HOBSON PETROLEUM CORP V STATE OF MICH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HOBSON PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
EVELYN ANNA SCHOMMER, MARY LOU
PRUSIK, GEORGE PRUSIK, PATRICIA
SCHOMMER, DENNIS L. SCHOMMER,
BARBARA A. SCHOMMER, GERALD T.
SCHOMMER, CYNTHIA SCHOMMER,
LAWRENCE E. SCHOMMER, MARY
SCHOMMER, RODNEY L. SCHOMMER, BETH
ANN GARDISON, and KENNETH D.
HARDISON,
UNPUBLISHED
December 21, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN, THE DEPARTMENT
OF QUALITY CONTROL, SUPERVISOR OF
WELLS, GORDEN E. GUYER, RUSSELL J.
HARDING, ASSISTANT SUPERVISOR OF
WELLS, HAROLD J. FITCH, THOMAS R.
SEGALL, NATURAL RESOURCES
COMMISSION,
No. 222992
Court of Claims
LC No. 97-16541-CM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: K.F. Kelly, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this inverse condemnation action, plaintiffs appeal as of right from the Court of Claims
decision granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and
(C)(10). We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
This case has a lengthy and detailed history. Hobson Petroleum Corporation (hereinafter
“Hobson”) is an oil and gas exploration and production company that acquired an oil and mineral
lease from Plaintiff Evelyn Schommer, (hereinafter “Schommer”). Schommer owns an eighty
acre parcel located within the Pigeon River Country State Forest (hereinafter “Pigeon River.”).
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The lease gave Hobson the right to explore for and develop oil and gas reserves underlying the
Schommer property.
Pigeon River was dedicated on December 7, 1973, and the Natural Resources
Commission adopted “A Concept of Management for the Pigeon River Country.” The primary
purpose for the dedication was to create a unified management plan to address the potential for
disruption wrought by oil and gas development. After the dedication, the then Michigan
Department of Natural Resources, (now Department of Environmental Quality), developed a
formal plan to manage the hydrocarbon resources in the Pigeon River area in addition to creating
a comprehensive environmental impact statement. Collectively, these documents recommended
that any hydrocarbon development in the Pigeon River area be accomplished pursuant to a
controlled, unitized operation. That is, allowing only one designated operator, with combined
facilities, strict environmental controls, all within a limited area and for a limited period of time.
In 1976, these recommendations were incorporated into a consent order and unit
agreement with the major oil companies which held the bulk of mineral rights leases within
Pigeon River. One year after the consent agreement, litigation arose over drilling exploratory
wells within Pigeon River, which culminated in the Michigan Supreme Court issuing a
permanent injunction prohibiting drilling of the wells in that area. See West Michigan
Environmental Action Council v Natural Resources Comm, 405 Mich 741, 760; 275 NW2d 538
(1979).
In 1980, negotiations between environmental groups, oil companies, and the State,
resulted in a second consent order. The second consent order was similar to the 1976 order,
again requiring development by one operator, use of combined facilities, strict environmental
controls, limited areas of development, and a limited time frame.
Additionally, during this time, the Legislature passed an act1 incorporating the plan
outlined by the consent orders which delineated the framework for all hydrocarbon development
within the Pigeon River area. The act incorporated the provisions of the 1980 consent order
which included a “nondevelopment region” where no drilling could occur.
Schommer acquired her interest in the property 1972. Schommer’s property is situated
within the nondevelopment region thus prohibiting any drilling on her land. In 1984, four years
after the Pigeon River Country State Forest Hydrocarbon Development Act, Hobson acquired
mineral leases on the subject property by an assignment of a lease providing it with exclusive
rights to explore for and develop the oil and gas reserves underneath the land. By virtue of
individual assignments dated May 2, 1983, Shommer’s children and their respective spouses,
also plaintiffs in the action, own royalty interests in the oil, gas and other minerals underlying the
subject property.
1
The Pigeon River Country State Forest Hydrocarbon Development Act, 1980 PA 316, as
amended MCL 319.121 et seq., now Part 619 of the Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Act, MCL 324.61901.
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After acquiring the lease in 1984, Hobson applied for a permit to drill on the Schommer
property. Because Hobson’s application did not address the requirements for drilling in the
Pigeon River area imposed by the 1980 legislation, Hobson’s application was denied.
Hobson filed a second Application For A Permit to Drill an oil and/or gas well on the
Schommer property in February of 1986. Because the decision on the application was not
forthcoming, Hobson filed an administrative appeal. By letter dated February 5, 1988, Hobson’s
application was denied, ostensibly because it would not agree to the conditions governing
drilling in the Pigeon River area and also because a prudent and feasible alternative to the surface
location proposed by Hobson existed south of the no-drill boundary line. This alternative would
allow Hobson to access the minerals by “directionally drilling” from a surface location outside of
the nondevelopment area. The unit operator for the relevant area was Shell Western E & P, Inc.
(hereinafter “SWEPI”) and as such, SWEPI had the sole authority to conduct oil and gas
operations within the Pigeon River designation. Accordingly, SWEPI would have to drill and
operate the well thus increasing Hobson’s cost by thirty-two percent. After a full evidentiary
hearing, the administrative law judge2 held that directionally drilling from a surface location
outside of the no-drill boundary was a feasible and prudent alternative. This determination was
contained in the administrative law judge’s comprehensive Proposal for Decision issued on
January 11, 1992 which the Natural Resources Commission adopted as a final decision on
August 13, 1992.
Hobson appealed the 1992 final decision of the Natural Resources Commission to the
Ingham Circuit Court. The circuit court affirmed the Commission’s decision. Hobson sought
leave to this Court but this Court denied it’s request for lack of merit. See Hobson Petroleum v
Supervisor of Wells, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 27, 1995 [Docket
No. 179717.] Hobson then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court but that
application was also denied. See Hobson Petroleum Corp v Supervisor of Wells, 450 Mich 994;
___ NW2d ___ (1996).
After the Supreme Court rejected Hobson’s appeal from the 1986 denial, Hobson, along
with Schommer as owner in fee simple of the subject property and her children and their spouses
as owners of the royalty interests in the minerals underlying the property, filed an inverse
condemnation claim alleging that the State’s denial of Hobson’s drilling permits constituted a
taking for which just compensation is required. After discovery, by written Decision and Order,
dated October 5, 1997, the Court of Claims granted the State’s motion for summary disposition
as to all plaintiffs pursuant to MCR 2.116(c)(7), (8), and (10). Hobson appeals as of right. We
affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
II. Overview on Taking Clause Jurisprudence
In the case at bar, the individually named plaintiffs argue that the State’s regulations
governing drilling within the Pigeon River designation effects a taking of their property for
which they must be justly compensated. Additionally, Hobson contends that the State’s denial of
2
We acknowledge that the proper title for an administrative law judge is now “hearing referee.”
However, for purposes of clarity and in accord with the documentation presented in the case at
bar, we use the former designation.
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its application for a permit to drill on Ms. Schommer’s property despite Hobson’s efforts to
comply with feasible and prudent alternatives, to wit: directionally drilling from an area outside
of the no-drill region constitutes a taking for which the State must provide just compensation.
Both our federal and state constitutions prohibit the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. See U.S. Const., Am V and Const. 1963, art 10 §2.
Few will dispute the government’s authority to regulate private property for the good of
the public. Indeed, “government regulation -- by definition -- involves the adjustment of rights
for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic
exploitation of private property.” Andrus v Allard, 444 US 51, 64; 100 S Ct 318; 62 L Ed 2d 210
(1979). Consequently, the government is not required to compensate for all regulations that
impinge upon an owner’s interests in private property as this “would effectively compel the
government to regulate by purchase.” Id. (Emphasis in original.)
The general rule stated by Justice Holmes seventy-nine years past remains the governing
law to date, “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far, it
will be recognized as a taking.” Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393, 415; 43 S Ct 158;
67 L Ed 322 (1922). Whether a regulation goes “to far” necessarily turns on the facts of each
individual case. K & K Construction Inc., v Department of Natural Resources, 456 Mich 570,
576; 575 NW2d 531 (1998).
Abundantly clear, however, is that a taking occurs “when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good
[and thus] leave his property economically idle.” Lucas v South Carolina Costal Counsil, 505
US 1003, 1019; 112 S Ct 2886; 120 L Ed 2d 798 (1991). Just as clear is that a taking does not
obtain “where an owner possesses a `full bundle’ of property rights [and suffers] the destruction
of one `strand’ of the bundle.” Andrus, supra at 65-66.
Essentially, there are two situations where land use regulations will effect a taking: (1)
where the regulation does not substantially advance a legitimate state interest, or (2) where the
regulation denies an owner economically viable use of his land. K & K, supra at 576. The
second category of government regulation is subdivided into: (a) a categorical taking which
deprives the owner of `all economically beneficial or productive use of land,’ (citing Lucas,
supra at 1015), and (b) a taking pursuant to the balancing test established in Penn Central3. K &
K Construction, supra at 576-577.
In a categorical taking situation, the owner automatically recovers for the taking. Lucas,
supra at 1015. Conversely, the balancing test requires “an ad hoc factual inquiry” involving
three factors: (1) the character of the government’s action, (2) the economic effect of the
regulation on the property, and (3) the extent by which the regulation has interfered with distinct,
investment-backed expectations. K & K Construction, supra at 577, citing Penn Central, supra
at 124. Incumbent upon plaintiff alleging a taking requiring just compensation is to establish that
the regulation obliterates the value of the land or that because of the regulation, plaintiff cannot
3
Penn Central Transportation Company, v New York City, 438 US 104; 98 S CT 2646; 57 L Ed
2d 631 (1978).
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make use of the property at issue. Dowerk v Charter Township of Oxford, 233 Mich App 62, 67;
592 NW2d 724 (1999). Indeed, plaintiff’s burden is onerous considering that a mere disparity in
value between potential uses is insufficient to establish a taking. Id. at 68. And, a taking does
not obtain even where a particular regulation “deprives the owner of the most profitable use of
his property . . . .” Oceco Land Company v Department of Natural Resources, 216 Mich App
310, 313; 548 NW2d 702 (1996). Bearing these governing principles in mind, we now consider
the facts presented in the case at bar.
III. Summary Disposition
A. Standards of Review
This Court reviews de novo motions for summary disposition. A motion pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim itself to determine whether plaintiff’s
pleadings set forth a prima facie case. Estate of Bradford v O’Connor Chiropractic Clinic, 243
Mich App 524, 529; 624 NW2d 245 (2000). Conversely, a motion brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for the claim. A reviewing court considers all
documentary evidence submitted to determine whether a genuine material factual issue exists
upon which reasonable minds may differ. Smith v Global Life Insurance Co, 460 Mich 446,
454-455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).
Similarly, in reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the court must consider all
affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence filed or submitted by
the parties. Unlike a motion brought pursuant to (C)(10), however, a (C)(7) movant is not
necessarily required to file any supportive material and the party opposing the motion need not
respond in kind. Maiden v Rozwood 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Rather, the
allegations contained in the complaint are accepted as true save for those allegations specifically
contradicted by documentation submitted by the movant. Id. If the parties in fact submit
documentary evidence, the court must consider the evidence submitted when deciding the
motion. Diehl, supra at 123. The motion should not be granted unless no factual development
could provide a basis for recovery. Simmons v Apex Drug Stores, Inc, 201 Mich App 250, 252;
506 NW2d 562 (1993).
B. Plaintiff Evelyn Schommer – Summary Disposition and Leave to Amend
For purposes of Taking Clause analysis, the Court of Claims distinguished Schommer’s
interest as a landowner in fee simple from the mineral and royalty interests retained by Hobson
and the other individually named plaintiffs. As an owner in fee simple, the Court of Claims
reasoned that Schommer had a separate and distinct ownership interest. Indeed, as owner in fee
simple, Schommer owned all rights and interests in the subject property as opposed to only
owning an interest in the minerals underlying the land. Based on this distinction, the Court of
Claims ruled that Schommer could not claim a categorical taking because the economic value of
her land divorced from the mineral rights there under were not affected by the government’s
regulations. Accordingly, the Court of Claims ruled that because Schommer only alleged that
the government regulation prevented her from exploiting the mineral rights underneath her land,
and otherwise failed to allege a destruction of other rights and interests inuring to her as owner in
fee simple, Schommer failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the
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Court of Claims granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition as to Schommer pursuant
to MCR 2.116(c)(8) and (c)(10).
A bedrock principle underlying Taking Clause jurisprudence is the “nonsegmentation
principle” which provides that when considering the effect of a regulation on a particular piece
of property, the subject property must be considered as a whole and must not be divided into
discrete segments to discern a taking. K & K Construction, supra at 578. Indeed, “[c]ourts
should not `divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.’ Rather, we must examine the effect of the
regulation on the entire parcel, not just the affected portion of that parcel.” Id. at 578-79
(quoting Penn Central, supra at 130.)
There is no doubt that the State’s regulation prohibiting drilling on Schommer’s property
deprives her of a valuable use. In fact, developing the underlying minerals may be the most
profitable use of that particular property. However, a mere deprivation of even the most
profitable use of property is not necessarily a “taking” requiring just compensation. See Oceco
Land Company, supra at 313. Indeed, according to the standard enunciated in Lucas, to establish
a taking, a landowner must initially allege that the regulation at issue is so pervasive as to require
that property owner to sacrifice “all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good [leaving] his property economically idle.” Lucas, supra at 1019. (Emphasis in original.)
Plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain this vital allegation rendering it legally deficient as
to Schommer. The Court of Claims, however, in accord with MCR 2.116(I)(5) should have
permitted plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint to allege that the State’s regulations
rendered the property entirely worthless and economically idle. K & K Construction, supra at
587; see also Dowerk, supra at 67, thus establishing a taking for which just compensation must
be forthcoming. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Claims’ grant of summary disposition as
to Schommer and remand to permit plaintiffs to amend the complaint in that regard. In light of
our ruling, the Court of Claims’ grant of defendant’s motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is
therefore premature at this juncture.
C. Hobson and Other Individually Named Plaintiffs
The Court of Claims granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition finding that
Hobson and the other plaintiffs could not have “reasonable investment-backed expectations” in
the subject property. The Court of Claims noted that aside from Schommer, all of the other
individually named plaintiffs acquired their mineral rights in the subject property in 1983 and
1984. And, considering the turmoil surrounding hydrocarbon development within the Pigeon
River designation, three or four years preceding the time that plaintiffs acquired their respective
interests, plaintiffs must have appreciated the possibility that developing oil and gas on land
within the Pigeon River designation may be significantly curtailed. Despite the drilling
occurring in that region, the Court of Claims nevertheless held that the subject land is located in
the “nondevelopment” area or “no-drill” region and the 1980 legislation was “unambiguous
notice” that drilling directly on the land overlying their mineral rights was prohibited.
Accordingly, the Court of Claims held that the plaintiffs could not have had reasonable
investment-backed expectations sufficient to constitute a taking and that defendants were thus
entitled to summary disposition.
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In addition, the Court of Claims found unpersuasive the “self-serving” affidavit submitted
by Charles Hobson, president of Hobson Petroleum Corporation, attempting to establish that by
virtue of a “joint venture,” Hobson actually acquired its mineral rights in 1980 for exploring and
developing minerals in the Pigeon River area well before all of the controversy arose. Finding
no genuine factual issue, the Court of Claims granted summary disposition in accord with MCR
2.116(C)(10). We find that the Court of Claims erred in this regard.
It is axiomatic that a Court of Claims may not assess credibility or otherwise determine
facts when considering motions for summary disposition. Oade v Jackson National Life
Insurance Company of Michigan, 465 Mich 244, 265; 632 NW2d 126 (2001). The Court of
Claims’ designation of Charles Hobson’s affidavit as “self-serving” necessarily involves a
determination as to his credibility. Although the testimony provided by Charles Hobson during
the administrative hearing directly conflicts with the statement contained in his affidavit, that
does not give the Court of Claims a basis to invade the ultimate province of the finder of fact and
make a definitive finding as regards Charles Hobson’s credibility sufficient to render judgment
as a matter of law.
Indeed, the finder of fact should be permitted to assess Charles Hobson’s credibility
within the context of an adversarial proceeding and make that determination part and parcel of its
ultimate verdict. No matter how saturated with self-interest the representations contained in
Charles Hobson’s affidavit, they are nevertheless sufficient to, at the very least, create a genuine
factual issue to withstand a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Franzel v Kerr
Manufacturing Co, 234 Mich App 600, 622; 600 NW2d 66 (1999) (recognizing that “the jury is
the sole arbiter of witness credibility.”)
Because our review de novo of the record reveals that a genuine factual issue exists
pertaining to when Hobson obtained its oil and gas interests in the subject property, and to what
extent drilling within the designation by other companies affected the individually named
plaintiffs’ reasonable investment backed expectations, there are therefore factual issues raised
concerning the extent to which the state’s regulations interfered with these expectations. See K
& K Construction, supra at 577. Accordingly, we find that the Court of Claims committed error
requiring reversal by granting summary disposition in this regard.
V. Collateral Estoppel
Next, Hobson argues that the lower court erred by determining that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel applied and thus precluded it’s ability to relitigate issues previously raised,
litigated and determined within the context of the administrative hearing and subsequent
determination denying it’s 1986 application finding that feasible and prudent alternatives existed.
The Court of Claims held that summary disposition in accord with MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10)
was therefore appropriate for lack of a genuine factual issue that Hobson failed to avail itself of
these feasible and prudent alternatives before the administrative hearing on the denial of its 1986
application. Accordingly, the Court of Claims held that plaintiffs damages did not result from
the State’s actions, but rather, obtained from Hobson’s decision not to pursue these feasible and
prudent alternatives. We agree.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to bar relitigation of issues already litigated
and determined where the same parties previously had a “full and fair opportunity to adjudicate
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their claims.” Nummer v Treasury Dep’t, 448 Mich 534, 541; 533 NW2d 250 (1995). Where a
party seeks to preclude relitigation pursuant to an administrative decision, that party must
establish that: 1) the administrative determination was adjudicatory in nature; 2) there was a right
to an appeal; and 3) the Legislature must have intended that the decision rendered be final absent
an appeal. See Id. at 542.
A review of the record in the case at bar reveals that after a full hearing in a contested
case, the administrative law judge made a factual determination that Hobson would not have
been an appropriate operator in the Pigeon River designation and was unwilling to comply with
reasonable restrictions that would have permitted development of oil and gas underlying the
property, and that Hobson had a reasonable, feasible and prudent alternative consisting of
directional drilling from outside of the no-drill boundary. (Emphasis added.) The administrative
law judge’s determinations contained in the Proposal for Decision became the final decision of
the Natural Resources Commission and subsequently upheld in an appeal to the circuit court4.
Although Hobson argues on appeal that “there was never any determination made that [it]
refused or failed to take steps to drill at that feasible and prudent alternate location,” a review of
the record belies Hobson’s position. Indeed, the administrative law judge found that Hobson
refused to comply with reasonable restrictions imposed upon drilling within the Pigeon River
designation; compliance with which would have permitted Hobson to develop the oil and gas
underlying the subject property. Accordingly, the administrative law judge made a
determination that Hobson, because of its refusal to comply with certain reasonable restrictions,
failed to avail itself of a feasible and prudent alternative thus resulting in the denial of its 1986
application for permit. The Court of Claims upheld this determination finding that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of these very same issues.
A review of the record reveals that the administrative law judge rendered its
determination after a full hearing on a contested case which was an adjudicatory proceeding, the
issues raised concerning the denial of Hobson’s 1986 permit were actually litigated and
determined, and Hobson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate these issues. Consequently, we
find that the Court of Claims did not commit error requiring reversal when it determined that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of these factual issues and granted defendant’s
motion in accord with 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10) respectively. Ergo, insofar as plaintiffs relied on
the denial of the 1986 permit as a basis for its taking claim, we find that the Court of Claims did
not err by determining that plaintiffs’ damages in that regard flowed not from State action, but
rather, from Hobson’s failure to comply with reasonable restrictions imposed on drilling within
the Pigeon River designation thus rendering summary disposition in accord with MCR
2.116(C)(10) appropriate.
VI. Denial of 1992 Application
In 1992, shortly after the Michigan Supreme Court denied Hobson’s application for
leave, Hobson filed another permit to drill seeking to use the alternate location containing
4
As previously noted, this Court and the Michigan Supreme Court both denied Hobson’s
application for leave to appeal the decision rendered in the Ingham Circuit Court affirming the
Commission’s final decision.
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SWEPI’s facilities. Hobson contends that after pursuing the identified feasible and prudent
alternatives, its application was nevertheless denied. Conversely, defendants contend that
Hobson’s 1992 application was denied because Hobson failed to properly pursue the feasible and
prudent alternatives because Hobson was seeking permission for it to drill and operate the
proposed well which was prohibited by the regulatory scheme governing drilling within the
Pigeon River designation. Accordingly, in May of 1994, Hobson’s application was denied.
Hobson never sought an appeal pertaining to the denial of the 1992 application.
The Court of Claims held that material factual issues remain with regard to whether the
denial of Hobson’s 1992 application constituted a regulatory taking for which the State must
provide just compensation. We agree.
A review of the documentary evidence submitted reveals a flurry of correspondence after
Hobson filed its 1992 application for a permit establishing that Hobson attempted to pursue the
feasible and prudent alternatives identified but to no avail. Antithetically, defendants argue that
Hobson never proceeded properly as regards the available alternatives. Accordingly, a review of
the record reveals genuine factual issues concerning whether the ultimate denial resulted from
Hobson’s failure to comply with all applicable restrictions imposed on drilling within the Pigeon
River designation or whether the State’s restrictions are so burdensome as to effect a taking of
property for which the State must provide just compensation. Because genuine factual issues
exist in this regard, the Court of Claims’ decision denying defendant’s motion for summary
disposition relative to the 1992 application did not constitute error requiring reversal.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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