CHESTER F KUZIEMKO V SUZANNE MARIE KUZIEMKO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHESTER F. KUZIEMKO,
UNPUBLISHED
December 4, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 212377
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-553519-DO
SUZANNE MARIE KUZIEMKO,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Kelly, P.J., and White and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a judgment of divorce, challenging the trial court’s
division of property pursuant to an antenuptial agreement. We affirm in part, reverse in part and
remand for further action.
I
Plaintiff and defendant were married on October 7, 1995, and divorced eight months later
on June 24, 1996. The parties remarried on August 16, 1997, but plaintiff filed for a second
divorce on October 28, 1997. The parties each have two children from previous marriages, but
no children together.
Prior to their second marriage, the parties reached an antenuptial agreement. Plaintiff and
defendant prepared a joint outline of the agreement, and then asked defendant’s attorney, who
was also her employer, to prepare a final draft. Among other things, the antenuptial agreement
contained the following provisions:
2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of marriage, SUZANNE shall
place her [Royal Oak] residence . . . on the market for sale and shall sell said
residence at the highest obtainable price within a reasonable time period,
depending upon market conditions. Upon the closing of the sale of the . . .
property, SUZANNE shall pay, from her separate estate, the sum of $100,000.00
to Standard Federal Savings Bank to reduce the principal balance on the mortgage
on the [West Bloomfield] real property owned by CHET . . . from approximately
$360,000.00 to $260,000.00.
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3. At the time SUZANNE shall make payment of the $100,000.00
mortgage reduction to Standard Federal Savings Bank, CHET shall convey the
[West Bloomfield] property . . . from himself, as a married man, husband of
SUZANNE, to himself and SUZANNE, as husband and wife.
4. Within thirty (30) days after the marriage of the parties, CHET shall
obtain a life insurance policy upon his life, having a policy face value of
$500,000.00, and containing a double indemnity clause in the event of accidental
death. SUZANNE shall be the owner of said policy, and CHET shall pay all
premiums due thereon. Alternatively, CHET may own the policy, but shall
designate SUZANNE as irrevocable beneficiary, and shall pay all premiums
thereon.
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22. Each party hereby acknowledges the following:
***
(c) There is a significant disparity between the estates of the parties; and
the likelihood that the subsequent death of CHET may result in a significant
reduction in the wealth and living standards to which SUZANNE may become
accustomed during the marriage. As a further consideration for this Agreement,
the parties acknowledge that CHET is providing life insurance benefits to
SUZANNE, in the event of his death, insuring his life for the sum of $500,000.00,
and shall pay all premiums therefor as long as he is living, but only if no
Complaint for Divorce is filed or pending and the parties are still married.
(d). In the event of divorce, SUZANNE may experience a significant
reduction in income and the standard of living she may have become accustomed
to during the marriage, and in consideration thereof, the parties agree that, in
addition to an equal division of the marital estate, CHET shall pay SUZANNE the
sum of $20,000.00 upon entry of any Judgment of Divorce.
The parties signed the antenuptial agreement on August 14, 1997 and left for Las Vegas
the following morning where they were married for the second time. Defendant testified that
after returning from Las Vegas she placed a “for sale by owner” sign on her house on September
14, 1997, and that, before she and plaintiff remarried she had discussed the possibility of her
neighbor purchasing her home. Despite these steps in furtherance of the agreement, the parties’
second marriage began to unravel almost immediately after they were married and plaintiff filed
for divorce on October 28, 1997. Defendant filed a counter-complaint for divorce, seeking
specific performance of the antenuptial agreement.
At trial, the parties agreed that the antenuptial agreement was not obtained through fraud,
duress, mistake or misrepresentation, and was not unconscionable when executed. Thus the only
issue before the court was whether the facts and circumstances had changed since the agreement
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was executed, making its enforcement unfair and unreasonable. Following a bench trial, the trial
court found that the parties’ antenuptial agreement was valid, and that plaintiff, the party
challenging the validity of the agreement, did not sustain his burden of proof. The trial court
noted, however, that it could still consider each term of the agreement and apply equitable
principles to determine whether the facts and circumstances had changed such that enforcement
of the entire agreement would be unfair and unreasonable. The trial court concluded that, in this
case, enforcing every provision of the parties’ agreement would be unfair and unreasonable for
the following reasons:
We have two adults that never, ever should have married one another.
Maybe not even the first time, but surely not the second time. We had a situation
where, within four or five days of the second marriage they were fighting like cats
and dogs. This Court feels, if I enforce all of the provisions of that antenuptial
agreement, it would be unfair and unreasonable.
The trial court then refused to enforce that part of the agreement that granted defendant
50% of the value of the marital home, so long as she placed her Royal Oak home for sale within
30 days and contributed $100,000 of the sale proceeds toward the equity in the marital home.
The trial court found that despite defendant’s good faith efforts to comply with the terms of the
agreement, enforcement of the agreement provision as written would be inequitable.
The trial court next found that although plaintiff’s agreement to pay defendant $20,000
upon entry of any judgment of divorce may have been “a mistake,” because plaintiff agreed to the
payment that provision would be enforced. Finally, with respect to plaintiff’s employment
bonus, stocks and stock options acquired during the marriage, the trial court awarded defendant
one-third of plaintiff’s $58,000 bonus, one-half of the $9,000 stock value, and one-third of
plaintiff’s stock options, noting that the assets were being valued from the date of the filing of the
divorce complaint, not the date of judgment. Defendant appealed.
II
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to strictly enforce all terms of the
antenuptial agreement. We agree.
It is well settled that antenuptial agreements governing the division of property in the
event of divorce are enforceable in Michigan. Booth v Booth, 194 Mich App 284, 288-289; 486
NW2d 116 (1992); Rinvelt v Rinvelt, 190 Mich App 372, 379, 382; 475 NW2d 478 (1991).
However, while antenuptial agreements are not void ab initio, certain standards of fairness must
be satisfied in order to find an antenuptial agreement valid and enforceable. Rinvelt, supra at
380, quoting Brooks v Brooks, 733 P2d 1044, 1049 (Alas, 1987). Thus, in deciding whether an
antenuptial agreement is enforceable, a trial court must consider (1) whether the agreement was
obtained through fraud, duress or mistake, or misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material fact,
(2) whether the agreement was unconscionable when executed, and (3) whether the facts and
circumstances changed since the agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair
and unreasonable. Rinvelt, supra at 380, quoting Brooks, supra at 1049. See Booth, supra at
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288-289. The party challenging the validity of the agreement bears the burden of proof and
persuasion. Rinvelt, supra at 382.
Antenuptial agreements are subject to the rules of construction applicable to contracts in
general. In re Hepinstall’s Estate, 323 Mich 322, 327-328; 35 NW2d 276 (1948). Antenuptial
agreements, like other written contracts, are matters of agreement by the parties, and the function
of the court is to determine what the agreement is and enforce it. Id. See Eghotz v Creech, 365
Mich 527, 530; 113 NW2d 815 (1962). Clear and unambiguous language may be not rewritten
under the guise of interpretation; rather, contract terms must be strictly enforced as written, and
unambiguous terms must be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning. South
Macomb Disposal Authority v American Ins Co (On Remand), 225 Mich App 635, 653; 572
NW2d 686 (1997). If the agreement fairly admits of but one interpretation, even if inartfully
worded or clumsily arranged, it is not unambiguous. Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich
App 700, 722; 565 NW2d 401 (1997).
In the instant case, after finding that the antenuptial agreement was valid, the trial court
then found that enforcement of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agreement would be unfair and
unreasonable. The trial court failed, however, to identify any particular facts and circumstances
that had changed since the parties entered into the agreement to support its decision not to
enforce those provisions.
We find nothing in the record to support the conclusion that there was a change in the
facts and circumstances after the parties executed the agreement, such that enforcement of the
entire agreement would be unfair and unreasonable. Neither party experienced a significant
change in financial status after the agreement was executed. Furthermore, neither the short
duration of the parties’ marriage nor the benefit defendant may receive under the agreement,
individually or collectively, would constitute a change in facts or circumstances justifying
departure from the parties’ agreement. See Richard v Detroit Trust Co, 269 Mich 411, 415; 257
NW 725 (1934) (where parties entering into an antenuptial contract are of mature years and have
a full understanding of the meaning of the instrument, the agreement, in the absence of fraud, is
valid, enforceable and not against public policy). We therefore conclude that the trial court
inappropriately substituted its judgment for that of the parties, thereby thwarting the express
intent of the parties. As our Supreme Court has recognized:
Prenuptial agreements . . . provide . . . people with the opportunity to
ensure predictability, plan their future with more security, and, most importantly,
decide their own destiny. Moreover, allowing couples to think through the
financial aspects of their marriage beforehand can only foster strength and
permanency in that relationship. In this day and age, judicial recognition of
prenuptial agreements most likely “encourages rather than discourages marriage.”
In sum, both the realities of our society and policy reasons favor judicial
recognition of prenuptial agreements…. [W]e see no logical or compelling reason
why public policy should not allow two mature adults to handle their own
financial affairs. Therefore, we join those courts that have recognized that
prenuptial agreements legally procured and ostensibly fair in result are valid and
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can be enforced. “The reasoning that once found them contrary to public policy
has no place in today’s matrimonial law.” [Rinvelt, supra at 382, quoting Brooks
v Brooks, 733 P2d 1044 (Alas, 1987).]
Courts cannot make contracts. They can only construe them. Morales v Auto Owners
Ins. Co., 458 Mich 288, 297, fn 3; 582 NW 2d 776 (1998) quoting Ruddock v Detroit Life Ins
Co, 209 Mich 638, 654-655, 177 NW 242 (1920). In keeping with this principle, it necessarily
follows that parties who negotiate and ratify antenuptial agreements should do so with the
confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld and enforced by the courts.
See Karkaria v Karkaria, 405 Pa Super 176; 592 A2d 64 (1991), in which the court
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the antenuptial agreement should be held invalid, stating:
A court should not ignore the parties’ expressed intent by proceeding to
determine whether a prenuptial agreement was, in the court’s view, reasonable at
the time of its inception or the time of divorce. These are exactly the sorts of
judicial determinations that such agreements are designed to avoid. [Id. at 70,
quoting Simeone v Simeone, 525 Pa 392; 581 A2d 162 (1990).]
Our determination that the short duration of the marriage and the benefit conferred
on defendant by the antenuptial agreement do not constitute the requisite change in
circumstances is supported by cases including Gant v Gant, 329 SE2d 106, 114-115 (W
Va, 1985), which is quoted in Rinvelt’s lengthy excerpt from Brooks, Rinvelt, supra at
381, and in which the Supreme Court of West Virginia noted:
The cases that discuss prenuptial agreements in other jurisdictions lead to
the conclusion that when courts talk about ‘fairness’ in the setting of a
prenuptial agreement, they are usually not talking about an entirely
subjective, open-ended concept that allows judges to renegotiate contracts
and substitute their own judgment for the agreement of the parties. Rather,
what other courts are really concerned about is ‘foreseeability.’ In the case
of [the husband and wife] there is no reason not to honor the parties’
prenuptial agreement because circumstances have transpired exactly as the
parties foresaw that they might transpire at the time the prenuptial
agreement was made. Basically, things did not work out romantically
between two middle-aged adults, and that was the exact eventuality about
which they had bargained and contracted.
See also Warren v Warren, 147 Wis2d 704; 433 NW2d 295 (Wis App, 1988), in which
the court similarly noted:
[F]or a change of circumstances to be uncontemplated, the event
must not have been reasonably foreseen by the parties prior to or at
the time of the making of the agreement.
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The standard of unforeseeable changed circumstances appears to
be the emerging test in other states as well as Wisconsin. See, e.g.,
Gant v. Gant [supra at 114-115]. It used to be that the standard
was confined only to the amorphous concept of “fairness.”
However, fairness, without further elaboration, gives no guidance
concerning which agreements should be binding and which should
be struck down. Id. at 114. Measuring an agreement by an
undefined judicial standard of fairness is an invitation to the very
wealth redistribution that these agreements are designed to prevent.
Our courts should enforce the specific terms of the agreement if the
circumstances at the time the marriage ends were what the parties
foresaw at the time they entered in the prenuptial agreement. [Id.
at 709, adopting the rationale of Gant, supra.]
We note that the proper application of the provisions regarding the house to the facts as presented
at trial is not entirely apparent. The trial court should address the issue on remand.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce paragraph 4 of the
agreement relating to life insurance. Defendant’s argument is without merit. Paragraph 22(c) of
the agreement provided that plaintiff was only required to provide life insurance benefits to
defendant if no complaint for divorce was filed or pending. Here, plaintiff filed a complaint for
divorce on October 27, 1997. Thus, because the agreement explicitly contemplated that
plaintiff’s obligation to purchase life insurance would cease upon the filing of a complaint for
divorce, the trial court did enforce this provision according to the parties’ express intent.
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly limited the marital estate to assets
acquired prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce.
Under the agreement, the marital estate was to include all additions to plaintiff’s
Ford Motor accounts and stock, and interest, dividends, income and appreciation on the
additions to the accounts and stock after marriage, and defendant was to receive an “equal
division” of the marital estate, plus $20,000. Although the trial court apparently
considered assets acquired after the filing of the complaint, specifically plaintiff’s
employment benefits, the court should have determined the marital estate and awarded
defendant one half. It is not apparent that the court did so, and we therefore remand on
this issue as well.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further action consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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