Woods parcel. The nature of the court’s decision in this case
leaves to question its particular rulings. Nonetheless, we agree that the grant of summary
disposition in favor of plaintiffs, purportedly on all three bases, was improper.
A
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of
Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). As defendant notes, however,
appellate review of the trial court’s summary disposition order in this case is complicated by the
fact that the court provided no specific legal rationale to support its decision. In granting
summary disposition, the court merely noted: “adopt plaintiffs[’] brief and oral argument as the
basis for my decision.”
Plaintiffs argued alternative theories for their request for equitable relief to preclude
defendant’s proposed development. Plaintiffs argued that defendant’s plan was contrary to the
general plan of development for the Pine Woods and therefore the proposed construction was
precluded by a reciprocal negative easement. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that the deed
restrictions provided plaintiffs the right to enforce the restrictions, including requiring prior
approval of defendant’s construction plans, by an architect designated by plaintiffs, on the basis
of “aesthetic consideration[s] and the effect upon the outlook of neighboring property.” It was
plaintiff’s contention that dividing the Pine Woods parcel into two home sites would destroy the
character and integrity of a “one-of-a-kind area,” particularly because constructing a home on the
west end of the parcel would destroy its woods, which is considered to be one of the first
reforestation efforts in the United States. We find neither theory, as presented, a proper basis for
summary disposition, but agree that the deed restrictions expressly entitle plaintiffs to enforce the
restrictive covenants put into place by the original grantor with regard to development of the
Pine Woods parcels.
Because the trial court’s decision involved considerations outside the pleadings, this
Court applies the principles for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Kubisz v
Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc, 236 Mich.App 629, 633, n 4; 601 NW2d 160 (1999). Summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of
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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life Ins
Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). The court must consider the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Id.
B
We find no basis for a conclusion as a matter of law that the deed restrictions bar
defendant’s proposed development in total. Words used in restrictive covenants must be given
their ordinary meaning, and, where clear and unambiguous, they are controlling. Sylvan Glens
Homeowners Ass’n v McFadden, 103 Mich App 118, 121-122; 302 NW2d 615 (1981).
However, where the language of such covenants is ambiguous, courts must observe established
rules of interpretation with regard to such covenants. Borowski v Welch, 117 Mich App 712,
716; 324 NW2d 144 (1982). In Stuart v Chawney, 454 Mich 200, 210; 560 NW2d 336 (1997),
our Supreme Court noted that, with respect to the interpretation of covenants: “[n]egative
covenants ... are grounded in contract ... [and] the intent of the drafter controls.” Restrictive
covenants are to be strictly construed against those seeking to enforce them and any doubts must
be resolved in favor of the free use of the property. Id. “Courts will not grant equitable relief
unless there is an obvious violation.” Id.
It is undisputed that defendant’s parcel is subject to deed restrictions, which provide in
relevant part:
1. APPROVAL OF PLANS. No buildings shall be erected on any building site
as hereinafter defined and no improvements or alterations of any building on any
building site shall be undertaken except in accordance with complete plans and
specifications, which plans and specifications shall show the grade of the
proposed buildings in relation to the grade level of the street and shall show the
proposed location of the buildings on the building site, furnished to and approved
in writing, prior to the commencement of construction, by the architect designated
for that purpose by the Lothrop Estate Company and any expense connected with
such designation, submission or approval shall be borne by the parties submitting
said plans and specifications, and such plans and specifications shall be
disapproved if there is any noncompliance with any of the restrictions herein
contained and may be disapproved if in the opinion of the architect the proposed
structure would otherwise be unsuitable or undesirable, and in this connection
aesthetic consideration and the effect upon the outlook from neighboring property
may be considered. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs 1 to 12 hereof shall
not be waived by the Company or the architect except where provision for such
waiver is expressly made and failure of the architect to act upon the plans and
specification shall in no manner affect the right of any owner of any building site
in the building sites to enforce such restrictions.
2. BUILDING SITES. No building shall be erected, placed or maintained on any
parcel of land in the tract which has less area than the minimum area of the
building site herein described. The minimum area of a building site shall be 75
feet in width measured at right angles to the line dividing Private Claims 122 and
231 and at least 260 feet in depth measured parallel to said line.
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4. SINGLE DWELLING HOUSE ONLY. No building shall be erected on any
building site other than one single residence dwelling and a private garage for use
in connection with the residence building. The residence dwelling shall be
designed for the use of and shall be used and occupied by only one single family
and the domestic servants in the employ of the family.
The deed restrictions do not expressly prohibit dividing defendant’s parcel into two building sites
or limit construction of a home to the east end of the parcel and to a contemporary design as
sought by plaintiffs.
However, the deed restrictions expressly preserve plaintiffs’ right to enforce the
restrictions set forth, including those with regard to the approval of construction plans:
The restrictions set forth in paragraphs 1 to 12 hereof shall not be waived by the
Company or the architect except where provision for such waiver is expressly
made and failure of the architect to act upon the plans and specification shall in no
manner affect the right of any owner of any building site in the building sites to
enforce such restrictions.
Under ¶ 1, Approval of Plans, defendant’s proposed construction must be approved by an
architect designated for that purpose. In the absence of enforcement by Lothrop Estate
Company, plaintiffs, i.e., the other site owners, are entitled to enforce this restrictive covenant.
“[T]he language employed in stating the restriction is to be taken in its ordinary and
generally understood or popular sense ….” Borowski, supra at 716. The deed restrictions
require that building plans be “furnished to and approved in writing, prior to the commencement
of construction, by the architect designated for that purpose by the Lothrop Estate Company ….”
It is undisputed that the Lothrop Estate Company no longer exists. Therefore, we agree that,
pursuant to plaintiffs’ express right to enforce the deed restrictions, plaintiffs may reasonably
designate an architect to approve defendant’s construction plans to ensure compliance with the
deed restrictions, and that the architect may consider whether “the proposed structure would
otherwise be unsuitable or undesirable.” The parties to a written conveyance are presumed to
have intended a reasonable construction, and the courts will resolve all doubts by adopting a
construction that does not produce unusual or unjust results. Wisniewski v Kelly, 175 Mich App
175, 178-179; 437 NW2d 25 (1989).
The court’s determination that plaintiffs could designate an architect who would review
defendant’s construction plans to achieve the stated purposes of the deed restrictions was a
reasonable interpretation of the grantor’s intent. Id. at 179. We affirm the grant of summary
disposition to the extent it permits plaintiffs to enforce the deed restrictions in a reasonable
manner.
C
We find no basis for a conclusion as a matter of law that a reciprocal negative easement
bars defendant’s development plan. If the owner of two or more lots sells one lot with
restrictions that benefit the land retained, the restriction becomes mutual, and, during the period
of restraint, the owner of the lot or lots retained can do nothing forbidden to the owner of the lot
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sold. Sanborn v McLean, 233 Mich 227, 229-230; 206 NW 496 (1925). This is known as a
reciprocal negative easement. Id. at 230.
A reciprocal negative easement requires that:
[t]here must have been a common owner of the related parcels of land, and in his
various grants of the lots he must have included some restriction, either
affirmative or negative, for the benefit of the land retained, evidencing a scheme
or intent that the entire tract should be similarly treated. Once the plan is
effectively put into operation, the burden he has placed upon the land conveyed is
by operation of law reciprocally placed upon the land retained. In this way those
who have purchased in reliance upon this particular restriction will be assured that
the plan will be completely achieved. [Lanski v Montealegre, 361 Mich 44, 47;
104 NW2d 772 (1960).]
We find no clear evidence of a reciprocal negative easement in this case to support
summary disposition. Plaintiffs do not argue that Lothrop Estate Company, the common grantor,
sold their parcels with express restrictions that by operation of law should apply to defendant’s
parcel because such express restrictions were not placed on defendant’s parcel. See Sanborn,
supra at 230-231 (common grantor sold numerous lots, including plaintiffs’, with restrictions to
effect a common residential plan, but defendants’ lot in the same subdivision was later conveyed
without the restrictions). In fact, the restrictions at issue, placed upon plaintiffs’ parcels, are the
same as those placed on defendant’s parcel.
Plaintiffs’ contend that there is overwhelming evidence establishing the Lothrop Estate
Company’s general plan for the Pine Woods to effect the alleged restrictions. We disagree.
Plaintiffs presented their own affidavits, as well as those of an architect and one of the original
Pine Woods homeowners,1 as evidence that the Pine Woods homes are all of contemporary
design, flow with the contours of the land, and are built on the east sides of the property with
access only from Lothrop Road, leaving the wooded western half of the property undisturbed.
The affidavit of the former owner of defendant’s parcel specifically averred that he purchased his
vacant lot from Lothrop Estate Company and engaged the services of an architect, who was
considered the architect of Lothrop Estate Company, to design his home in conformity with the
deed restrictions. He stated that the architect designed the home with contemporary styling,
similar to the other homes in the immediate area, and to preserve the neighborhood aesthetics by
maintaining the woods.
Plaintiffs also point out that Lothrop Estate Company provided each Pine Woods parcel
with an easement to Lothrop Road, but not Charlevoix Road, and there is a stone wall along the
western edge of the parcels, evincing the grantor’s intent that homes be built only on the east half
of the parcels. Finally, plaintiffs point to a 1935 news article on the career of George Lothrop,
reporting that he planted evergreens in the back of his farm (apparently, the wooded area of the
Pine Woods), considered to be the first example of reforestation in the United States, which
plaintiffs contend further supports their assertion of the intended deed restrictions.
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the original owner of the home purchased by defendant.
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Plaintiffs evidence does not rise to the level of proof required to conclusively establish a
“scheme of restrictions” on defendant’s parcel. Doxtator-Nash Civic Ass’n v Cherry Hill
Professional Bldg, Inc, 12 Mich App 468, 473; 163 NW2d 262 (1968). Plaintiffs evidence does
not establish that the alleged common scheme was imposed by the grantor, Lothrop Estate
Company, on certain parcels sold for the benefit of parcels retained, rather than that the
commonalities merely reflect the choice of the original purchasers. A reciprocal negative
easement cannot be created retroactively by mutual agreement among common land owners to
act in a certain way. Sanborn, supra at 230. Reciprocal negative easements “arise, if at all, out
of a benefit accorded land retained, by restrictions upon neighboring land sold by a common
owner.” Id. at 230.
Further, the fact that Lothrop Estate Company required architectural approval of the
home plans does not establish that it, as grantor, specifically required that the homes be built of a
contemporary design and constructed only on the eastern half of the parcels. While such an
inference may be drawn from the evidence, plaintiffs are not entitled to have such inferences
drawn in their favor under either the summary disposition standard or under the rules for judicial
interpretation of restrictive covenants. In deciding a motion for summary disposition, the court
must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Smith,
supra at 454. In an action to enforce a covenant, the provisions are to be strictly construed
against the enforcer and doubts are to be resolved in favor of the free use of the property. Stuart,
supra. The trial court erred in granting summary disposition on the basis of the evidence
presented.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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