PEOPLE OF MI V DWIGHT A BROWN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217017
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-007670
DWIGHT A. BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Wilder and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317;
MSA 28.549, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b;
MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced to twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for the murder
conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant
appeals by delayed leave granted. We affirm.
Defendant contends that reversal is warranted because the trial court failed to instruct the
jury on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter and the theory of self-defense. Because
defendant did not request these instructions in the trial court, appellate relief is precluded absent
a showing of plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights, i.e., a “clear or obvious” error
affecting the outcome of the proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763, 774; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). Even if plain error is shown, reversal is not warranted unless the defendant is
actually innocent or the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
proceedings. Id.
This Court reviews jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether error occurred.
People v Caulley, 197 Mich App 177, 184; 494 NW2d 853 (1992). Generally, jury instructions
must include all elements of the charged offense and should not exclude material issues,
defenses, and theories if there is evidence to support them. Id. Even if the instructions are
somewhat imperfect, there is no error if they fairly presented to the jury the issues to be tried and
sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights. Id.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to give an instruction on
voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing committed under the
influence of passion or hot blood produced by adequate provocation and before a reasonable time
has passed for the blood to cool. People v Hess, 214 Mich App 33, 38; 543 NW2d 332 (1995).
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It is a cognate lesser offense of murder. People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 479; 549 NW2d
584 (1996). Instruction on a cognate lesser included offense is required if (1) the principal
offense and the lesser offense are of the same class or category and (2) the evidence adduced at
trial would support conviction of the lesser offense. Id.
Defense counsel argued to the jury that defendant did not fire a gun, but even if he did,
the shooting was justified because Kenneth Jordan, the father of one of the men involved in the
altercation, fired at him first. In support of this theory, a defense witness testified at trial that
Jordan fired several shots with a rifle. Because no evidence was presented regarding the timing
of defendant’s shots in relation to those allegedly fired by Jordan, the jury might have been able
to infer from the evidence that defendant fired his gun in response to being shot at first. Thus,
since the jury could have conceivably found that defendant fired his gun under adequate
provocation, a voluntary manslaughter instruction was appropriate.
Defendant also claims that the an instruction on self-defense was appropriate given the
evidence. The killing of another in self-defense is justifiable homicide if the defendant honestly
and reasonably believed that his life was in imminent danger or that there is a threat of serious
bodily harm. People v Fortson, 202 Mich App 13, 20; 507 NW2d 763 (1993). Self-defense
consists of the following elements: (1) the defendant honestly believed that he was in danger; (2)
the danger feared was death or serious bodily harm; (3) the action taken appeared at the time to
be immediately necessary; and (4) the defendant was not the initial aggressor. People v Deason,
148 Mich App 27, 31; 384 NW2d 72 (1985). As noted above, one defense theory was that
Jordan shot a rifle first and defendant returned fire on him.1 In view of the trial testimony from a
defense witness that both defendant and Jordan fired their guns, an instruction on self-defense
was appropriate.
However, although we conclude that failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and
self-defense amounted to plain error, we are not persuaded that defendant’s substantial rights
were affected by the error. While there was conflicting evidence whether defendant possessed a
gun and whether Jordan fired a rifle at the scene, none of the witnesses testified that defendant
fired a gun in response to being shot at first. In fact, the sole defense witness testified that he did
not see defendant with a gun at all. On this record, we find that defendant has not satisfied his
burden of establishing that the failure to instruct on self-defense and manslaughter affected the
outcome of trial. In other words, considering all the evidence, we cannot conclude that the error
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent person or that the error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of defendant’s trial. Carines, supra. Accordingly, reversal
is not warranted.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to identify,
locate and list all known res gestae witnesses contrary to the res gestae witness statute, and by
1
Although defendant was not defending himself against the victim who was an innocent
bystander to these events, our research has not revealed any case law precluding application of
the self-defense doctrine to situations where a defendant was allegedly defending himself against
someone other than the victim.
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suggesting during closing arguments that there were no other witnesses to the charged offense.
We disagree.
Alleged prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed on a case by case basis. This Court
examines the pertinent portion of the record to determine whether defendant was denied a fair
and impartial trial. People v Legrone, 205 Mich App 77, 82-83; 517 NW2d 270 (1994). Under
the res gestae witness statute, MCL 767.40a; MSA 28.980(1), the prosecuting attorney is
required to produce a list of all res gestae witnesses known to the prosecutor or law enforcement
officers and is under a continuing duty to disclose the names of any res gestae witnesses as they
become known. However, unlike the former res gestae witness statute, the current statute no
longer imposes a duty on the prosecutor to locate and produce res gestae witnesses. People v
Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 288-289; 537 NW2d 813 (1995). While there may have been other
people in the vicinity at the time of the offense, there is no indication in the record that the
prosecutor was aware of their identities. Nor is there any indication that these other witness
could have provided information helpful to defendant’s case. Under these circumstances, we
find no basis for concluding that the prosecutor violated the statute, or that defendant was
prejudiced.
We likewise reject defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s remarks during closing
arguments were improper. Defendant challenges the following remarks made by the prosecutor:
“[l]adies and gentlemen, we have the people that were actually there and saw it” and
“[i]ncidentally, it’s interesting that everybody heard two shots except Mr. Stitts [the defense
witness] who heard five shots.” We find nothing inappropriate about these remarks. To the
contrary, the prosecutor was simply arguing the evidence presented at trial, which was entirely
proper. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Lastly, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.
Because defendant did not move for a new trial or evidentiary hearing in the trial court, this
Court’s review is limited to any mistakes apparent on the record. People v Hurst, 205 Mich App
634, 641; 517 NW2d 858 (1994). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
show that counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., that counsel made errors so serious that he
was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and that the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense, i.e., that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
defendant of a fair trial with reliable results. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 5-6; 594 NW2d 57
(1999). In doing so, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the challenged
conduct was sound trial strategy. Id. at 6.
Defendant contends that counsel was ineffective because he failed to demand the
production of Jordan, an endorsed prosecution witness, or to request an instruction directing the
jury to infer that the missing witness’ testimony would have been unfavorable to the prosecution.
We disagree. Upon review of the record, it is not apparent that the prosecution failed to exercise
due diligence or that Jordan could have been produced with due diligence. Nor is it apparent
from the record that Jordan, if produced as a witness, would have provided any information
helpful to the defense. Accordingly, defendant has failed to show that defense counsel was
deficient in this regard.
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Defendant also contends that counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and learn
the identities of other unknown res gestae witnesses. However, defendant does not articulate
what efforts, if any, counsel made to learn the identities of other witnesses, nor is there any
indication in the record that there were in fact other witnesses who could have provided
information helpful to the defense. Thus, defendant’s claim must fail.
Finally, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request jury
instructions on voluntary manslaughter and self-defense. As previously indicated, there is no
reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had those instructions
been given. Thus, defendant has failed to establish prejudice as a result of counsel’s error and
reversal is not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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