PEOPLE OF MI V JAMES VERNON GANSZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 12, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee
v
No. 216174
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 98-001036-FC
JAMES VERNON GANSZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Wilder and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his conviction by a jury of kidnapping, MCL 750.349;
MSA 28.581, and two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b;
MSA 28.788(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to three concurrent terms of fifteen to forty
years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial
because the prosecutor did not disclose a statement defendant made to a police officer until after
defendant testified. “We review a trial court’s decision regarding the appropriate remedy for
noncompliance with a discovery order for an abuse of discretion.” People v Davie (After
Remand), 225 Mich App 592, 597-598; 571 NW2d 229 (1997).
A defendant is entitled to have produced at trial all the evidence bearing on his guilt or
innocence that is within the prosecutor’s control. People v Florinchi, 84 Mich App 128, 133;
269 NW2d 500 (1978). While earlier case law suggests that prosecutorial noncompliance with a
discovery order would result in reversal unless the failure to divulge was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, see People v Pace, 102 Mich App 522, 530-531; 302 NW2d 216 (1980), more
recent case law is consistent with MCR 6.201 and holds that questions of noncompliance with
discovery orders or agreements are subject to the discretion of the trial court. People v Taylor,
159 Mich App 468, 487-488; 406 NW2d 859 (1987). The court must exercise discretion in
fashioning a remedy for noncompliance. Id. at 487. To fashion a remedy, the court must
determine the legitimate interests of the court and the parties involved and how they may be
affected by the remedial choices available. Id. This process requires an inquiry into all the
relevant circumstances, including the causes of the tardy or total noncompliance, as well as a
showing by the objecting party of actual prejudice. Davie, supra at 598.
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The use of a defendant’s nondisclosed statements for impeachment purposes is
permissible and generally is considered not prejudicial because a defendant is presumed to know
of them. Thus, in People v Lynn, 91 Mich App 117, 126-127; 283 NW2d 664 (1979), where the
defendant was impeached with a prior statement that had not been made available to him
pursuant to a discovery order, this Court found no prejudicial error because the statement was
made by the defendant, and the defendant was presumed to know what statements he had made.
Similarly, in Taylor, supra at 487-488, this Court held that the defendant was properly
impeached with a letter he wrote, despite the prosecution’s nondisclosure of the letter, because
the defendant had knowledge of the letter independent of discovery.
In this case, defendant clearly had knowledge of his own statement to the police officer
independent of discovery, and therefore he was not in a position to claim prejudice from its use
for impeachment purposes. Moreover, even ignoring the impact of the admission of the
statement, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Under these circumstances, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial and allowing
the statement at issue to be used for impeachment purposes.
Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
This Court reviews claims of the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. People v Mayhew, 236
Mich App 112, 124; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). In evaluating whether the evidence introduced
against a defendant supported a conviction, this Court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecutor and determines whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 722-723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
The kidnapping conviction in the instant case was based on secret confinement. See
People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 297, 305-307; 519 NW2d 108 (1994). Defendant contends that
no secret confinement occurred in this case because the victim was not restrained and was free to
leave. We disagree.
Secret confinement occurs when the victim is unable to avail herself of the opportunity
for outside help. Id. at 307. The essence of secret confinement as contemplated by the
kidnapping statute is deprivation of the assistance of others by the virtue of the victim’s inability
to communicate her predicament. Id. at 305-309. To determine whether secret confinement
occurred, the totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine whether the victim
was deprived of the assistance of others. Id. at 309.
When looking at the totality of the circumstances in this case, a rational trier of fact
clearly could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that secret confinement occurred. Deputy
Thomas Buckley stated that when the police approached defendant’s house, he could see a man
and woman physically fighting and heard the man telling the woman to “shut up.” The woman
was trying to get away but the man held her and covered her mouth. The victim stated that when
she realized the police were outside the house, she tried to bang on the window but could not do
so because defendant was holding her back. She stated that defendant told her to be quiet and not
to move and not to answer the door. The victim further testified that she was not free to leave the
house or to make telephone calls during a three-day period. She testified that defendant hid the
upstairs telephone so she could not use it and that defendant would not allow her to answer or
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return calls from her ex-husband or the police. According to the victim, defendant was with her
the whole three days except when he left to return a videotape; she did not leave the house then
because the video store was very close and she had nowhere to go, and she explained that she did
not call the police because she feared that defendant might return home and harm her before they
responded to her telephone call. The victim further testified that defendant beat her up severely
and sexually assaulted her during the three days.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, a rational trier of fact
could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim in this case was (contrary to
defendant’s argument) not free to leave, was unable to effectively communicate her predicament
to others, and was therefore kidnapped.1
With regard to the CSC I conviction involving penile-vaginal intercourse, defendant
contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction because the victim
consented to having intercourse. However, when viewing the evidence as a whole in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, it is clear that the prosecutor presented sufficient evidence
from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
victim did not in fact consent to having sexual intercourse with defendant. The victim stated that
in addition to causing her other physical injuries, defendant split her head open by throwing her
against the headboard of a bed at some point before they had sexual intercourse. She stated that
she told defendant “no” more than once but that defendant penetrated her anyway. She further
stated that she did not consent to having sex with defendant but that, based on past experience,
she knew he would have sex with her whether she wanted to or not. She explained that she did
not fight against defendant because when she had tried to fight him off in the past, she had been
unsuccessful. This evidence indicated that the victim was in fear and unable to stave off
defendant. A rational trier of fact could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
victim did not consent to having sexual relations with defendant.
With regard to both the CSC I convictions (which were based on penile-vaginal and
manual/digital-anal intercourse), defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain
the convictions because the victim suffered no personal injury in connection with the two alleged
penetrations. However, the CSC I charges were based on the alternative theories of personal
injury, MCL 750.520b(f); MSA 28.788(2)(f), and penetration occurring during a kidnapping,
MCL 750.520b(c); MSA 28.788(2)(c). Because, as discussed supra, there was sufficient
evidence to support the existence of a kidnapping, the CSC I convictions were supported by
sufficient evidence even assuming, arguendo, that no personal injury occurred in connection with
the sexual penetrations. See People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28-32; 592 NW2d 75 (1998)
(indicating that aggravating circumstances for a CSC I conviction are alternative theories on
which jury unanimity is not required), and People v Asevedo, 217 Mich App 393, 397-398; 551
NW2d 478 (1996) (indicating that if two alternative CSC I theories not requiring jury unanimity
are set forth, then a guilty verdict shall be sustained even if only one of the theories is supported
1
Defendant additionally contends that a kidnapping conviction may not be based on a victim’s
confinement in her own house. This contention is without merit. See Jaffray, supra at 312 n 37.
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by sufficient evidence). A rational trier of fact could have concluded that the elements of each
CSC I conviction were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson, supra at 723.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
his trial attorney failed to determine before trial that witness Hedy Nuriel was an expert on
battered women’s syndrome and therefore failed to adequately prepare for Nuriel’s testimony or
to secure a corresponding expert on defendant’s behalf.
This Court presumes the effective assistance of counsel, and a defendant’s burden to
prove otherwise is a heavy one. People v Eloby (After Remand), 215 Mich App 472, 476; 547
NW2d 48 (1996). To determine whether ineffective assistance of counsel occurred, this Court
must determine (1) whether counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, and (2)
whether the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s defective performance. People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601
NW2d 887 (1999). To convince this Court of prejudice, a defendant must establish “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result [of the proceedings] would have
been different.” People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999), quoting People v Johnson,
451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). Here, because defendant did not raise the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court, our review is limited to mistakes that are
apparent from the record. People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 408; 552 NW2d 663 (1996).
Even assuming that counsel’s performance was deficient in the instant case, defendant
has failed to demonstrate prejudice. First, defendant’s attorney cross-examined Nuriel regarding
whether different people in the same circumstance react to a situation differently and asked if
Nuriel thought people have free will. Second, as noted by the prosecution, Nuriel’s testimony
concerned the behavior of battered women in general; her testimony was not specifically about
defendant’s conduct. Third, the judge gave a limiting instruction regarding the testimony.
Fourth, defendant has presented (1) no affidavit or other documentation indicating that his
attorney could have obtained an expert defense witness to counter Nuriel’s testimony, and (2) no
argument indicating how a better-prepared defense attorney would have more effectively crossexamined Nuriel. Finally, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was strong, even in the absence of
Nuriel’s testimony. Under these circumstances, defendant has not met his burden of showing
that his trial attorney’s representation prejudiced him, and he is therefore not entitled to a new
trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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