PEOPLE OF MI V EARL L JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 18, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 226746
LC No. 99-007612
JOSEPH K. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
V
No. 226747
LC No. 99-007612
EARL L. JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Cavanagh and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Joseph K. Jones was convicted of arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to
five to twenty years’ imprisonment for the arson conviction and a consecutive two-year term for
the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant Earl L. Jones was convicted of assault with intent to
do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, arson of a dwelling house, MCL 750.72,
discharging a firearm at a dwelling, MCL 750.234b, and two counts of felony firearm. He was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of fifty-seven to 120 months’ for the assault conviction,
eight to twenty years’ for the arson conviction, and twenty-three to forty-eight months’ for the
discharge of a firearm conviction, to be served consecutively to two concurrent two-year terms
for the felony-firearm convictions. Defendants appeal by right.
In Docket No. 226746, defendant Joseph K. Jones argues that he was improperly assessed
twenty-five points for offense variable one of the sentencing guidelines. We disagree. Because
this was a multiple offender case and a codefendant was assessed twenty-five points, the court
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was required to assess the same number of points for defendant Joseph K. Jones.
777.31(2)(b).
MCL
In Docket No. 226747, Earl L. Jones argues that the evidence at the preliminary
examination was insufficient to bind him over on the higher charge of assault with intent to
commit murder and that the evidence at trial was similarly insufficient to submit that charge to
the jury. He argues that his conviction on the lesser offense of assault with intent to commit
great bodily harm less than murder was therefore the product of an improper compromise
verdict. We disagree.
The evidence adduced at the preliminary examination and during trial was sufficient to
enable a factfinder to infer that defendant intended to kill. Defendant argues that he merely shot
into a building, but much more happened. The evidence revealed that defendant and his
accomplices pushed and threatened a family of eleven into a house. They then shot through the
windows and into the first and second floor walls. A shotgun blast ripped through the front door
while the homeowner was behind it. All this time, defendant and his accomplices were aware
that people were trapped in the house.
During a break in the shooting, the occupants secretly escaped. Thinking the victims
were still in the house, defendant and the others surrounded the home and firebombed it. When
they realized the occupants were not coming out, they did not attempt to rescue them or
minimize damage. Instead, even when the fire department arrived, the group wanted the house
to continue burning.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence was sufficient to allow
a rational trier of fact to infer an intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460
Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). See also People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392; 614 NW2d 78
(2000); People v Mills, 450 Mich 61; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), modified on other grounds 450
Mich 1212 (1995); People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670; 528 NW2d 842 (1995); People v
Smith, 89 Mich App 478; 280 NW2d 862 (1979), cert den 452 US 914; 101 S Ct 3047; 69 L Ed
2d 417 (1981).
We affirm both of these cases.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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