PEOPLE OF MI V MONTEZ ANTHONY BROOKS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 225042
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 95-004015-FH
MONTEZ ANTHONY BROOKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury conviction for possession with intent to
deliver between 50 and 225 grams of a controlled substance, in violation of MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iii). We affirm.
We consider first defendant’s argument that the prosecutor presented insufficient
evidence to support a finding that defendant constructively possessed the crack cocaine. We
review this question to determine “whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
people, would warrant a reasonable juror in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” with all
reasonable inferences from both circumstantial and direct evidence drawn, and all credibility
choices made, in support of the people’s case. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614
NW2d 78 (2000). Viewed according to this standard, we find that the evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the prosecutor introduced substantial evidence that defendant had control over
the apartment in which the crack cocaine was found, there was substantial evidence that
defendant had control over the crack cocaine. See People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356,
370; 592 NW2d 737 (1999). Defendant possessed the keys to the apartment, and the evidence
indicated that only he had such keys. The person in whose name the apartment was registered
testified that defendant lived in the apartment, at least at one time. That witness also denied that
she lived in or visited the apartment. Police discovered defendant’s personal identification in the
apartment. The management staff observed defendant at the apartment complex, inquiring about
renting a larger apartment, in a way that suggested he considered this apartment to be his.
Defendant ordered, paid for, and signed for delivery of a waterbed at the apartment, giving the
apartment as his address for that purpose. Finally, an envelope hidden inside a VCR in the
apartment, containing a substantial sum of money, bore the names of both defendant and his
girlfriend, along with a statement about their romantic attachment. The prosecutor introduced
-1-
additional evidence linking defendant to the apartment, but when considered in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, the above evidence alone was sufficient to establish defendant’s
constructive possession of the crack cocaine.
Against all this, defendant argues that the evidence also supported an inference that
others had access to the apartment, meaning that defendant could not have been in constructive
control of the apartment or of the crack cocaine. It is true that some evidence supported such an
inference. However, once a jury verdict is rendered, this Court’s role is not to seek those
inferences that may be drawn contrary to the jury verdict. Rather, this Court’s role is to
determine whether the jury verdict can be supported, viewing the jury verdict in the light of
every reasonable inference. Nowack, supra, 399-400. It is clear that inferences can be
reasonably drawn from the evidence supporting the jury verdict, and so the verdict must be
affirmed, even if opposite inferences could arguably also have been drawn. In addition, there
were contradictions in the testimony on this issue, and we are required to resolve credibility
issues in such a way as to support the jury verdict. Id. at 400. This last point is especially
significant when we consider that the witness on whose testimony defendant chiefly relies for his
theory rendered an extremely contradictory account. We cannot say that the jury was not entitled
to make a credibility determination giving less weight to those portions of her testimony which
did favor defendant than it gave to the testimony of other witnesses.
We therefore conclude that the prosecutor introduced sufficient evidence, when reviewed
under the applicable standard, to establish defendant’s constructive possession of the crack
cocaine. Given that defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the other
elements of the crime, it follows that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s
conviction.
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that defendant
offered to bribe the arresting police officer. We review claims of error with respect to admission
of evidence for abuse of discretion. Roulston v Tendercare (Michigan), Inc, 239 Mich App 270,
282; 608 NW2d 525 (2000). Here, we find no abuse of discretion.
It is well accepted in Michigan that evidence showing a defendant’s “guilty
consciousness,” such as evidence of flight to avoid arrest, procuring perjured testimony, and
attempts to destroy evidence, is admissible. People v Hooper, 50 Mich App 186, 199; 212
NW2d 786 (1973). There is no question that an attempt to bribe a police officer to drop charges
fits into this category, being most analogous to an attempt to destroy evidence.
Defendant argues, however, that the bribery evidence should be excluded on the basis of
two exceptions to this rule, which he notes have not been explicitly adopted by the Michigan
courts. Nevertheless, defendant suggests that these exceptions are consistent with the reasoning
of our cases, and ought to be adopted as the law of this state. The first exception limits
admission of evidence of acts manifesting a guilty consciousness to circumstances in which the
defendant was aware of the charges against him at the time the act was committed. The second
exception bars admission of such evidence when there were multiple causes that could have
caused the guilty consciousness. Defendant argues that both exceptions apply here, because the
cocaine charges had not yet been brought when the bribe attempt was made, and because
defendant had already been arrested on other charges, including possession of marijuana.
-2-
With respect to this issue, we note that the exceptions to which defendant points have not
been adopted in Michigan. Further, these exceptions seem to have been adopted in
circumstances involving flight from authorities. The rationale of these cases is that, given the
human psychological tendency to flee apparent danger, great care must be taken to ensure that
evidence that is not really evidence of guilty consciousness of the charged offense is not unfairly
introduced. That rationale does not require the same circumspection in admitting evidence of
bribes. If we were required to resolve the issue, we would not adopt the exceptions defendant
cites from the other jurisdictions, at least not in cases where guilty consciousness is demonstrated
by the offering of a bribe. However, we are not required to resolve this question, and decline to
do so, as our decision on this issue can be supported by two independent reasons.
Assuming arguendo that the cited exceptions ought to be applied, we cannot find that the
trial court abused its discretion in finding them inapplicable here. The clear evidence was that
defendant knew he was charged with possession of marijuana for a long time before the subject
of a bribe came up. In fact, defendant offered the bribe only when the subject of the apartment, in
which the crack cocaine was kept, arose. The arresting officer testified that defendant also made
statements indicating to the officer, a trained drug specialist, that defendant dealt in crack
cocaine. There were other circumstances as well, suggesting that the bribe offer stemmed from
the fear of discovery of the crack cocaine and the money made from its sale. For example,
defendant was willing to pay what proved to be a substantial percentage of the drug sale money,
but was very reluctant to pay a sum representing almost the entirety of it, lest he be “wiped out.”
Further, defendant wanted to pay the bribe not at or near the police station itself or some neutral
location, but at the apartment in which the crack cocaine and the proceeds from its sale were
kept. Considering the entirety of these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion in finding that the bribe offer demonstrated guilty consciousness with respect to
possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute it.
Moreover, as preserved nonconstitutional error, any hypothetical error the trial court may
have made on this issue is a ground for reversal only if it was more probably than not outcome
determinative. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). As we have
already noted, there was more than sufficient evidence to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, without even considering this evidence. Therefore, we find no error in the trial
court’s admission of this evidence, or in the jury instruction regarding this evidence.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting what defendant views as
drug dealer profile evidence that the practice of using “nominees” to hold record title to assets is
common among drug dealers, and that drug dealing is a cash business. However, this evidence
was submitted in a way that comports with the standards we have established for the admission
of drug dealer profile evidence. As we held in People v Murray, 234 Mich App 46, 53; 593
NW2d 690 (1999), “a prosecutor may use expert testimony from police officers to aid the jury in
understanding evidence in controlled substance cases.” We also held that an expert may testify
that a defendant “‘acted in accordance with usual criminal modus operandi’” and may explain
“the typical characteristics of drug dealing,” as long he does not offer an opinion that the
defendant is guilty merely because he fits a drug profile. Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
In the present case, a qualified expert offered opinion testimony in order to provide the
trier of fact a better understanding of the evidence from the viewpoint of a recognized discipline.
Further, the evidence was offered to explain the typical criminal mode of operating and to
-3-
explain drug dealer practices. The evidence was not accompanied by the opinion that defendant
was guilty because he met a profile. Therefore, under Murray, the evidence was admissible.
Like the expert, the prosecutor merely argued that defendant acted in accordance with a standard
criminal procedure. The prosecutor did not, as defendant claims, make the impermissible
suggestion that defendant was guilty because he met a drug profile.
Moreover, any error in the admission of this evidence would also constitute preserved
nonconstitutional error, and therefore would represent a ground for reversal only if it was more
probably than not outcome determinative. Lukity, supra at 495-496. Because there was more
than sufficient evidence to establish defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without even
considering this evidence, we find no error warranting reversal in the trial court’s admission of
the evidence, or in the fact that it gave no specific instruction as to how to consider it.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.