PEOPLE OF MI V OLIVER U GANTT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 21, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 210821
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-502846
OLIVER U. GANTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder,
MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, and first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a; MSA 28.305(a).
After vacating one of the second-degree murder convictions,1 the trial court sentenced defendant
to concurrent terms of twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment for the murder conviction and ten to
twenty years’ imprisonment for the home invasion conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
I
Defendant first claims that reversal is warranted based on the trial court’s improper jury
instructions and “suggestive” verdict form. Because defendant failed to object to the trial court’s
jury instructions or the verdict form below, appellate relief may be granted only if a miscarriage
of justice would otherwise result. People v Van Dorsten, 441 Mich 540, 544-545; 494 NW2d
737 (1993).
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly gave CJI2d 7.15, use of deadly force in
self-defense, rather than CJI2d 7.22, use of nondeadly force in self-defense or defense of others,
despite his testimony that he did not have a weapon. Defendant, however, did not request CJI2d
7.22. “[F]ailure of the court to instruct on any point of law shall not be ground for setting aside
the verdict of the jury unless such instruction is requested by the accused.” MCL 768.29; MSA
28.1052. See also People v Hendricks, 446 Mich 435, 440-441; 521 NW2d 546 (1994).
1
Defendant was charged in the alternative with first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree
felony murder.
-1-
Moreover, not only did defendant fail to object to the trial court giving CJI2d 7.15, but defense
counsel argued vigorously for the instruction when the prosecutor objected and argued against
that instruction being given. A party cannot request a certain action of the trial court and then
argue on appeal that the resultant action was error. People v McCray, 210 Mich App 9, 14; 533
NW2d 359 (1995). Accordingly, defendant has waived this issue for review. See People v
Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 488; 406 NW2d 859 (1987). We nevertheless note that, considering
that defendant was originally charged with first-degree premeditated murder and that a deadly
weapon was used to kill the victim, the instruction given was not improper. See, e.g., People
Hooper, 152 Mich App 243, 246-247; 394 NW2d 27 (1986).
Defendant also contends that the verdict form improperly suggested a verdict of guilty of
second-degree murder. We disagree. A jury must be instructed on the verdict of not guilty with
respect to each offense charged, which was what occurred in this case. See People v Ray, 119
Mich App 724, 728; 326 NW2d 622 (1982). In particular, with regard to first-degree
premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder, the verdict form provided the option of not
guilty, guilty, or guilty of second-degree murder. Moreover, defendant did not object to the
verdict form. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any relief on this basis.2
II
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into
evidence a cane sword that the prosecution offered to demonstrate the kind of weapon it
theorized was used in the murder of the victim.3 Because defendant failed to object to the trial
court’s ruling, our review is limited to whether the evidentiary ruling resulted in manifest
injustice. People v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386, 404; 585 NW2d 1 (1998). We will not reverse
on the basis of an evidentiary error unless the court's ruling affected a party's substantial rights.
MRE 103(a).
Demonstrative evidence, including physical objects alleged to be similar to those
involved in the incident at issue, is admissible where it may assist the trier of fact in reaching a
conclusion on a matter material to the case. People v Castillo, 230 Mich App 442, 444; 584
NW2d 606 (1998). A weapon similar to one allegedly used in the commission of a crime may be
admitted as demonstrative evidence where (1) substantial evidence attests to the similarity of the
exhibit offered to the weapon allegedly used, (2) there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
may fail to understand the demonstrative nature of the evidence, and (3) the opposing party has
ample opportunity for cross-examination regarding the demonstrative weapon. Id. at 445-446.
2
We decline to address defendant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the court’s jury instructions because defendant did not raise this claim in his statement
of issues presented. People v Yarbrough, 183 Mich App 163, 165; 454 NW2d 419 (1990). We,
however, note that it is unlikely that, but for counsel’s failure to object to the instructions, the
result of the proceedings would have been different. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69;
536 NW2d 809 (1995).
3
The cane sword recovered from the crime scene did not contain the blade because it had been
broken off. The blade on the demonstrative cane sword was still in tact.
-2-
In addition, the demonstrative evidence offered must satisfy traditional requirements for
relevance and probative value in light of policy considerations for advancing the administration
of justice pursuant to MRE 401-403. Id. at 444-445.
Upon considering these three elements and general principles of admissibility, it is
apparent that no error requiring reversal occurred. Concerning the first element, before defendant
entered his former girlfriend’s home, she observed him holding a long black pole that looked like
the shaft portion of a cane sword. Defendant’s daughter observed him swinging a cane sword
forward and repeatedly towards the victim. Both defendant’s former girlfriend and his daughter
testified that defendant owned a black cane sword that was similar to the demonstrative evidence.
Moreover, the two parts of the cane sword actually used in the incident (the shaft and the cover)
were recovered at the crime scene, and a detective indicated that those parts were identical to the
demonstrative cane sword. This evidence satisfies the requirement of a substantial evidentiary
basis for likening the demonstrative sword in evidence to the alleged instrumentality of the
crime.
With regard to the second element, we have reviewed the record and recognize no
attempts by the prosecution to deceive the jury regarding the demonstrative nature of the cane
sword. The prosecution made plain before the jury that the exhibit was not the weapon used
during the incident. In fact, a police detective testified that he purchased the demonstrative cane
sword at the Gibraltar Trade Center. Further, the recovered parts of the actual cane sword were
discussed and admitted into evidence immediately before the demonstrative cane sword was
discussed. With regard to the third element, defendant had ample opportunity and did, in fact,
cross-examine the eyewitnesses who likened the demonstration cane sword to the weapon used in
the murder. Accordingly, because the prosecutor acknowledged that the subject cane sword was
only for demonstration purposes and the defense had every opportunity to highlight for the jury
that the exhibit was only for demonstrative purposes, there is no reasonable likelihood that the
jury misapprehended the demonstrative nature of that evidence.
Finally, the demonstrative evidence was not irrelevant, as defendant claims. Evidence is
relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact which is of consequence to the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. MRE 401. The
demonstrative cane sword, which had the blade in tact, illustrated the prosecution's theory
regarding the instrumentality of the crime, as well as the congruence between the prosecution’s
theory of how the crime was committed and the evidence concerning the extent and nature of the
victim’s injuries. Further, the only unfair prejudice that defendant alleges is that the presence of
the demonstrative sword as an exhibit likely caused confusion and misled the jurors and
witnesses. However, as previously discussed, it was made clear that the exhibit was not the
weapon allegedly used. Accordingly, any unfair prejudice defendant may have suffered from
admission of the demonstrative evidence was not sufficient to outweigh substantially the
probative value of the evidence. MRE 403. For these reasons, the evidence in question satisfied
the general requirements for relevance and probative value as balanced against prejudicial effect.
Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to any relief on this basis.
III
-3-
Defendant also argues that he entitled to a new trial because the admission of the
demonstrative cane sword caused the verdict to be against the great weight of the evidence.
Because defendant did not move for a new trial below, this issue is not preserved for appellate
review and we need not review this issue. People v Winters, 225 Mich App 718, 729; 571 NW2d
764 (1997). As discussed previously, the demonstrative evidence was properly admitted.
Moreover, as discussed infra, the evidence in this case did not clearly weigh in defendant's favor.
Because the evidence reasonably supports the verdict in this case, no miscarriage of justice will
result from our failure to consider this issue. See People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 661; 509
NW2d 885 (1994).
IV
Defendant claims that insufficient evidence was presented to allow a rational trier of fact
to conclude that the essential elements of second-degree murder and first-degree home invasion
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence in a criminal case, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Vronko, 228 Mich App 649, 654; 579 NW2d 138
(1998). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to
prove the elements of a crime. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).
Questions of credibility are left to the trier of fact. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 123124; 575 NW2d 84 (1997). All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the
prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
The offense of second-degree murder consists of the following elements: “(1) a death, (2)
caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse.”
People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 463-464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). Defendant essentially
challenges the element of malice, which is defined as “the intent to kill, the intent to cause great
bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the
natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.” Id. at 464. Intent may
be inferred from all the facts and circumstances and, because of the difficulty of proving an
actor's state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient. People v Daniels, 163 Mich
App 703, 706; 415 NW2d 282 (1987).
The testimony, if believed, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the necessary
elements, including malice, beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence showed that, on the day of
the incident, defendant was observed beating on his former girlfriend’s door, while holding
something in his hand that resembled a cane sword. Defendant yelled that he was going to kill
her and that he knew that she had someone in her room. Defendant then kicked-in his former
girlfriend’s locked door and, ultimately, a struggle ensued between defendant and his former
girlfriend’s boyfriend--the victim. Defendant was observed standing on the bed, swinging a cane
sword forward towards the victim repeatedly, while the victim was standing beside the bed
holding a pillow with both hands in front of the chest area of his body. The victim died as a
result of multiple stab wounds made by a double-edged blade. This evidence, viewed in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the
essential elements of second-degree murder were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
-4-
With regard to defendant’s claim that insufficient evidence was presented to sustain his
conviction for first-degree home invasion, he failed to offer any argument to support this claim.
A defendant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and
rationalize the basis for his claims. People v Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 588; 569 NW2d 663
(1997). We, nevertheless, briefly note that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain
defendant’s conviction. See MCL 750.110a; MSA 28.305(1). Defendant does not dispute that
he entered his former girlfriend’s house without permission. Immediately before he kicked-in the
front door, defendant yelled that he was going to kill his former girlfriend, which infers that he
intended to commit a felony while in the house. Finally, the evidence, if believed, showed that
defendant was armed with a weapon. This evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that the essential elements of firstdegree home invasion were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.4
V
Defendant argues that numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair
trial. Defendant objected to only one of the several claims alleged. With regard to the remaining
claims, appellate review is precluded unless a curative instruction could not have eliminated any
possible prejudice or failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People
v Ramsdell, 230 Mich App 386, 404; 585 NW2d 1 (1998). Issues of prosecutorial misconduct
are decided on a case-by-case basis, with the reviewing court examining the pertinent portion of
the record and evaluating the prosecutor's remarks in context. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App
336, 341-342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). The test is whether defendant was denied a fair trial. Id.
Our review of the record reveals that the challenged remarks and conduct by the
prosecutor were either proper responses to defense counsel’s arguments or reasonable inferences
from the evidence produced at trial. People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 353; 492 NW2d 810
(1992). Although a prosecutor may not use a defendant's failure to present evidence as
substantive evidence of guilt, she may contest evidence presented by a defendant. People v Reid,
233 Mich App 457, 477; 592 NW2d 767 (1999). Moreover, with regard to all of the remarks,
any prejudice that did arise from the prosecutor's remarks could have been cured by a timely
objection and a request for a curative instruction. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to any
relief on this basis.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
4
We decline to address defendant’s claim presented in his statement of the issue that the court
erred in instructing the jury on CJI2d 3.9, because he failed to object to the instructions below
and fails to argue this issue in the body of his brief.
-5-
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