IN RE WALKER/DAVIS/HARRIS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JAMES NIKALE WALKER JR.,
NIKIA RENEE LASHAWN WALKER, and
JERVONE NIKLE WALKER, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 15, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 225118
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 92-302888
JAMES N. WALKER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Wilder and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant James Walker appeals by leave granted from the family court order
terminating his parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (c)(i),
(g), (h) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (c)(i), (g), (h) and (j). We affirm.
Upon review of the record, we find that the family court did not clearly err in finding that
statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
5.974(I); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Sours; 459 Mich
624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). This
Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings in an order terminating parental rights for clear
error. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, supra at 337; In re Vasquez, 199 Mich App 44, 51; 501
NW2d 231 (1993). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
In re Miller, supra. Deference must be accorded to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of the witnesses before it. MCR 2.613(C); In re Newman, 189 Mich 61, 65; 472 NW2d 38
(1991). Once the trial court finds a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing
evidence, the court must terminate parental rights unless it finds, based on the whole record, that
termination is clearly not in the best interests of the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo, supra at 350; In re Maynard, 233 Mich App 438, 450-451; 592
NW2d 751 (1999).
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Termination of parental rights is proper where the child’s parent has deserted the child for
91 or more days and has not sought custody of the child during that period. MCL
712A.19b(3)(a)(ii); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii). A parent’s failure to make any substantial
effort to visit or communicate with the child or seek custody of the child for a period in excess of
the statutory period establishes desertion. See In re Mayfield, 198 Mich App 226; 497 NW2d
578 (1993); In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217; 469 NW2d 56 (1991).
The record in this case clearly establishes that respondent deserted the children for 91 or
more days and did not seek custody of the children during that period. The most compelling
evidence in support of termination under subsection 19b(3)(a)(ii) comes from the respondent
himself who testified that he has not seen or had any contact with his children since 1993. He
further testified that he never provided financial support for the children, never visited the
children and only once inquired of friends and family about their whereabouts and welfare since
1993. Respondent’s testimony additionally revealed that he made no plans for his children
during his incarceration or for reunification after his release.
The record is also clear that respondent never sought custody of the children during this
time of desertion. Respondent testified that he sent one letter to the court inquiring about his
children, but it was returned because of a “no contact” order issued by the court prohibiting
respondent from having any contact with his children. However, respondent’s one attempt at
contacting his children over a seven-year period does not constitute “seeking custody” of the
children. Further, respondent did not send this letter until 1998, almost five years after his last
contact with the children in 1993. On this record, we agree with the family court that there was
clear and convincing evidence that respondent had deserted his children for more than 91 days
and had not sought custody of the children during this time. Accordingly, termination of his
parental rights under subsection 19b(3)(a)(ii) was proper.1
Further, the family court’s assessment of the best interests of the children was not clearly
erroneous. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo Minors, supra. The
record reveals that respondent had not established any parental relationship or emotional bond
with his children. Indeed, having not seen them since they were toddlers over seven years ago,
he is a virtual stranger to the children. Further, in light of appellant’s incarceration with an
uncertain release date, his failure to provide any financial or emotional support to the children
over the years, and his failure to provide a plan for the children during his incarceration or for
reunification upon his release, the family court did not clearly err in finding that termination of
1
Because the family court properly terminated appellant’s parental rights under subsection
19b(3)(a)(ii) and only one statutory ground for termination must be established in order to
terminate parental rights, we need not decide whether termination was also proper under the
other subsections. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
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appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
27.3178(598.19b)(5).
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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