PEOPLE OF MI V LETHORN RAYE IRVING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 30, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 216966
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 95-069211-FH
LETHORN RAYE IRVING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Smolenski and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to deliver 650 grams or
more of cocaine, MCL 750.157a; MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i). The trial court sentenced defendant to
thirty to forty five years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
On January 13, 1995, this Court granted a petition to convene a multicounty grand jury
that “shall consist of 17 jurors, selected as follows: 6 jurors from Ingham County, 6 jurors from
Eaton County, and 5 jurors from Clinton County.” In re Petition for Multicounty Citizens’
Grand Jury, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 13, 1995 (Docket No.
181751). The order also granted the prosecution’s motion to suppress the record of the grand
jury proceeding and the contents of the petition until further order of this Court under MCL
167.19f and MCR 7.216(A)(7).
On June 8, 1995, defendant was indicted by the multicounty grand jury on one count of
conspiring to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine. Appointed defense counsel filed an
appearance and a demand for a speedy trial. On July 14, 1995, defendant retained counsel who
was substituted for appointed counsel. On August 4, 1995, on the advice of retained counsel,
defendant waived his right to a preliminary examination. On September 8, 1995, defendant’s
retained counsel was replaced by the original appointed counsel who again filed an appearance
and a demand for a speedy trial. Appointed counsel also filed a motion to remand to district
court for a preliminary examination, arguing that retained counsel was ineffective for advising
defendant to waive the preliminary examination. The prosecutor did not oppose the motion and
the circuit court remanded the case to the district court for a preliminary examination.
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In September 1995, defendant was provided with copies of transcripts from the grand jury
proceeding; however, the transcripts had been redacted by the prosecutor and had not been
certified by the chief judge of the county in which the grand jury was convened pursuant to MCR
6.107. In October 1995, defendant filed a motion with the chief judge presiding over the grand
jury to certify which grand jury transcripts would be made available. The parties stipulated to
adjourn the preliminary examination until the transcripts were released to defendant. Defendant
specifically waived his right to a prompt preliminary examination during this time. The grand
jury transcripts were certified by the chief judge and released to defendant on February 28, 1996.
For reasons that are not clear from the record, the preliminary examination was not
rescheduled until one year later on February 14, 1997. On February 13, 1997, the day before the
preliminary examination was to be held, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges, alleging
a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The following day, defendant filed a motion to quash the
information, alleging that the grand jury indictment failed to specify the crimes to be
investigated, the grand jury statute unconstitutionally precluded challenges to the jury array, and
the grand jury was underrepresented by African-Americans. The district court denied the
motions, but stayed the proceedings, including the preliminary examination, pending an appeal to
circuit court. The circuit court found that much of the delay was caused by the proper purpose of
redacting grand jury transcripts and, while much of the remaining delay was unexplainable,
defendant was not prejudiced because he “had the appropriately redacted transcripts from which
he could prepare his defense.” The circuit court affirmed the district court’s ruling and ordered
that the preliminary examination be scheduled within fourteen days of the order. The circuit
court also affirmed the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to quash the indictment.
Apparently, in the course of transmitting the file from the circuit court back to the district court,
the file was lost and had to be reconstructed by counsel. The preliminary examination was
eventually held on February 24, 1998 and defendant was bound over to circuit court for trial. A
felony information charging defendant with conspiracy to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine
was filed on March 3, 1998.
On June 3, 1998, defendant filed another motion to dismiss the case based on an alleged
violation of his right to a speedy trial, and another motion to quash the grand jury indictment. In
his motion to dismiss, defendant argued that prejudice was presumed because the delay exceeded
eighteen months. Defendant further argued that he suffered actual prejudice because the
memories of prosecution witnesses had faded, impeding his ability to challenge specific
testimony about the details of the charged offense. The circuit court denied defendant’s motion,
noting that only four months had elapsed since the preliminary examination and it had already
held that defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial before the preliminary examination.
In his motion to quash the indictment, defendant reiterated his argument that the grand
jury statute was unconstitutional and that the jury composition discriminated against AfricanAmericans. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the absence of African-Americans
on this grand jury panel did not automatically equate to a systematic exclusion and, in any event,
the preliminary examination during which the prosecution established probable cause cured any
defects in the grand jury selection process. Trial was scheduled for September 1998.
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This Court denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal the circuit court’s order
denying his motion to dismiss the charge and quash the information. People v Irving,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 14, 1998 (Docket No. 213621).
On September 16, 1998, defendant filed a third motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that the
three additional months of delay since his previous motion was denied resulted in a violation of
his right to a speedy trial. The circuit court denied the motion because the case was scheduled
for trial in two weeks. A six-day jury trial commenced on September 29, 1998 and defendant
was convicted as charged.
II. Analysis
A. Motion to Quash Indictment
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the indictment
because MCL 767.14, the statute under which the grand jury was organized, precluded him from
challenging the grand jury array based on racial discrimination in the selection process in
violation of his constitutional rights. We disagree.
Statutory interpretation and constitutional challenges are legal issues that are reviewed de
novo. People v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 423; 531 NW2d 734 (1995).
MCL 767.13 provides:
A person held to answer to any criminal charge may object to the
competency of any 1 summoned to serve as a grand juror, on the ground that he is
the prosecutor or complainant upon any charge against such person; and if such
objection be established, the person so summoned shall be set aside.
MCL 767.14 provides:
No challenge to the array of grand jurors, or to any person summoned as a
grand juror, shall be allowed in any other case than that specified in the preceding
section.
This Court recently held that “under a long line of United States Supreme Court
precedence, it is beyond question that defendant may challenge the selection of the grand jury
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” People v Glass, 235 Mich
App 455, 463-464; 597 NW2d 876 (1999), rev’d on other grounds 464 Mich 266 (2001), citing
Vasquez v Hillery, 474 US 254, 261; 106 S Ct 617; 88 L Ed 2d 598 (1986); Strauder v West
Virginia, 100 US 303; 25 L Ed 2d 554 (1880). See also People v Glass (After Remand), 464
Mich 266, 285 n 15; 627 NW2d 621 (2001).1 The Glass Court further held that a defendant may
1
While reversing this Court’s decision in Glass on other grounds, our Supreme Court explicitly
stated that:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that a defendant can challenge the
grand jury selection process on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds,
(continued…)
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also allege a Sixth Amendment constitutional violation with respect to the selection of a grand
jury.
Therefore, despite the dictates of MCL 767.13; MSA 28.953 and MCL
767.14; MSA 28.954, a criminal defendant may certainly allege a constitutional
violation with respect to the selection of a grand jury. These statutes cannot
preclude a constitutional challenge to the grand jury selection process, and we do
not read these provisions as attempting to do so. It is axiomatic that the
Legislature cannot enact a statute that runs afoul of the constitution or attempts to
narrow constitutional rights. Rather, the proper analysis is that challenges to the
grand jury selection process may be based on the fair-cross-section requirement of
the Sixth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
or an applicable statutory provision. [Glass, supra 235 Mich App 465-466;
emphasis in original.]
Thus, contrary to defendant’s argument, the statutes in question do not preclude
constitutional challenges to the grand jury array based on alleged racial discrimination in the
selection process; rather, the statutes “protect the grand jury from ‘technical’ challenges or
defects.” Id. at 466. See also People v Lauder, 82 Mich 109, 135; 46 NW 956 (1890). In fact,
defendant’s racially based challenge to the grand jury array was adjudicated and rejected by the
lower court. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash the
indictment on this ground.
B. Racial Discrimination in Grand Jury Selection Process
Defendant next argues that he established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in
the grand jury selection. We disagree.
Specifically, defendant contends that African-Americans were systematically excluded
from the grand jury array in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
composed of members from a fair cross-section of the community, US Const, Am VI, and his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, US Const, Am XIV. Defendant contends that
Clinton County represents 13.8 percent of the total population of the three counties, but is only
3.85 percent African-American, Eaton County represents 21.47 percent of the total population of
the three counties, but is only 3.56 percent African-American, and Ingham County represents
65.16 percent of the total population of the three counties, but is only 9.87 percent African
American.2 Defendant thus argues that this Court’s order directing that five grand jurors be
selected from Clinton County, six jurors come from Eaton County, and six jurors be from
Ingham County amounted to a systematic overrepresentation of Eaton and Clinton Counties and
(…continued)
notwithstanding MCL 767.13, 767.14, which the prosecutor argued precluded
such challenges. [People v Glass (After Remand), 464 Mich 266, 285 n 15; 627
NW2d 621 (2001).]
2
These population figures are based on the 1990 census.
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a systematic underrepresentation of Ingham County. Defendant maintains that if proper
percentages had been used, eleven jurors would have come from Ingham County, four jurors
would have been from Eaton County, and only two jurors would have been from Clinton
County.3
This Court reviews claims of systematic exclusion of minorities from jury venires de
novo. People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 525; 616 NW2d 710 (2000). In order to make out
a prima facie case of the fair cross-section requirement under the Sixth Amendment protection,
“a defendant must show that a distinctive group was underrepresented in his venire or jury pool,
and that the underrepresentation was the result of systematic exclusion of the group from the jury
selection process.” Glass, supra 464 Mich 286, quoting People v Smith, 463 Mich 199, 203; 615
NW2d 1 (2000), citing Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364; 99 S Ct 664; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979).
In order to establish a prima facie case of systematic racial discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the defendant must show that (1) the defendant is a member of a distinct,
recognizable group singled out for different treatment; (2) members of this group were
significantly underrepresented on grand jury venires as compared to the community as a whole
over a significant period; and (3) the procedure used to select the grand juries was susceptible to
abuse or was not racially neutral. Glass, supra 464 Mich 285, citing Castaneda v Partida, 430
US 482, 494; 97 S Ct 1272; 51 L Ed 2d 498 (1977).
We note that defendant was indicted by the same grand jury that indicted the defendant in
Glass and that defendant’s statistical challenge of this grand jury is identical to the statistical
challenge made by the defendant in Glass. Glass, supra 464 Mich 273-274, quoting Glass,
supra 235 Mich App 459-460.4 Thus, our decision regarding defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth
amendment challenges is mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Glass, supra 464 Mich
266. There, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals decision that “defendant has not
3
Defendant attached to his motion an affidavit from a witness at the grand jury proceedings who
stated that no African Americans served on the seventeen member grand jury.
4
In Glass, the defendant’s argued that:
[T]he population of Clinton County is 3.85 percent African-American and
13.8 percent of the total population of the three counties, the population of Eaton
County is 3.56 percent African-American and 21.47 percent of the total
population of the three counties, and the population of Ingham County is 9.87
percent African-American and 65.16 percent of the total population of the three
counties. Defendant thus contended that this Court’s order that five grand jurors
be from Clinton County, six from Eaton County, and six from Ingham Count
amounted to a systematic overrepresentation of the counties with the smallest
African-American population and a systematic underrepresentation of the county
with the largest African-American population. Defendant further contended that
if proper percentages had been used, Clinton County would have had four grand
jurors, and Ingham County would have had eleven grand jurors. [Glass, supra 464
Mich 273-274, quoting Glass, supra 235 Mich App 259-260 (footnotes omitted).]
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presented a prima facie case of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment”5 and further
held that the defendant would not be able “to establish a prima facie case upon further review of
the grand jury proceedings because he will be unable to establish a discriminatory purpose.”
Glass, supra 464 Mich 285. In so holding, the Court stated that:
Defendant does not challenge the manner in which the jury impaneling
was implemented. Defendant’s claim is premised solely upon the allegedly
disparate effect of the 6-5-5 composition of grand jurors from the three counties
chosen by the Court of Appeals. Defendant does not present evidence suggesting
a discriminatory purpose, and noting in the grand jury record could conceivably
aid defendant in his effort to prove that the Court of Appeals acted with
discriminatory purpose in establishing the 6-6-5 split.
The possibility of an adverse effect on the representation of blacks
resulting from the 6-6-5 composition is relevant to discriminatory purpose, but is
insufficient alone to establish that it was a purposeful device to exclude blacks
from the grand jury. [Id. at 285-286 (internal citations omitted).]
In the instant case, defendant presents no greater proof in support of his claim than did the
defendant in Glass. Therefore, we conclude not only that defendant failed to present a prima
facie case of racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Glass, supra 464 Mich 285, but also conclude that because “defendant will be
unable to establish a discriminatory purpose,” defendant would not be able to present a prima
facie case of racial discrimination even upon review of the grand jury proceedings. Glass, supra
464 Mich 286.6
5
In finding that the defendant’s statistical evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court of Appeals majority stated
that:
because [the defendant] has not provided evidence regarding the racial
composition of the grand jury venire, he has not shown that the
underrepresentation of African-Americans was due to a systematic exclusion of
their members during the selection process, and he has not shown that the grand
jury selection procedure was racially biased or susceptible to abuse. [Glass, supra
235 Mich App 470.]
6
This finding is mandated because in this case, as in Glass, “defendant does not challenge the
manner in which the jury impaneling was implemented.” Glass, supra 464 Mich 285. We further
find that “because defendant cannot, upon further discovery, establish a prima facie case under
either the Fourteenth or Sixth Amendment, … the reasons for secrecy of grand jury proceedings
outweigh the desirability of further discovery.” Id at 289. Additionally, the Supreme Court in
Glass expressly held that this Court abused its discretion when it ordered an in camera review of
the grand jury proceedings in Glass. Id. Defendant here relies on the same facts and arguments
relied upon by the defendant in Glass to support his contention that an in camera review of the
(continued…)
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Further, with regard to defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim, we note that the Supreme
Court in Glass stated:
We need not decide whether Michigan should apply the fair cross section
requirement to grand jury venires in this case because defendant has failed to
allege a cognizable fair cross section claim. Defendant contends that Ingham
County residents were underrepresented on the basis of the 1990 census figures.
He argues that Ingham County should have had eleven positions on the grand jury
rather than six. Defendant argues that the underrepresentation of Ingham County
residents had the effect of systematically underrepresenting blacks. However, the
fair cross section requirement does not guarantee that any particular jury chosen
will literally mirror the community; rather, “jury wheels, pools of names, panels,
or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive
groups . . . and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof . . . .” Smith,
supra at 214 (opinion of Cavanagh, J.). Because defendant’s challenge is relevant
to the make up of his particular grand jury, he cannot succeed on his claim.
[Glass, supra 464 Mich 287-288.]
Similarly, defendant here has only identified an isolated instance where AfricanAmericans were underrepresented on a grand jury. Thus, because defendant has produced no
evidence establishing that the grand jury selection process systematically excluded AfricanAmericans, he has failed to show that the selection process was not reasonably representative of
the community in which the grand jury was drawn. Id. See also People v Hubbard (After
Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 481; 552 NW2d 493 (1996). Accordingly, just as in Glass,
because defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge fails to attack the grand jury selection process
as a whole, and instead merely challenges a particular grand jury, defendant “cannot succeed on
his claim.” Glass, supra 464 Mich 288.7
C. Right to a Speedy Trial
Defendant argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial and the
benefit of the 180-day rule because over three years elapsed between defendant’s arraignment
and trial. We disagree.
Whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been denied is a constitutional question
of law that this Court reviews de novo. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 111; 605 NW2d 28
(1996). However, any factual findings regarding the matter are reviewed for clear error. People
(…continued)
grand jury proceedings is warranted. Thus, pursuant to Glass, we decline to order an in camera
review as impermissible on these facts.
7
Further, for the reasons stated previously, we hold that defendant would not be able to present a
cognizable claim under the Sixth Amendment even if provided the opportunity to review the
grand jury proceedings. See Glass, supra 464 Mich 285-289.
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v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). Whether the 180-day rule applies is
also a question of law subject to review de novo. Connor, supra at 423.
Initially, we reject defendant’s argument that he was denied the benefit of the 180-day
rule for lack of merit. The 180-day rule, codified at MCL 780.131, provides that an inmate of a
state correctional facility must be brought to trial for other untried charges pending against the
inmate within 180 days of the Department of Corrections providing notice to the prosecutor of
the place the inmate is imprisoned. The purpose of this rule “is to dispose of untried charges
against prison inmates so that sentences can run concurrently.” People v Smielewski, 235 Mich
App 196, 198; 596 NW2d 636 (1999). Because defendant was not an inmate in a state
correctional facility, the 180-day rule simply does not apply to him.
With respect to defendant’s claim that he was denied his right to a speedy trial,
considering all the relevant factors under the circumstances, we are not convinced that
defendant’s constitutional right was violated. When evaluating an alleged violation of a right to
a speedy trial, this Court considers four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the
delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) any prejudice to the
defendant.” Cain, supra at 112; People v Williams, 163 Mich App 744, 755; 415 NW2d 301
(1987).
First, the length of the delay between defendant’s indictment in June 1995 and his trial in
September 1998 was certainly considerable. However, the length of the delay, alone, is not
determinative. Cain, supra at 112. This Court has upheld delays even longer than the one in the
instant case where appropriate. See e.g., People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563; 526 NW2d
33 (1994) (4½ years); People v Smith, 57 Mich App 556; 226 NW2d 673 (1975) (nineteen years).
Nonetheless, because the delay exceeds eighteen months, defendant is entitled to a presumption
of prejudice that the prosecution has the burden to rebut. Cain, supra at 112; Gilmore, supra at
460.
Second, the reasons for the delay in this case were varied. The brief delay from
defendant’s indictment in June 1995 until he waived his preliminary examination in August 1995
was inherent in the court system. Delays inherent in the court system are technically attributable
to the prosecutor, but are given neutral tint and minimal weight. Gilmore, supra at 460. The
delay from August 1995 to October 1995 is attributable to defendant because he moved to
remand to the district court for a preliminary examination, arguing ineffective assistance of
counsel. Time needed to adjudicate defense motions is charged to the defendant. Id. at 461. In
November 1995, defendant specifically waived his right to a prompt preliminary examination
until the redacted grand jury transcripts were released to him, which occurred in February 1996.
This express waiver thus extinguished any error resulting from the delay. See People v Carter,
462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
The record is unclear as to the reason for the one-year delay between defendant’s receipt
of the grand jury transcripts in February 1996 and the scheduled preliminary examination date of
February 14, 1997.8 Unexplained delays are attributed to the prosecution. People v Ross, 145
8
The prosecutor asserts that the court file was lost during this one-year period; however, the
(continued…)
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Mich App 483, 491; 378 NW2d 517 (1985). However, this delay must be considered together
with the third factor, defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial. Defendant waited until
February 13, 1997, the day before the scheduled preliminary examination, to file a motion to
dismiss and formerly assert his right to a speedy trial. Thus, the delay between February 1997
and December 1997, the time period required to adjudicate defendant’s motion to dismiss and the
resultant interlocutory appeal to circuit court, is attributable to defendant. Cain, supra at 113;
Gilmore, supra at 461.
After the circuit court denied defendant’s appeal, the court file was inexplicably lost
while being returned to the district court and had to be reconstructed. This delay was attributable
to the prosecution, but only accounted for two months because the preliminary examination was
eventually held on February 24, 1998. Further, the delay from the preliminary examination until
June 1998 resulted from normal docket congestion, which is attributable to the prosecution, but
with a neutral tint. Gilmore, supra at 460. The delay from June 1998, when defendant again
moved to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial and filed an application for leave to
appeal the trial court’s ruling, until September 14, 1998, when this Court denied defendant’s
application, was attributable to defendant. Id. Trial commenced on September 29, 1998. In
sum, the prosecution was responsible for approximately twenty months of the delay, while
defendant was responsible for approximately nineteen months of the delay.
With respect to the third factor, defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the
record reveals that although defendant demanded a speedy trial in defense counsel’s initial
appearance in June 1995, he did not move to dismiss the charge based on that right until the day
before the preliminary examination was scheduled in February 1997, almost two years later.
Thus, we conclude that defendant’s failure to timely assert his right in this case weighs against a
finding that he was denied a speedy trial. People v Wickham, 200 Mich App 106, 112; 503
NW2d 701 (1993) (the defendant failed to timely assert his right when he demanded a jury trial
initially, but did not pursue the issue until twenty months after his arrest).
Lastly, we consider the prejudice to defendant, both to the person and to the defense.
Gilmore, supra at 461-462. Defendant was not incarcerated while awaiting trial, but had been
released on bond; thus, there was no prejudice to the person. Id. at 462; Wickham, supra at 112.
Although defendant claims that the delay caused witnesses’ memories to fade, hindering his
ability to effectively examine them, this general allegation is insufficient to establish prejudice to
the defense. Gilmore, supra at 462. In any event, the fading of witnesses’ memories would tend
to assist defendant, rather than prejudice him. Indeed, a review of defense counsel’s cross
examination of prosecution witnesses reveals that the witnesses’ fading memories provided
ammunition for defendant to impeach by prior inconsistent statements. Thus, although prejudice
to defendant was presumed given the length of the delay, we conclude that the prosecutor has
overcome that presumption of prejudice in this case.
(…continued)
record demonstrates that the court file was not lost until after defendant’s appeal to the circuit
court in December 1997.
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In sum, considering all the factors, we conclude that defendant was not denied his right to
a speedy trial.
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by: (1) interjecting factual
and argumentative statements into the voir dire of prospective jurors, (2) vouching for the
credibility of a prosecution witness, and (3) allowing knowingly false testimony to go
uncorrected. We disagree.
With respect to defendant’s claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during voir
dire, defendant failed to object to the alleged misconduct at trial and expressed satisfaction with
the jury and he has thus failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. People v Schutte, 240
Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000) People v Bell, 209 Mich App 273, 278; 530 NW2d
167 (1995). In addition, because defense counsel affirmatively expressed satisfaction with the
jury, this issue has been waived. See Carter, supra at 214-216; People v Tate, 244 Mich App
553, 558; 624 NW2d 524 (2001). In any event, assuming that this issue was not waived, we note
that this Court reviews unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error, Schutte,
supra, and in order to avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, the defendant must demonstrate
plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). Reversal is warranted only where the plain error “resulted in the conviction of an
actually innocent defendant” or where the error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 763.
A review of the challenged comments during voir dire reveals that the prosecutor was
simply explaining to the jurors the nature of the charge against defendant to discern whether
jurors would be able to be fair and impartial in this case. The prosecutor was seeking to impanel
an impartial jury by eliciting sufficient information to develop a rational basis for excluding those
who are not impartial from the jury. People v Tyburski, 445 Mich 606, 618; 518 NW2d 441
(1994) (Mallett, J.); People v Dunham, 220 Mich App 268, 270; 559 NW2d 360 (1996). The
prosecutor never promised the jurors what the evidence would show; rather, he merely informed
them of what the allegations were. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor’s statements
during voir dire were not improper. Defendant has not demonstrated plain error that affected his
substantial rights. Carines, supra.
We also find no merit to defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the
credibility of prosecution witness Tracy Edmonds by stating that the police had time to verify
Edmonds’ statements, implying that the police and the prosecutor knew he was telling the truth.
Again, defendant failed to object to the comment during trial or request a curative instruction;
thus, we review the claim for plain error. Carines, supra at 763; Schutte, supra at 720.9
9
The trial court subsequently denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial due to the prosecutor’s
comments.
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Defendant objects to the following remarks made by the prosecutor during closing
argument:
But, again, he has been incarcerated since 1994. He hasn’t had a chance to
talk to Tamper Allen, Bill Sorrell, or Michael Sorrell. He has given multiple
statements to the police, DEA, FBI, many people over this time period. He has
testified in the Grand Jury, and preliminary exam, and in a trial over this time
period. The police have had ample opportunities to check those statements out.
A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness, nor suggest that the
government has some special knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully. People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548;
575 NW2d 16 (1998). However, a prosecutor may argue from the evidence that a witness is
credible. Howard, supra. We find nothing improper with the challenged remarks in this case.
The prosecutor did not expressly state that the police had verified Edmonds’ statement; rather, he
was simply arguing from the facts in evidence that the witness was credible. Further, many
witnesses testified in this case regarding the multiple cocaine transactions in which defendant
participated. Thus, this case was not a mere credibility contest between defendant and one
witness. Cf. People v Smith, 158 Mich App 220, 231-232; 405 NW2d 156 (1987). On this
record, we are not convinced that the prosecutor’s statements constituted improper vouching for
the credibility of a witness, nor do we find that defendant was denied a fair trial as a result of the
remarks.
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to correct
the knowingly false testimony of William Sorrell. Specifically, defendant argues that Sorrell
perjured himself when he testified that he had not received anything in exchange for his
testimony, even though the Tri-County Metro Narcotics Squad provided a letter, dated October
25, 1995, to the parole board on behalf of Sorrell. This letter indicated that Sorrell had been
cooperative with law enforcement and prosecutors and requested that it be placed in Sorrell’s
parole file. Therefore, defendant contends that pursuant to People v Atkins, 397 Mich 163, 173;
243 NW2d 292 (1976), because Sorrell was given leniency in exchange for his testimony against
defendant, the prosecutor had a duty to disclose this to the jury.
However, while it is apparent that the Tri-County Metro Narcotics Squad provided this
letter to the parole board, there is no indication that either Sorrell or the prosecutor knew of its
existence or that it had any bearing in the parole board’s decision to parole Sorrell. In addition,
because the letter is dated October 26, 1995 and defendant trial took place in October of 1998, it
is evident that the letter was sent based on cooperation Sorrell had provided long before
defendant’s trial. Because defendant has failed to show that Sorrell perjured himself, that the
prosecutor knew of the letter or of Sorrell’s perjury, or that the letter was provided in exchange
for Sorrell’s testimony at defendant’s trial, we find this issue to be without merit. See Atkins,
supra at 173-174.10 Further, assuming Sorrell’s testimony was untrue and that the prosecutor
10
We also note that defense counsel never requested that the prosecutor inform the jury of the
alleged leniency. Without such a request, it is doubtful that the prosecutor would have any duty
to disclose the information. See People v Woods 416 Mich 581, 602; 331 NW2d 707 (1982) and
(continued…)
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knew that it was untrue, we note that it was elicited by defense counsel during cross-examination,
not by the prosecutor during direct, and that the jury had the opportunity to consider what, if any,
effect this letter may have had on Sorrell’s testimony. Thus, since “the disclosure requirement
may be considered satisfied where the ‘jury [is] made well aware’ of such facts ‘by means of . . .
thorough and probing cross-examination by defense counsel,’” People v Mumford, 183 Mich
App 149, 152; 455 NW2d 51 (1990), quoting Atkins, supra at 174, we would find that the duty to
disclose was met in this case. See also People v Woods, 416 Mich 581, 602; 331 NW2d 707
(1982) and People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 358; 619 NW2d 413 (2000).
E. Other Acts Evidence
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other acts under
MRE 404(b). Specifically, defendant argues that prosecution witness Tracy Edmonds improperly
testified that he instructed defendant not to use violence in conducting the drug trade, implying
that defendant was a violent person in the past. We disagree.
Defendant characterizes this issue as whether the trial court erred in admitting the
challenged evidence; however, because defendant did not object to the evidence and ask that the
remarks be stricken, the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on the issue. Instead,
defendant moved for a mistrial based on the remarks. Thus, the dispositive issue before this
Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mistrial. People v OrtizKehoe, 237 Mich App 508, 513; 603 NW2d 802 (1999). An abuse of discretion exists only when
denial of the motion deprives the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. People v Wolverton, 227
Mich App 72, 75; 574 NW2d 703 (1997).
During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Edmonds, the following exchange took
place:
Q:
You talked about how you wanted to, or you counselled [sic] with the
Defendant in terms of doing business?
A:
Um-hum
Q:
Describe for the jury what you mean by that?
A:
Well, first of all, I didn’t need any violent - we didn’t need any, because I
was already being, I was under surveillance by the FBI. I just didn’t need any
more heat. I didn’t want to go to prison. So when I talked to [defendant], he got
into a lot of confrontations from time to time around town. I said, listen, we don’t
need no fighting.
Q:
Keep your voice up.
(…continued)
People v Atkins, 397 Mich 163, 173 n 10.
-12-
A:
We don’t need any fighting. We don’t need anybody to come up dead.
We don’t need none of that. If somebody beaus us out of our money, you know,
we may go talk to them and everything. But it’s not worth getting a case about,
getting another case. So I really wanted to try to tone him down from what you
how he used to be in the past.
Although Edmond’s testimony may have inappropriately implied that defendant was
involved in violent, confrontational activity in the past, we are not convinced that the admission
of this brief and unsolicited testimony warranted a mistrial. Where error involved unsolicited
remarks by a witness, “[a] mistrial should be granted only where the error complained of is so
egregious that the prejudicial effect can be removed in no other way.” People v Gonzales, 193
Mich App 263, 266; 483 NW2d 458 (1992). Generally, “an unresponsive, volunteered answer to
a proper question is not grounds for the granting of a mistrial.” People v Haywood, 209 Mich
App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). “This is especially true where the defendant has rejected
the opportunity to have the jury charged with a cautionary instruction.” People v Lumsden, 168
Mich App 286, 299; 423 NW2d 645 (1988).
In this case, any prejudice caused by Edmonds’ remarks could have been cured by a
timely instruction to the jury. Indeed, the trial court offered to provide a curative instruction to
remove any potential prejudice, but defendant refused the instruction, seeking to avoid any
further emphasis of the remarks. Further, defendant does not argue, and the record does not
show, that the prosecutor elicited the improper testimony or knew that Edmonds would make the
challenged remarks. See People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 455 NW2d 358 (1990);
People v Barker, 161 Mich App 296, 307; 409 NW2d 813 (1987).11 Defendant was not denied a
fair and impartial trial by Edmonds’ testimony and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to grant a mistrial.
F. Claimed Trial Court Errors
1. Instructional Error
Defendant argues that because the testimony was varied and inconsistent regarding the
amounts of each alleged drug transaction, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the
requested lesser included offenses of conspiracy to deliver more than 225 but less than 650 grams
of cocaine and conspiracy to deliver more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine. We agree
that the failure to instruct on the lesser offenses was error, but conclude that the error was
harmless and does not warrant reversal.
Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety to determine whether there was error
requiring reversal. People v Mass, 238 Mich App 333, 339; 605 NW2d 322 (1999), rev’d in part
on other grounds 464 Mich 615; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). Even if somewhat imperfect, there is no
error if the instructions fairly presented the issues to be tried and sufficiently protected
11
After Edmonds’ made the challenged remarks, a bench conference was held and the prosecutor
instructed Edmonds not to discuss anything beyond what the prosecutor was directing his
attention to.
-13-
defendant’s rights. People v McCrady, 244 Mich App 27, 30; 624 NW2d 721 (2001); Mass,
supra. When reviewing the propriety of a requested lesser included offense instruction, the court
must first determine if the lesser included offense is necessarily included in the greater charge, or
if it is a cognate lesser included offense. People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 667; 549 NW2d 325,
amended on other grounds 453 Mich 1204; 551 NW2d 163 (1996). The evidence introduced at
trial must support a conviction of the cognate lesser offense in order for an instruction on that
offense to be appropriate, id. at 668; however, regardless of the evidence in a given case, the jury
must be instructed on necessarily included lesser offenses. People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 254;
562 NW2d 447 (1997); People v Beach, 429 Mich 450, 463; 418 NW2d 861 (1988).
In People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379, 387; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), our Supreme Court
explained the distinction between a necessarily included lesser offense and a cognate lesser
offense:
The common-law definition of lesser included offenses is that the lesser
must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without having committed
the lesser. This definition includes only necessarily included lesser offenses. This
definition, however, is generally conceded to be unduly restrictive, and thus most
jurisdictions, including Michigan, have statutes that are broadly construed to
permit conviction of “cognate” or allied offenses of the same nature, under a
sufficient charge. These lesser offenses are related and hence “cognate” in the
sense that they share several elements, and are of the same class or category, but
may contain some elements not found in the higher offense. [Citations omitted;
emphasis in original.]
The Court has since followed the distinction articulated in Ora Jones, supra, and defined
necessarily included lesser offenses as those in which the defendant cannot commit the greater
offense without also committing the lesser offense, and cognate lesser offenses as those that
share several elements with the greater offense and are of the same class of crime, but contain
additional elements not found in the greater offense. See e.g., People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 61;
594 NW2d 477 (1999); Lemons, supra at 253; Bailey, supra at 667-668; People v Hendricks, 446
Mich 435, 443; 521 NW2d 546 (1994); People v Mosko, 441 Mich 496, 499-500; 495 NW2d
534 (1992); Beach, supra at 461-462.12
12
The prosecutor argued, and the trial court apparently agreed, that People v Marji, 180 Mich
App 525, 531; 447 NW2d 835 (1989), governed the instant case. In Marji, this Court held that
delivery of lesser amounts of cocaine were cognate lesser offenses of delivery of greater amounts
of cocaine and an instruction on the lesser offenses was not appropriate unless the evidence
supported the charges. Id. at 531. The Marji Court reasoned that although delivery of lesser
amounts of cocaine are crimes within the same category as delivery of greater amounts of
cocaine and share some elements with the greater offense, they also contain essential elements
not present in the greater offense, namely, proof of lesser quantities of controlled substances. Id.
Thus, delivery of lesser amounts of cocaine are considered cognate offenses, not necessarily
included offenses. Id. However, we believe that Marji was wrongly decided. Because that case
was decided before November 1, 1990, it is not precedentially binding on this Court and we
decline to follow it. MCR 7.215(H)(1). Instead, we choose to follow the rule of law set forth by
(continued…)
-14-
In this case, defendant was charged with conspiracy to deliver more than 650 grams of
cocaine. He requested instructions on conspiracy to deliver 50 to 225 grams of cocaine and
conspiracy to deliver 225 to 650 grams of cocaine. The only distinction between the greater and
lesser offenses is the quantity of cocaine involved; thus, we conclude that defendant’s requested
instructions were for necessarily included lesser offenses of the charged offense. Lemons, supra;
Ora Jones, supra. Refusing to grant a requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser
offense constitutes error. Mosko, supra at 501; Ora Jones, supra at 390. Accordingly, we find
that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses as requested was
error.
However, a trial court’s failure to grant a requested instruction is subject to the harmless
error analysis. Mosko, supra at 502-503. In this case, the evidence overwhelmingly
demonstrated that defendant conspired to deliver several kilograms of cocaine. Indeed, each
prosecution witness testified that defendant was involved in cocaine transactions totaling far
more than 650 grams, and many of the witnesses testified that defendant participated in multiple
transactions of a kilogram, totaling thousands of grams of cocaine. Thus, it cannot seriously be
disputed that the amount of cocaine involved in this case exceeded 650 grams. Under these
circumstances, the jury could not reasonably have convicted defendant of the lesser offenses and
the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the requested lesser included offenses was harmless
error.
2. Trial Court’s Comments
Defendant also contends that he was prejudiced by certain comments made by the trial
court during recross-examination of a prosecution witness.13 Although defendant did not object
(…continued)
our Supreme Court in Ora Jones and its progeny, holding that the offenses of delivery of lesser
amounts of controlled substances are necessarily included offenses of delivery of greater amounts
of controlled substances and the jury must be so instructed upon request.
13
The challenged comments occurred during the following exchange:
Q. Sir, you testified earlier that you had gone to Central and Livernois in
Detroit, one of the places you acquired drugs?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, that’s – that’s a location near the bridge to Canada; is that right?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever go to Canada with Mr. Irving and some other friends to have
some fun?
[The Prosecutor]: I’m going to object. This goes way beyond the scope –
The Court:
What’s it relevant to?
(continued…)
-15-
to the challenged comments of the trial court below, because the comments were made by the
trial court, we may review the issue to ensure that defendant was not deprived a fair trial.
People v Collier, 168 Mich App 687, 697; 425 NW2d 118 (1988); see also People v Paquette,
214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). In reviewing a trial court’s conduct during trial,
we must not review the challenged portion out of context; rather, we should review the entire
record to determine if the trial court’s comments pierced the judicial veil of impartiality. See Id.;
Collier, supra at 697-698. “If the trial court’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial impartiality, a
defendant’s conviction must be reversed.” People v Romano, 181 Mich App 204, 220; 448
NW2d 795 (1989), quoting Collier, supra at 698.
The appropriate test to determine whether the trial court’s comments or
conduct pierced the veil of judicial impartiality is whether the trial court’s conduct
or comments “were of such a nature as to unduly influence the jury and thereby
(…continued)
[Defense Counsel]: It’s relevant as to why he thinks that location was a
drug house versus the fact that it wasn’t.
The Court: That he went to Canada, Livernois and Central is no where
near the bridge?
[Defense Counsel]: Well, that’s – that’s what he’s saying.
The Court: Yeah.
Q. (By [Defense Counsel]): The location that you talked about near central
[sic] and Livernois, did you ever pass that location on the way to Canada?
A. No.
Q. Never went there to go to one of the clubs?
[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I’m going to object. What the relevance?
The Court: You can ask whether he passed the location on his way to
some club in Canada.
Q. (By [Defense Counsel]): Did you ever go to a club in Canada with Mr.
Irving?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And that’s not how you obtained that location you talked about that you
claim was a drug house?
A.
No. [Emphasis added.]
-16-
deprive the [defendant] of his right to a fair and impartial trial.” [Collier, supra,
quoting People v Rogers, 60 Mich App 652, 657; 233 NW2d 8 (1975).]
See also Paquette, supra; Romano, supra.
Here, a review of the whole record indicates that the trial court was trying to ascertain
what the witness was being asked and what the relevance of that information was so that he could
rule on an objection that had been placed by the prosecutor. Because the comment was made in
this context and not meant to bolster the credibility of a prosecution witness, we conclude that
the trial court’s comments did not unduly influence the jury in this case and therefore did not
pierce the judicial veil of impartiality. Accordingly, the trial court’s comments did not deprive
the defendant of a fair and impartial trial. See Paquette, supra; Romano, supra at 220-221.
G. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant’s final claim on appeal is that that the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction for conspiracy to delivery 650 grams or more cocaine, MCL
750.157a(a); MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i). Again, we disagree.
To determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction, we
review the lower court record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
a rational jury could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 94; 617 NW2d 721 (2000); People v
Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 655; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). Our Supreme Court has stated that in
order
to be convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled
substance, the prosecution [must] prove that (1) the defendant possessed the
specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charged, (2) his coconspirators
possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as charge, and (3)
the defendant and his coconspirators possessed the specific intent to combine to
deliver the statutory minimum as charged to a third person. [Mass, supra 464
Mich 630, citing People v Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 349; 562 NW2d
652 (1997) (emphasis added).]
Thus, in the instant case, the prosecution had to present evidence that proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that plaintiff conspired to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine. In this
regard, we note that both Tamper Allen and Edmonds testified that they and defendant agreed to
be partners with defendant in order to sell cocaine in the Lansing area. In addition, Edmonds
testified that on at least two occasions he had supplied Allen and defendant with one kilogram of
cocaine to sell and that on one occasion he supplied defendant with two kilograms for the
purposes of sale. Michael Sorrell also testified that defendant had up to one kilogram of cocaine
at a time and that he had sold more than four kilograms of cocaine on behalf of defendant. Based
on this testimony, we conclude that when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
the jury was presented with sufficient evidence that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of conspiring with others to deliver more than 650 grams of cocaine.
-17-
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
-18-
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