PEOPLE OF MI V MARK BRADFORD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224790
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-167462-FC
MARK BRADFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Hood and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83. He was sentenced, as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to thirty
to sixty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
On March 25, 1999, defendant went to the marital home where his estranged wife, the
victim, and his children were living. Defendant was admitted to the home by his stepdaughter,
Jennifer. Although the screen door of the home was never locked, it was locked after defendant
entered the home. Defendant entered the bedroom and spoke with the victim. The victim took
her cellular telephone to Jennifer in case something happened. One week prior to this visit by
defendant, the victim had told neighbors that she feared that defendant would kill her. The
couple spoke for an extensive period of time. Defendant told the victim that he thought about
killing her, but it was not “worth it.” At approximately 9:30 p.m, defendant telephoned his
employer to advise that he would be late for work. Defendant indicated that he wanted to
reconcile, but the victim was concerned about prior drug and physical abuse by defendant. At
approximately midnight, the victim advised defendant that she needed to sleep. Defendant told
the victim that she did not need to sleep and began to choke her. Defendant tried to get the
victim to enter the basement, but she refused. The couple struggled, and the victim screamed for
help. Jennifer tried to call 911, but found that the two telephones in the home had been disabled.
Jennifer was unable to contact 911 with the cellular telephone. Jennifer observed defendant
strike the victim in the face.
The victim tried to exit the home, but found that the screen door was locked. The victim
was able to unlock the door and jump off the porch. Defendant chased after the victim with a
knife. The victim was stabbed in the back. The victim struggled to get the knife from defendant.
She was stabbed in the neck on two occasions. The victim managed to get the knife from
defendant on two occasions and toss it aside. Each time, defendant retrieved the knife and
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attacked the victim. Neighbors observed the stabbing on the front lawn, called 911, and
screamed at defendant to leave the victim alone. Neighbor James Waters, jumped off his porch
and said, “What in the hell are you doing, Bradford?” Defendant looked and began walking
down the street.
The Waters family assisted the victim into their home. There was so much blood that it
was difficult to discern where the stabbings wounds were located. The victim told the family to
apply pressure to her neck. In addition to the neck and back wounds, the victim suffered
numerous cuts to her hands. The victim was taken to the hospital where she was treated by Dr.
Kenneth Gibb. Dr. Gibb testified that the neck injuries were life threatening because of the
major blood vessels in the neck. However, the back injury was not life threatening because the
stabbing had not pierced the victim’s lungs. Near the scene, police observed defendant walking.
When defendant saw the police, he fled and hid in a field, where he was arrested.
In his opening statement, defense counsel argued that the prosecutor could not establish
the element of intent to kill because of defendant’s alcohol and drug induced condition. At trial,
the victim testified that defendant was “high.” When asked to provide a factual support for that
conclusion, the victim stated that she “knew” defendant, he had never acted so violently before,
and his eyes were red. However, the victim also testified that defendant did not slur his words,
did not ramble, and did not stagger. Jennifer testified that she did not smell alcohol on defendant
when he arrived at the home. There was no evidence admitted at trial that defendant consumed
any alcohol or drugs between the time of his arrival at the home and at the time of the attack. A
police officer responsible for defendant’s intake, who was trained in signs of alcohol and drug
intoxication, did not perceive the conditions that evidence such consumption. Evidence at trial
also revealed that defendant normally parked in the driveway or on the street, but during this
visit, parked across the street in a plaza parking lot. The prosecution argued that this evidence
coupled, with the screen door being locked and the disconnection of the telephones, evidenced
the requisite intent and negated the intoxication defense.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence of the element of intent to
support the conviction. We disagree. When reviewing a claim based on sufficiency of the
evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have concluded that the essential elements of the crime
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d
78 (2000). This review is deferential because we draw all reasonable inferences and examine
credibility determinations in support of the jury verdict. Id. at 400. The elements of assault with
intent to commit murder are: (1) an assault; (2) with an actual intent to kill; (3) which, if
successful, would make the killing murder. People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 181; 603
NW2d 95 (1999). In the present case, defendant takes issue only with the intent element of the
conviction. However, the question of a defendant’s intent presents a question of fact to be
inferred from the circumstances by the trier of fact. People v Tower, 215 Mich App 318, 322;
544 NW2d 752 (1996). Where there is credible evidence presented that both supports and
negates the intent requirement, a factual question exists that is left for resolution by the jury.
People v Neal, 201 Mich App 650, 655; 506 NW2d 618 (1993). Because of the difficulty of
proving a defendant’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient. McRunels,
supra.
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We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the element of intent to kill.
While the victim, defendant’s wife, testified that he was “high,” her conclusion was based on the
redness of defendant’s eyes and her prior relationship with him. There was no evidence of any
drug or alcohol consumption between defendant’s arrival at the home and the attack hours later.
Other witnesses to defendant’s state or condition on the date of the incident contradicted the
victim’s testimony that defendant was high. There was ample evidence for the jury to reject the
intoxication defense. Nowack, supra.1
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by increasing the score of three offense
variables. We disagree. Review of the record reveals that the scores of these offense variables
were supported by evidence at trial. Regarding offense variable three, MCL 777.33, Dr. Gibb
did, in fact, testify that the victim’s injuries were life threatening because of the blood vessels in
the neck. Regarding offense variables seven and ten, respectively MCL 777.37 and MCL
777.40, defendant did not object based on the evidence at trial, but asked the court not to
interfere with the probation department’s assessment. Review of the record reveals that the trial
court’s scoring of these variables was supported by the record in light of the extended nature of
the attack and the manner in which the attack was achieved. Accordingly, we find no error.
Defendant next argues that his sentence was disproportionate. We disagree. Because the
sentence was within the appropriate guidelines sentence range, we affirm the sentence. MCL
769.34(10). Assuming without deciding that the principle of proportionality has survived the
enactment of the legislative sentencing guidelines, we would conclude that the sentence was
proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.2
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ William B. Murphy
1
Defendant’s related argument, that he was “provoked” by the victim and did not an intend
murder as opposed to the intent required for manslaughter, is completely without foundation in
the record. The victim testified that the couple discussed their relationship for a lengthy period.
However, the comment that preceded the attack was the victim’s request to go to sleep.
2
The majority opinion in People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 73; 624 NW2d 479 (2000),
concluded that appellate review of a sentence within the guidelines, MCL 769.34(10) is
precluded. However, the sole issue in Babcock was whether the trial court had substantial and
compelling reasons to deviate from the guidelines, MCL 769.34(11). Accordingly, this language
is dicta. Cheron, Inc v Don Jones, Inc, 244 Mich App 212, 216; 625 NW2d 93 (2000); People v
Bowns, 39 Mich App 424, 426; 197 NW2d 834 (1972).
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