WILLIAM W ANDERSON V SHARON T ANDERSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM W. ANDERSON,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 226666
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 98-011433-DO
SHARON T. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Jansen and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-husband appeals as of right from the March 14, 2000 judgment of divorce,
challenging provisions relating to property division. We affirm.
The parties were married on December 26, 1955. Plaintiff filed for divorce on November
6, 1998, after forty-four years of marriage. Following a one-day trial during which both parties
testified, the court entered a divorce judgment on March 14, 2000. On appeal, plaintiff argues
that the trial court’s division of the marital property was inequitable.
When reviewing the trial court’s property division in divorce proceedings, we review the
trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, and then determine whether the ultimate dispositional
ruling was fair and equitable under the circumstances. Byington v Byington, 224 Mich App 103,
109; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). We will affirm a trial court’s property distribution unless we are
left with a definite and firm conviction that the division was inequitable. Sparks v Sparks, 440
Mich 141, 152; 485 NW2d 893 (1992).
The goal of the court when apportioning a marital estate is to reach an
equitable division in light of all the circumstances. Each spouse need not reach a
mathematically equal share, but significant departures from congruence must be
explained clearly by the court. When dividing the estate, the court should
consider the duration of the marriage, the contribution of each party to the marital
estate, each party’s station in life, each party’s earning ability, each party’s age,
health, and needs, fault or past misconduct, and any other equitable circumstance.
The significance of each of these factors will vary from case to case, and each
factor need not be given equal weight where the circumstances dictate otherwise.
[Byington, supra at 114-115 (citations omitted).]
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On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in not dividing defendant’s Kent
Community Hospital pension plan and Lincoln National Life Insurance Company annuity
between the parties.1
Under Michigan law, a party’s right to a vested pension or annuity shall be considered a
part of the marital estate for purposes of property division. MCL 552.18(1); Boonstra v
Boonstra, 209 Mich App 558, 563; 531 NW2d 777 (1995). However, simply because an
individual’s right to a vested pension and annuity is considered part of the marital estate does not
require the division of that asset between the parties. See Bone v Bone, 148 Mich App 834, 839;
385 NW2d 706 (1986). Rather, as the Boonstra Court recognized:
Pension [and annuity] benefits are assets to be considered part of the marital
estate subject to distribution in the discretion of the circuit court. To hold
otherwise would be to restrict the ability of the trial court to reach one of the
primary objectives of any divorce proceeding: to arrive at a property settlement
that is fair and equitable in light of all the circumstances. [Boonstra, supra at 563
(emphasis supplied; citation omitted).]
In dividing the marital estate in the instant case, the trial court noted the lengthy duration
of the parties’ marriage, and concluded that each contributed equally to the marital estate.
Observing that the parties were approximately the same age, the court further found that the
parties were similarly stationed in life. However, the trial court went on to observe that
defendant’s arthritis prevented her from working as a registered nurse. In contrast, the trial court
found that the record evidence indicated that plaintiff’s heart ailment did not prevent him from
working.2 Finally, the trial court concluded that any consideration of fault did not warrant a
disproportionate division of the marital estate. Consequently, the court ruled that “the assets of
the parties . . . should be [divided] equally.”
Ruling from the bench on February 21, 2000, the trial court found the entire marital estate
to have a value of $239,734.51. The trial court calculated this amount by factoring in the
following assets belonging to the parties: (1) the marital home, valued at $125,000, (2) the
parties’ recreational vehicle, plaintiff’s car, and the mobile home purchased by plaintiff in
Arizona, valued at $17,500 (3) plaintiff’s life insurance, valued at $5,000, (4) plaintiff’s bank
accounts and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) valued at $64,712.31, and, (5) furniture in
the marital home with a value of $2,000. The trial court went on to divide the sum of
$239,734.51 in half, expressing its intention to award each party $119,867.25 worth of assets.
Thus, in the divorce judgment the trial court awarded plaintiff the parties’ recreational vehicle,
his car, the mobile home, various personal items, his accounts and IRAs, and the cash value of
1
The specific value of these assets at the time of trial is unclear from the record. However,
during trial defendant testified that she received approximately $585 a month from her Kent
Community Hospital pension plan, and approximately $970.71 a month from the Lincoln
National Life Insurance Company annuity. Exhibits corroborating defendant’s testimony in this
regard were also admitted into evidence at trial.
2
According to the record plaintiff suffered from cardiomyopathy, and underwent open-heart
surgery in 1997. At the time of trial plaintiff was retired and drawing Social Security benefits.
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his life insurance, for a total of $87,212.31. The trial court then awarded defendant her accounts3
and IRAs as well as the marital home. The trial court imposed a $32,654.94 lien on the marital
home, payable to plaintiff. According to the trial court, the lien was necessary to equalize the
value of the marital assets received by each party.
Plaintiff’s challenge to the division of the marital estate implicates the court’s decision to
not divide defendant’s pension and annuity. Our review of the record indicates that the trial
court, after properly weighing the factors to be considered in dividing the marital estate, see
Byington, supra at 115, concluded that defendant should retain the whole of the pension and
annuity because her arthritis prevented her from continuing her employment as a registered
nurse. It is well to remember that a trial court’s division of the marital estate need not be
mathematically equal, only fair and equitable under the circumstances. Byington, supra at 114.
It would appear that the Court awarded the wife these additional income-generating assets in an
effort to equalize the respective incomes of the parties. (The husband’s social security and IRA
yielded him twice the income of the wife). Under the circumstances, we are not left with a
definite and firm conviction that the trial court’s division of the marital assets was inequitable.
Id. at 109.
Plaintiff also argues that the court erred in concluding that defendant’s interest4 in a
parcel of real property she inherited from her grandmother in 1976 was separate property.
A trial court’s initial consideration when undertaking to divide property in divorce
proceedings is to discern whether property is part of the marital estate, or whether it is separate.
Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 493-494; 575 NW2d 1 (1997). Martial property is
“property that came to either party by reason of the marriage . . . .” Id. at 493, quoting MCL
552.19 (emphasis and ellipses in original). Because defendant inherited this interest in real
property and kept it separate from the marital estate, it is properly characterized as separate
property not subject to distribution. See Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 584-585; 597 NW2d 82
(1999); Reeves, supra at 494. Likewise, we reject plaintiff’s argument that the property was
subject to distribution because property taxes were paid out of joint marital funds. We agree
with the trial court that any contribution by plaintiff to the property was not significant to the
extent that it has “a distinct value deserving of compensation.” Reeves, supra at 495. At best,
plaintiff’s contribution to the property was indirect and minor in nature. See Grotelueschen v
Grotelueschen, 113 Mich App 395, 401; 318 NW2d 227 (1982). Nor are we persuaded that
plaintiff has demonstrated additional need to the extent that this asset may be invaded. See MCL
552.401; Reeves, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
3
As relevant to this appeal, the divorce judgment provided, “specifically, defendant/wife is
awarded her Kent Community Pension and her Lincoln Life annuity.”
4
According to the record, defendant shares an interest in the property with her siblings.
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