IN RE WINGATE/FLICK MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CAROLYN ANN WINGATE,
BOBBI LYNN WINGATE, JENNIE LYNN
FLICK, and ZANE RYAN FLICK, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 223210
Clare Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-000087-NA
GERALD ROBERT FLICK, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
STACEY FLICK,
Respondent.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Griffin and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from a family court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) and (c)(i); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii) and (c)(i). We affirm.
Respondent-appellant claims that the family court erred in assuming jurisdiction over him
solely on the basis that he admitted being incarcerated at the time the petition was filed.1
1
Respondent incorrectly argues that the family court erred in assuming jurisdiction over him
when the appropriate inquiry is whether “the proceeding is of a class the court is authorized to
adjudicate and the claim stated in the complaint is not clearly frivolous.” In re Hatcher, 443
Mich 426, 444; 505 NW2d 834 (1993). A valid exercise of jurisdiction in a child protection
proceeding is determined from the contents of the petition after the judge or referee finds
probable cause to believe that allegations contained in the petition are true. Id. at 437, 444.
(continued…)
-1-
However, respondent-appellant may not collaterally attack the family court’s exercise of
jurisdiction in an appeal as of right from the order terminating parental rights. In re Hatcher, 443
Mich 426, 439; 505 NW2d 834 (1993); In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 587-588; 528 NW2d
799 (1995). To challenge the family court’s assumption of jurisdiction over a termination
proceeding, respondent-appellant was required to directly appeal the family court’s jurisdictional
decision or request a rehearing of the ruling within twenty days of the order terminating parental
rights. MCL 712A.21; MSA 27.3178(598.21). Accordingly, respondent-appellant may no
longer challenge the family court’s exercise of jurisdiction and we decline to consider this claim.
Next, respondent-appellant claims that his due process rights were violated when the
family court failed to appoint him an attorney as prescribed by MCR 5.915(B). We disagree.
This Court has previously held that MCR 5.915(B) “requires affirmative action on the part of a
respondent in order to have an attorney appointed at statutory review hearings.” In re Hall, 188
Mich App 217, 222; 469 NW2d 56 (1991).2 Further, the right to counsel may be waived or
relinquished under MCR 5.915(B)(c) by a respondent’s actions. Id. In this case, a review of the
record reveals that respondent-appellant failed to request an attorney or otherwise demonstrate
his desire for an attorney to the family court after his appointed counsel was released, despite the
court’s order requiring him to specifically request an attorney upon his return to Michigan. Thus,
respondent-appellant effectively waived or relinquished his right to counsel until such time as he
reasserted his right for purposes of this appeal. In re Hall, supra.3
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
(…continued)
Because respondent-appellant admitted that the allegation against him in the petition was true,
jurisdiction over this proceeding was proper.
2
Respondent-appellant’s reliance on People v Brown, 49 Mich App 358; 212 NW2d 55 (1973),
is misplaced because that case was decided under the former version of the court rule, JCR 1969,
6.3(A)(2)(b), which required that counsel be appointed on the court’s own motion to indigent
respondents in a termination proceeding. The court rule has since been amended to clearly state
that a respondent in a termination proceeding has the right to a court-appointed attorney upon
request or after demonstrating a desire for an attorney. MCR 5.915(B). Thus, under the current
version of the court rule, a family court is no longer required to sua sponte appoint counsel in
termination proceedings; rather, parents are charged with some responsibility for having counsel
appointed for their benefit in child protection proceedings. In re Hall, supra at 222.
MCR 5.915 was again amended on October 1, 1995 and April 1, 1998; however, MCR
5.915(B) was not changed.
3
To the extent respondent-appellant alleges a constitutional due process violation, we find that
he has abandoned the issue by failing to cite any authority in support of an alleged constitutional
violation. In re Powers, supra at 588.
-2-
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