DALE ELLEN GARY V SOUTHFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DALE ELLEN GARY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 12, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 212895
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 96-520936-CZ
SOUTHFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS, JUDITH
HOFFMEYER and WALTER KOKAL,
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants. We affirm.
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, plaintiff was employed as a paraprofessional by
defendant Southfield Public Schools. Plaintiff is an African-American woman. In 1993,
Southfield laid off approximately fifty paraprofessionals due to budget cuts. Plaintiff was one of
those laid off. Following the layoff, plaintiff was placed, at her request, in the district’s Severely
Emotionally Impaired (SEI) program at Southfield Lathrop High School. In this position,
plaintiff worked one-on-one with special needs students.
The SEI program serves severely emotionally impaired students throughout Oakland
County. Defendant Kokal is the director of the SEI program, and defendant Hoffmeyer was
plaintiff’s direct supervisor. The SEI program is funded by Oakland Schools. Plaintiff’s
placement in the SEI program meant that another paraprofessional with less seniority was
bumped from the position. This SEI position was one that was reviewed annually by Oakland
Schools to determine if there was a need to continue funding the position in the following school
year.
At the end of the 1993-1994 school year, funding for plaintiff’s SEI position was
eliminated. Plaintiff was then advised that the following three paraprofessional vacancies
existed: career education specialist, pre-primary impaired assistant, and locker room assistant.
Plaintiff interviewed for the career education specialist, but was not offered the job because she
was not found to possess the requisite qualifications. Of the two remaining vacancies, plaintiff
chose the locker room assistant position. Thereafter, plaintiff filed her complaint alleging racial
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discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment. Plaintiff’s claim of racial
discrimination is based on the theory of disparate treatment. Plaintiff points to three instances of
alleged discrimination. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to
defendants. We disagree. This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de
novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a
plaintiff’s claim. MCR 2.116(C)(10) permits summary disposition when, except
for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to damages as a matter of law. A court reviewing
such a motion must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions,
and any other evidence in favor of the opposing party and grant the benefit of any
reasonable doubt to the opposing party. [Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206
Mich App 83, 85; 520 NW2d 633 (1994).]
Plaintiff cites three alleged instances of discriminatory behavior. First, plaintiff contends
that defendants failed to advise her of the undesirable nature of the SEI position and that they
purposefully placed her in that position because it was undesirable. Second, plaintiff argues that
she was wrongfully denied the career education specialist position. Third, plaintiff maintains that
she was discriminated against when she was required to fill a vacancy rather than bump another
less senior individual after her SEI position was eliminated.
The Michigan Civil Rights Act (MCRA) prohibits an employer from discriminating
against an employee based upon race. MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(1)(a). “In order to
establish a prima facie case of ‘[d]isparate treatment’ race discrimination, a plaintiff ‘must show
that [she] was a member of a protected class entitled to protection under the [MCRA] and that,
for the same or similar conduct, [she] was treated differently than one who was a member of a
different race.’” Betty v Brooks & Perkins, 446 Mich 270, 281; 521 NW2d 518 (1994), quoting
Schipani v Ford Motor Co, 102 Mich App 606, 617; 302 NW2d 307 (1981). Defendants do not
challenge that plaintiff is a member of a protected class. Once a plaintiff has established a prima
facie case of discrimination, it is incumbent upon the defendant to show some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s treatment. Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co,
235 Mich App 347, 359; 597 NW2d 250 (1999). If the defendant does so, the burden of proof
shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered justification is a mere pretext for
discrimination. Id.
Plaintiff first argues that because the trial court’s decision was based on its interpretation
of the district collective bargaining agreement, the case is preempted by § 301 of the federal
Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 USC 185(a). Accordingly, plaintiff asserts that
the trial court should have either dismissed the case without prejudice so that it could be refiled
in federal court, or apply federal labor law principles in ruling on the summary disposition
motion. Betty, supra. We disagree.
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“[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective
bargaining agreement,” then the claim is preempted by § 301 of LMRA. Lingle v Norge Div of
Magic Chef, Inc, 486 US 399, 405-406; 108 S Ct 1877; 100 L Ed 2d 410 (1988). Contrary to
plaintiff’s assertion, however, the trial court’s resolution of her lawsuit did not require
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.
Plaintiff’s lawsuit is based on
nonnegotiable rights that apply to all employees under the MCRA, not on rights established
under the collective bargaining agreement. Betty, supra at 282. The agreement neither
established those rights, nor can it extinguish them. Ramirez v Fox Television Station, Inc, 998
F2d 743, 748 (CA 9, 1993). The fact that defendants relied on the collective bargaining
agreement when asserting legitimate reasons for their actions does not mean that this lawsuit is
preempted. Betty, supra at 287-289. The trial court did not attempt to determine if defendants’
interpretation of the agreement was correct under federal labor law principles. Rather, the court
considered whether defendants’ claim that their actions were based on the collective bargaining
agreement set forth a nondiscriminatory motive for plaintiff’s treatment. Id. at 289, n 24. Thus,
we conclude that plaintiff’s preemption argument is without merit.
We now turn to plaintiff’s three cited instances of alleged disparate treatment. With
regard to plaintiff’s claim centered on her work for the SEI program, we conclude that the trial
court did not err in granting defendants summary disposition. Plaintiff asserts that she was given
the least desirable position available—the one-on-one position—while the other white
paraprofessionals who bumped into the SEI program received more favorable classroom
assignments. Plaintiff asserts the position was undesirable because it required her to work in
isolation with highly disruptive and troubled children, and because it was subject to annual
budget review.
We will assume, as did the trial court, that plaintiff has satisfied her initial burden of
demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination. It was then incumbent upon defendants to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s placement. Defendants did so by
pointing to the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement provided that in the event of a
displacement, the most senior employee would bump the most junior employee. That is exactly
what happened, with plaintiff, as the most senior paraprofessional, bumping the most junior
member from the SEI program. Plaintiff presents absolutely no evidence that defendants’
proffered reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. Wilcoxon, supra at 359.
We also believe that summary disposition was properly granted on plaintiff’s claim that
she was denied an equal opportunity to compete for the career education specialist position.
Plaintiff was required to show “‘by a preponderance of the evidence that [s]he applied for an
available position for which [s]he was qualified but was rejected under circumstances giving rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination.’” Pomranky v Zack Co, 159 Mich App 338, 343-344;
405 NW2d 881 (1987), quoting Clark v Uniroyal Corp, 119 Mich App 820, 824-825; 327 NW2d
372 (1982)(emphasis added). As the trial court observed, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she
was even minimally qualified for the position.1 When asked why she thought she was qualified,
1
Plaintiff’s argument relies heavily on the allegation that unlike the two other white women who
applied for the career education specialist position, she was not informed that under the
collective bargaining agreement, she could appeal the finding that she was not qualified for the
(continued…)
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plaintiff merely responded, “Why wasn’t I?” Further, plaintiff could not set forth a reason why
defendants would have denied her the position based on race, and even admitted that she was
guessing that they did not want a black employee for the position.2
Finally, plaintiff claims that defendants discriminated against her by forcing her to take
the vacant position of locker room assistant rather than allowing her to bump another less senior
member from another position. However, plaintiff failed to demonstrate how a similarly situated
member of the nonprotected class was treated more favorably in this regard. Furthermore,
Chekaway testified that the school district interpreted the collective bargaining agreement as
setting forth differing procedures for handling small and large layoffs. According to Chekaway,
in the event of a single displacement, such as plaintiff’s, the displaced individual was required to
fill a vacancy before bumping another employee. Plaintiff failed to show that this justification
was a mere pretext for discrimination.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
(…continued)
position. In support of this allegation, plaintiff points to the rejection letters sent to her and the
other two women. It is clear from these letters that unlike the other two women, plaintiff was not
advised in her letter that she could attempt to prove her qualifications after being rejected.
However, John Chekaway, the school district’s director of personnel, testified in his deposition
that plaintiff was advised via telephone of these rights. Plaintiff does not challenge this
assertion.
2
Plaintiff also admitted that the individual who was actually hired had more seniority. Thus,
even if plaintiff could have proven her qualifications, she would have lost out to the more senior
candidate under the collective bargaining agreement.
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