OCEANA CO BD ROAD OF COMMRS V DEPT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
OCEANA COUNTY BOARD OF ROAD
COMMISSIONERS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 11, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 221673
Oceana Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000974-AA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Jansen and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by leave granted from the circuit court’s August 2, 1999, order
granting petitioner’s motion for peremptory reversal of respondent’s decision denying
petitioner’s applications to replace existing bridges with culverts at two locations in Oceana
County. We affirm.
In 1996, petitioner filed an application proposing to replace a bridge crossing the south
branch of the Pentwater River at 136th Avenue in Elbridge Township in Oceana County.
Petitioner later filed a separate application to replace the existing bridge crossing Carlton Creek
at 92nd Avenue in Grant Township in Oceana County. After respondent denied both permit
applications, petitioner contested the denials and a three-day administrative hearing followed.
Following the hearing, the administrative hearing referee entered his proposals for
decision in January 1999. The proposals found, as a matter of fact based on the record, that
neither the south branch of the Pentwater River nor Carlton Creek had ever been capable of
floating logs, therefore, neither was navigable.1 Also as a matter of fact, the proposals concluded
that riparian rights, agriculture, commerce and industry, and wildlife would not be affected.
Moreover, the proposals also found that installation of twin arch culverts would not materially
1
The test for determining the navigability of a stream is whether the waterway is capable of
floating logs. Bott v Natural Resources Comm, 415 Mich 45, 60-61; 327 NW2d 838 (1982);
Moore v Sanborne, 2 Mich 519, 526 (1853).
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affect fish or fisheries. As a matter of law, the administrative hearing referee further concluded
that because the streams were not navigable, they were not impressed with the public trust, and
therefore the proposed project would not adversely impact the public trust. The administrative
hearing referee also found that the proposed projects would not have an adverse impact on
riparian rights, recreation, fish or wildlife, aesthetics, local government, commerce, or industry.
On February 11, 1999, respondent’s attorney requested, by way of letter to the Acting
Deputy Director of the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), that the Director of the
DEQ render the final decision in each of the contested cases because of their policy significance.
That request was granted, and on April 9, 1999, Director Russell J. Harding heard oral argument
regarding objections to the proposed decision. In a decision entered April 15, 1999, Director
Harding issued the agency’s final determination and order. Specifically, Director Harding
adopted petitioner’s proposed findings of fact that neither stream was navigable, and neither
proposed project affected riparian rights, agriculture, commerce or wildlife. Director Harding
also concluded as a matter of law that because neither stream was navigable, they were not
impressed with the public trust, and therefore the public trust was not adversely affected.
Director Harding also concluded as a matter of law that riparian rights would not be adversely
affected by the proposed projects. Director Harding went on to express his concerns that the
proposed projects “would result in a significant adverse impact to the high quality fish and fish
habitat present in the Carlton Creek and the south branch of the Pentwater River.” Noting that
clear span bridges provided a reasonable alternative to the installation of twin arch culverts, the
Director denied petitioner’s applications to install the culverts.
Petitioner subsequently petitioned for review in the Oceana Circuit Court on May 26,
1999, arguing that the DEQ did not have discretion to deny the permits where it expressly
concluded that the proposed projects did not adversely affect riparian rights or the public trust.
Petitioner subsequently moved for peremptory reversal on June 21, 1999. Respondent
challenged petitioner’s motion for peremptory reversal, arguing that petitioner’s interpretation of
MCL 324.30106 was flawed. The circuit court granted petitioner’s motion for peremptory
reversal in an order entered August 2, 1999. In a subsequent amended order entered August 30,
1999, the court included specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Notably, the court
found that neither stream was navigable, and that neither project would adversely affect riparian
rights or the public trust. In the circuit court’s view, the plain language of MCL 324.30106
required the DEQ to issue the requested permits where riparian rights and the public trust were
not adversely affected. We granted respondent’s application for leave to appeal in an order
entered September 17, 1999.
In Barak v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 246 Mich App 591, 597; 633 NW2d 489 (2001),
this Court recently set forth the applicable standard of review for claims arising from
administrative proceedings.
“An administrative agency decision is reviewed by the circuit court to
determine whether the decision was authorized by law and supported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Const 1963,
art 6, § 28; Ansell v Dep’t of Commerce (On Remand), 222 Mich App 347, 354;
564 NW2d 519 (1997). Substantial evidence is any evidence that reasonable
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minds would accept as adequate to support the decision; it is more than a mere
scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance of the evidence. See
Korzowski v Pollack Industries, 213 Mich App 223, 228; 539 NW2d 741 (1995).
This Court’s review of the circuit court’s decision is limited to determining
whether the circuit court ‘applied correct legal principles and whether it
misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test to the
agency’s factual findings.’ Boyd v Civil Service Comm, 220 Mich App 226, 234;
559 NW2d 342 (1996). In other words, this Court reviews the circuit court’s
decision for clear error. Id. A decision is clearly erroneous when, ‘on review of
the whole record, this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.’” [Barak, supra at 597, quoting Michigan Ed Ass’n
Political Action Committee (MEAPAC) v Secretary of State, 241 Mich App 432,
443-444; 616 NW2d 234 (2000).]
On appeal, respondent contends that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of § 30106
of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA), MCL 324.101 et seq.,
which governs the DEQ’s issuance of permits regulating inland lakes and streams. MCL
324.30102 mandates that permits be acquired for certain activities concerning inland lakes and
streams. MCL 324.30106 sets forth the procedure for granting a permit, and provides in
pertinent part as follows:
The department shall issue a permit if it finds that the structure or project
will not adversely affect the public trust or riparian rights. In passing upon an
application, the department shall consider the possible effects of the proposed
action upon the inland lake or stream and upon waters from which or into which
its waters flow and the uses of all such waters, including uses for recreation, fish
and wildlife, aesthetics, local government, agriculture, commerce, and industry.
The department shall not grant a permit if the proposed project or structure will
unlawfully impair or destroy any of the waters or other natural resources of the
state.
After reviewing the above statutory language, the circuit court determined that the DEQ
was required to issue the requested permits where the department expressly found that neither
proposed project would affect riparian rights or the public trust. On this record, we are not
persuaded that the circuit court applied erroneous legal principles or grossly misapplied the
substantial evidence test to the department’s factual determinations. Barak, supra at 597. We
may only reverse the circuit court’s decision where we are left with a definite and firm
conviction that the circuit court made a mistake. Id. In the instant case, we are not left with such
a conviction.
Director Harding, in his decision entered April 15, 1999, concluded that riparian rights
and the public trust were not adversely affected by the proposed projects. The circuit court
found these factual determinations to be supported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence on the whole record. Consequently, the circuit court determined that respondent was
required to issue a permit according to the plain language of § 30106. On the record before us,
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we are satisfied that the circuit court applied correct legal principles and that its decision was not
clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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