PEOPLE OF MI V LATASHA GENISE MORSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 8, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 226119
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-167284-FC
LATASHA GENISE MORSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
ON REMAND
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Fitzgerald and D. B. Leiber*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
On remand from the Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted, plaintiff
appeals from the trial court order that granted defendant’s motion to suppress her confession.
We reverse and remand. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
An inquiry into whether a waiver of Miranda rights is valid requires a bifurcated analysis
of whether the waiver was voluntary and whether it was knowing and intelligent, depending on
the totality of the circumstances. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 633, 638-639; 614 NW2d 152
(2000). While a finding of voluntariness of a waiver depends on the absence of police coercion,
a finding that a waiver was knowing and intelligent requires an objective inquiry into the
suspect’s level of understanding, irrespective of police conduct. Id. at 635-636. The prosecutor
has the burden of proving that a waiver is valid by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 634;
People v Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 644-645; 599 NW2d 736 (1999).
An appellate court must give deference to the trial court’s findings at a suppression
hearing. Although this Court reviews the record de novo, it should not disturb the trial court’s
factual findings regarding a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights unless such
findings are clearly erroneous. Daoud, supra at 629-630; People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 2930; 551 NW2d 355 (1996).
The issue in this case concerns only whether defendant’s waiver of rights was made
knowingly and intelligently. To establish a valid waiver, the prosecutor need only demonstrate
that the suspect understood that she did not have to speak, that she had the right to the presence
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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of counsel, and that the state could use what she said against her. “That is the meaning of
intelligent waiver; that and no more.” Cheatham, supra at 29. The focus of the inquiry must be
whether the defendant could in fact understand and waive his or her Miranda rights, not the
reason or motive underlying the confession. Daoud, supra at 15, 19.
Here, the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendant’s confession was neither
knowingly nor intelligently made by improperly focusing on the possible reasons for defendant’s
confession, e.g., lack of food and sleep, and being on pain medication, rather than focusing on
whether defendant could in fact understand and waive her rights. At the evidentiary hearing,
defendant testified that, despite her physical condition, she was able to converse with the
detective, understood what he said, and understood that the notes being taken would be given to
the prosecutor. She further testified that, although she did not pay particular attention to the
explanation of her rights, she understood them and understood the form when she signed it.
Finally, she testified that she had previously been arrested and convicted of uttering and
publishing in 1996, and that in that case her rights had been explained to her and she understood
them.
In light of defendant’s own testimony, the conclusion that must be drawn is that
defendant was in fact able to understand and waive her rights. The trial court clearly erred in
finding otherwise and, therefore, we reverse the order suppressing defendant’s confession.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Dennis B. Leiber
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