JOEL F LABEAU V BRIAN DAVID BOUCHARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOEL F. LABEAU,
UNPUBLISHED
November 27, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 223754
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 96-015064-NI
RICHARD D. FIGULA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Sawyer and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s October 29, 1999, order granting
summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on September 24, 1993, while traveling to
a job site in a van provided by his employer, Steve’s Plumbing & Heating, Inc. The van was
driven by Brian Bouchard,1 a fellow employee. Defendant, an employee and officer of the
company, purchased the vehicle with company funds in December 1992. The vehicle was titled
in defendant’s name “d/b/a Steve’s Plumbing & Heating.”
As relevant to this appeal, the trial court initially granted partial summary disposition in
favor of defendant on September 24, 1997. Although the trial court noted that the accident
occurred while plaintiff, defendant, and Bouchard were in the course of their employment, the
trial court nonetheless concluded that defendant was liable pursuant to the owner’s liability
statute. MCL 257.401(1). After defendant appealed, this Court vacated the trial court’s order
and remanded for reconsideration of defendant’s motion for summary disposition. LaBeau v
Bouchard, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, issued February 17, 1998 (Docket No.
206829). This Court provided the trial court with the following guidance in reconsidering
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
[A] claim against an alleged owner that is also a coemployee turns on whether or
not the coemployee was acting in the course of his employment either when he
1
Bouchard was originally a party to this action, but was dismissed pursuant to the parties’
stipulation on May 4, 2000.
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allowed the vehicle to be used by another or when the accident occurred. If the
alleged owner/coemployee was acting in the course of his employment, the claim
against him is precluded by the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. If he was
not acting within the course of his employment, he may be liable pursuant to the
owner’s liability statute.
Defendant renewed his motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10)
on September 3, 1999. On reconsideration, the lower court determined that defendant was
engaged in the course of his employment when plaintiff was injured. Accordingly, the trial court
granted summary disposition in favor of defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
We review de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the complaint’s factual support. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,
120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). We review the record evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists to warrant trial. Id.
On appeal, plaintiff claims that summary disposition was improperly granted and that the
Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., does not shield
defendant from tort liability because there was no connection between defendant’s employment
and plaintiff’s injury. According to plaintiff, “a coemployee must be part of the injury-causing
event to be entitled to immunity under the [WDCA].” We disagree.
In Threet v Pinkston, 20 Mich App 39; 173 NW2d 731 (1969), this Court rejected the
identical argument plaintiff raises in the instant case. In Threet, one of the plaintiffs was injured
when he was struck by a car driven by a coemployee in their employer’s parking lot. The
plaintiffs attempted to sue the defendant, a fellow employee who was the owner of the vehicle.
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the worker’s compensation act did not immunize the
defendant from tort liability pursuant to the owner’s liability statute because he was not “an
active tortfeasor” in the accident. Id. at 41. According to the record, the defendant had already
reported to work when his son hit the plaintiff with the defendant’s car in the parking lot. Id. at
40.
A review of Threet indicates that, similar to the present case, the defendant was not
actively involved in the accident giving rise to the plaintiff’s injury. On the basis of a plain
reading of the predecessor to MCL 418.827(1), this Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
the defendant was liable in tort. MCL 418.827(1) provides in pertinent part:
Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was
caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a
natural person in the same employ or the employer to pay damages in respect
thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefits or the taking of proceedings to
enforce compensation payments shall not act as an election of remedies but the
injured employee or his or her dependants or personal representatives may also
proceed to enforce the liability of the third party for damages in accordance with
this section. [Emphasis supplied.]
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The plain language of what is commonly referred to as the third-party tortfeasor statute
precludes an individual from maintaining a suit in tort against a fellow employee. Dixon v Sype,
92 Mich App 144, 146; 284 NW2d 514 (1979). In Threet, this Court observed the following
with regard to the plain language of the statute.
The statute speaks not of common-law legal liability nor of an active
tortfeasor. It speaks plainly of “under circumstances creating a legal liability in
some person other than a natural person in the same employ”. We may not
attempt to rewrite the statute, nor may we read into it restrictions at variance with
its plain language and clear meaning. [Id. at 41 (citations omitted).]
Consequently, plaintiff’s argument, though somewhat novel, has been soundly rejected by
this Court. See also Wilson v Al-Huribi, 55 Mich App 95, 98-98; 222 NW2d 49 (1974). The
evidence presented in this case demonstrates that defendant was engaged in the course of his
employment at the time of plaintiff’s injury. For instance, defendant testified in his deposition
that he was at work when plaintiff was injured. Barbara Butcher, another employee, likewise
testified in her deposition that defendant was at work when plaintiff was injured. Because
plaintiff was injured while defendant was in the course of his employment, MCL 418.827(1) acts
as a statutory bar to plaintiff’s tort claim against defendant. Wilson, supra at 97-98.2
Likewise, we reject plaintiff’s claim that the dual-capacity is applicable under these
circumstances. “The dual-capacity doctrine has been recognized by our courts as an exception to
the general immunity granted to employers from actions by employees in exchange for the
employee’s right to recover worker’s compensation benefits.” Miller v Massullo, 172 Mich App
752, 757; 432 NW2d 429 (1988). The doctrine is only applicable where the fellow employee has
a “second identity ‘completely removed and distinct from his status as employe[e].’ ” Atkinson v
Detroit, 222 Mich App 7, 13; 564 NW2d 473 (1997), quoting Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co, 421 Mich 641, 653; 364 NW2d 670 (1984). This judicial exception to the exclusive remedy
provision of the WDCA is intended to apply only in extraordinary circumstances. Herbolsheimer
v SMS Holding Co, Inc, 239 Mich App 236, 246; 608 NW2d 487 (2000). However, this Court
has applied the doctrine in the employee/coemployee situation. Miller, supra at 758.
After a review of the record, we are not convinced that the present case is one where “the
relationship between the cause of action and the plaintiff’s employment is no more than
incidental.” Herbolsheimer, supra at 246. There is no evidence that defendant had a separate
identity or relationship with plaintiff aside from that of coemployee to the extent that plaintiff
may pursue a tort remedy against defendant. For example, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that defendant leased the van to Steve’s Plumbing and Heating, Inc. Robards v Estate of
Kantzler, 98 Mich App 414, 419; 296 NW2d 265 (1980); Miller, supra at 760. During his
deposition, defendant testified that he purchased the van plaintiff was injured in on behalf of his
2
Given our conclusion that Threet controls the instant case and that there need not be a causal
relationship between defendant’s employment activities and plaintiff’s injury, we also reject
plaintiff’s suggestion that we should employ the economic realities test to determine whether
defendant controlled plaintiff’s employment activities.
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employer, and that he used company funds to complete the purchase. Thus, the present case is
not one where plaintiff could show at trial “that defendant’s act of leasing the vehicle to his
employer was independent of, and not related to, the common employment of both, and thereby
defeat defendant’s claim of immunity under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.” Id. at
760 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the dual-capacity doctrine is not applicable.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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