IN RE EDWARDS MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of GREGORY TYRONE
EDWARDS, TIA MARIE EDWARDS, and
KEANU TYRESE EDWARDS, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2000
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
TINA MARIE WATSON, a/k/a TINA MARIE
EDWARDS,
No. 223909
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-352878
Respondent-Appellant,
and
GREGORY TYRONE EDWARDS, SR.,
Respondent.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant Tina Marie Watson appeals as of right from an order terminating
her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (c)(i), (g),
and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
In a termination proceeding, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating a statutory
basis for termination, by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(F)(3). The petitioner need
only establish one statutory ground for termination. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 360; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). Once that statutory basis for termination is shown, the trial court shall
terminate parental rights unless it finds that doing so is clearly not in the child’s best interests.
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); MCR 5.974(F)(3); In re Trejo Minors, supra,
462 Mich 344. This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s decision that a ground for
termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 356-357; MCR 5.974(I); In
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re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ [if]
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id., quoting In re Riffe, 147 Mich
App 658, 671; 382 NW2d 842 (1985).
In the present case, appellant argues that petitioner failed to prove a statutory ground for
termination by clear and convincing evidence. As to Gregory and Tia, the court terminated
appellant’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (c)(i), (g), and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii), (b)(i), (c)(i), (g), and (j). As to Keanu, the court terminated
appellant’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) and
(j). We do not believe that the trial court committed clear error in finding that these statutory
grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence.
First, the trial court found that appellant had deserted Gregory and Tia for more than
ninety-one days, and had not sought custody during that period. MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(a)(ii). During the course of the guardianship, the children were placed with
their maternal grandmother and appellant exercised visitation with the children at the
grandmother’s home. However, in late May, 1998, the trial court ordered that appellant could
exercise only supervised visitation at the FIA facilities, because appellant was not in compliance
with the treatment plan. At trial, appellant admitted that she did not visit the children after the
visitation arrangements changed, until the following November. Because it is uncontested that
appellant failed to visit the children for a period longer than ninety-one days, the trial court
properly held that this statutory ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing
evidence.
Next, the trial court found that appellant had caused physical injury to Gregory and Tia,
and that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would suffer injury or abuse in the
foreseeable future if returned to appellant’s care.
MCL 712A.19(b)(3)(b)(i); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(i). When the FIA first took Gregory and Tia into custody, Gregory
stated that both respondents had physically abused him and his younger sister. Multiple scars
and marks were discovered on Gregory’s upper back and neck, demonstrating that he had been
physically abused. At trial, appellant admitted that she had physically beaten both children in the
past, and that she had caused the mark on Gregory’s neck. Further, after the children were placed
in foster care, appellant threatened Gregory that she would get to him and make him answer for
telling the authorities what went on in respondents’ home. Evidence introduced at trial also
demonstrated an atmosphere of domestic violence existing in respondents’ home. Testimony
was presented that appellant shot respondent-father in the leg on one occasion, and stabbed him
on another occasion. Although appellant began attending domestic violence counseling sessions
in March, 1999, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that appellant had not resolved
her domestic violence problems through counseling, and that she continued to avoid
responsibility for violence in the home. Accordingly, the trial court properly held that this
statutory ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Next, the trial court held that appellant was a respondent in a termination of parental
rights proceeding, that 182 or more days had elapsed since the initial dispositional order, that the
conditions that led to the adjudication continued to exist, and that there was no reasonable
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likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time, considering the ages of
the children. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i). The evidence presented
at trial supported a finding that appellant had a long-standing substance abuse problem involving
cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. Appellant admitted that she started using cocaine after Gregory
and Tia had been placed in the court’s custody. She also admitted using cocaine while pregnant
with Keanu, and the child had cocaine in his system at birth. Appellant did not enroll in a
substance abuse treatment program or submit to drug screens until Gregory and Tia had been in
foster care for over two years. Even after that point, she provided some screens which were
positive for drugs and alcohol. The evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s
conclusion that appellant did not appreciate the full extent of her substance abuse problem, and
that the children did not have additional time to wait. Accordingly, the trial court properly held
that this statutory ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Next, the trial court found that appellant, without regard to intent, had failed to provide
proper care or custody for Gregory, Tia, and Keanu, and that there was no reasonable expectation
that she would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time, considering
the ages of the children. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g). The evidence
presented at trial documented appellant’s problems with substance abuse and domestic violence.
She admitted physically abusing Gregory and Tia when they were in her care, and admitted using
cocaine while pregnant with Keanu. Given her long delay in seeking treatment for drug abuse
and domestic violence and her limited progress in those treatment programs, the trial court
properly held that this statutory ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing
evidence.
Next, the trial court found that there was a reasonable likelihood, based on appellant’s
conduct or capacity, that the children would be harmed if returned to her care. MCL
712A.19b(3)(j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(j). Given the evidence discussed above, we conclude
that the trial court did not commit clear error in finding that this statutory basis for termination
was established by clear and convincing evidence.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erroneously determined that the best interests
of the children supported termination of her parental rights. Under MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5), once a statutory ground for termination is established, the court must
terminate parental rights unless there exists evidence, on the whole record, that termination is
clearly not in the child’s best interests. In re Trejo Minors, supra, 462 Mich 344. This Court
reviews the trial court’s decision regarding the child’s best interests for clear error. Id. at 356357. The trial court may consider evidence introduced by any party when determining whether
termination is clearly not in a child’s best interest. Id. at 353. Neither the petitioner nor the party
opposing termination bears the burden of proving the best interests of the child, because
subsection 19b(5) permits the court to determine the child’s best interests from the evidence on
the whole record. Id. at 352-353. Given the evidence produced below and the trial court’s
factual findings that supported termination under multiple statutory subsections, we cannot say
that the trial court clearly erred in applying those same facts to determine that the whole record
did not demonstrate that termination was clearly not in the best interests of the children.
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Finally, appellant argues that the trial court violated her due process rights when it
conducted a pretrial hearing without appellant’s presence. The record reflects that the trial court
conducted a pretrial hearing on July 24, 1997, at which time the court exercised jurisdiction over
Gregory and Tia and placed them in the court’s temporary custody. Appellant was not present
for the hearing because she was incarcerated. Her attorney, who was present at the hearing, was
unaware of appellant’s incarceration. Appellant argues that the trial court should have somehow
discovered that she was incarcerated and should have adjourned the hearing until she could be
present, or should have provided a writ of habeas corpus to allow her to attend the hearing.
Appellant does not explain what evidence would have been presented, or how the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different, had she been present at the July 24, 1997 pretrial hearing.
Further, appellant participated in subsequent hearings before the trial court, but failed to raise the
argument that her absence from the pretrial hearing deprived her of due process of law.
Therefore, appellant’s claim is unpreserved for appellate review.
“This Court disfavors consideration of unpreserved claims of error.” People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 761; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Unpreserved error must be reviewed under the plain
error rule. Id. at 763. To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be
met: (1) error must have occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain
error affected substantial rights. Id. The third requirement necessitates a showing of prejudice,
i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Id. Because appellant
has failed to indicate how her absence from the pretrial hearing affected the outcome of the lower
court proceedings, she has forfeited appellate review of this unpreserved issue under the plain
error rule.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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