PEOPLE OF MI V ANTONIO DAVIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 218206
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-004378
ANTONIO DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a), first-degree felony-murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), arson of a building, MCL 750.73,
discharging a firearm at a dwelling, MCL 750.234b, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court vacated the first-degree premeditated
murder conviction, and sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of natural life for the
felony-murder conviction, five to ten years for the arson conviction, and two to four years for the
discharging a weapon conviction. In addition, defendant was sentenced to a consecutive, twoyear term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm in part and vacate in part.
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for both
arson and felony-murder. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires us to determine
“whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the people, would warrant a
reasonable juror in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392,
399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Here, defendant’s argument on appeal is not so much directed at
a claim that the evidence was factually insufficient to support a felony-murder conviction, but
that double jeopardy principles prohibited consideration of the same evidence for purposes of
both offenses. We find no support for defendant’s argument that the same evidence could not
have been considered as factual support for both crimes. We agree, however, that double
jeopardy principles require that defendant’s arson conviction be vacated where defendant was
also convicted of felony-murder with arson serving as the underlying felony. People v Minor,
213 Mich 682, 690; 541 NW2d 576 (1995).
Defendant raises several additional matters, all of which were not preserved for an appeal
with an appropriate objection below. Nevertheless, this Court reviews unpreserved issues for
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plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-766; 597 NW2d
130 (1999).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that, if they found
that he did not make the statement police attributed to him, they could not consider it for any
purpose. A review of the record reveals that the trial court instructed the jury that it “cannot
consider” defendant’s statement unless if first found that he actually made the statement, and
that, “[i]f you find that [defendant Davis] did not make the statement at all, you shouldn’t
consider it.” Viewed as a whole, the court’s instructions were essentially what defendant now
argues should have been given. Accordingly, we find no plain error. Carines, supra at 763.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury concerning
the quantum of proof applicable to the determination of whether he made the alleged statement to
the police. Defendant has not cited any authority specifying the applicable quantum of proof or
holding that such an instruction is required. “A party may not merely state a position and leave it
to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis of the claim.” People v Griffin, 235 Mich App
27, 45; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). Regardless, we do not believe that the trial court instructions
deprived defendant of a fair trial. Accordingly, he has failed to establish plain error . Carines,
supra at 763.
Defendant next argues that his dual convictions for discharging a firearm at a dwelling
and felony-firearm violate his constitutional protections against double jeopardy. We disagree.
Because discharging a firearm at a dwelling is not one of the four exceptions listed in the felonyfirearm statute, MCL 750.227b, defendant properly could be convicted of both offenses. People
v Mitchell, 456 Mich 693, 698; 575 NW2d 283 (1998). Moreover, we have specifically opined
that double jeopardy does not prevent a defendant from being convicted of both felony-firearm,
MCL 750.227b, and discharge of a firearm at a dwelling, MCL 750.234b. People v Guiles, 199
Mich App 54, 60-61; 500 NW2d 757 (1993). Consequently, defendant’s argument is without
merit.
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s alibi instruction erroneously failed to inform
the jury that an alibi could lead to an acquittal either if the jury believed the alibi, or if the alibi
raised reasonable doubts about defendant’s presence at the crime scene. Defendant also claims
that the instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. We disagree.
Although some panels of this Court have held that, upon request, a trial court should
instruct the jury that an alibi offers two avenues of relief: “clear proof of the alibi” (also known
as the greater standard or perfect defense), and “reasonable doubt that the defendant was present
at the time that the crime was committed” (also known as the lesser standard). People v Prophet,
101 Mich App 618, 625; 300 NW2d 652 (1980). However, we recognized that these decisions
stopped short of “unequivocally requiring instruction on both ‘avenues of relief’ whenever an
alibi instruction is requested.” Id. at 627. For example, in the absence of an objection, the
failure to instruct on the perfect defense avenue of relief does not result in sufficient prejudice to
constitute a showing of manifest injustice.” Prophet, supra at 626-627, quoting People v Adams,
66 Mich App 616, 619; 239 NW2d 683 (1976). In contrast, instructing the jury only on the
perfect defense avenue of relief, and not the lesser reasonable doubt standard, may be prejudicial
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error because it tends to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Prophet, supra at 627-628.
We further opined as follows:
[T]he giving of both instructions may be unnecessarily confusing to a jury which
must first determine why the natural corollary of the reasonable doubt concept
was given before it can apply both instructions to its analysis of the evidence.
Where the jury is instructed to acquit if it finds a reasonable doubt as to
defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, and it nevertheless finds defendant
guilty, such verdict implies that, even if the perfect defense instruction had been
given, acquittal would not have resulted.” [Id. at 628.]
In the instant matter, the trial court gave only the lesser reasonable doubt instruction, specifically
mentioning that defendant did not have the burden of proving that he was somewhere else.
Accordingly, under Prophet, there was no error and no prejudice. Thus, having failed to
establish plain instructional error, appellate relief on the basis of this unpreserved issue is not
warranted. Carines, supra at 763.
Defendant also claims that the trial court gave a confusing aiding and abetting
instruction. We disagree. It is not error to charge a defendant alternatively as a principal or an
aider and abettor where, as here, there is substantial evidence that the defendants helped each
other. See People v Smielewski, 235 Mich App 196, 202-205; 596 NW2d 636 (1999). Further,
the court in this case specifically instructed the jury “to consider the concept of aiding and
abetting because the instruction[s] I give you on the crimes require that you find either that the
defendant, Mr. Davis or Mr. Reeves[,] committed the crimes themselves or that they aided and
abetted in the commission of the offense.” The court also instructed the jury “that at the time the
defendant gave his assistance, he intended to help someone else commit the crime.” Moreover,
the court’s intent instruction was actually more favorable to defendant Davis than the formulation
of intent endorsed by our Supreme Court. See Carines, supra at 768. Thus, defendant has failed
to show a plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763
Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for not properly preserving the
aforementioned issues. Again, however, because defendant did not raise the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel in an appropriate motion below, our review is limited to mistakes apparent
on the record. People v Hurst, 205 Mich App 634, 641; 517 NW2d 858 (1994). Generally, there
is a strong presumption that counsel was effective. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App
429, 444; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). To overcome this presumption, defendant must establish that
“(1) the performance of his counsel was below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's
unprofessional error, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. Here,
defendant has failed to establish any errors; thus, we are not persuaded that the performance of
his counsel deviated from an objective standard of reasonableness or that any of the purported
errors would have impacted the outcome of the proceedings. Consequently, we conclude that
defendant’s contention that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel is without merit.
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Lastly, defendant argues that he was deprived of due process because, despite requests, he
never received a full transcript of his Walker1 hearing, thereby preventing him from effectively
challenging the voluntariness of his police statement on appeal. Although the transcript that was
prepared does appear to be incomplete, it clearly indicates that defendant waived the issue of
voluntariness by admitting at the hearing that he voluntarily signed the written document
containing the statement attributable to him. Defendant did not claim that the officer forced him
to say the words contained in the document. Instead, defendant suggested that he did not make
the statement itself. Under these circumstances, the only issue to be decided was whether
defendant made the statement, and this issue was properly submitted to the jury at trial. People v
Neal, 182 Mich App 368, 371-373; 451 NW2d 639 (1990); People v Weatherspoon, 171 Mich
App 549, 553-555; 431 NW2d 75 (1988). Thus, we are not persuaded that the failure to provide
a complete transcript of the Walker hearing, although error, affected defendant’s substantial
rights. Carines, supra at 763.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for correction of the judgment of
sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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