EARNELL HAILES V LIBERTY MUTUAL INSUR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EARNELL HAILES,
UNPUBLISHED
December 28, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
and JEFF BARRACO,
No. 215509
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-009772 PZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Hood and Neff, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Earnell Hailes appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting summary disposition
in favor of defendants Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Jeff Barraco on plaintiff’s claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm.
Plaintiff initiated this action in the circuit court following defendants' decision to terminate his
worker's compensation benefits. On defendants' motion for summary disposition, the circuit court
determined that plaintiff’s emotional distress claim arose from a breach of an insurance contract between
plaintiff and defendant, and following Kewin v Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins Co, 409 Mich 401;
295 NW2d 50 (1980), the court concluded that plaintiff could not pursue this claim because it stemmed
from a breach of contract. Thus, because only a breach of contract claim remained, the court finally
concluded that the proper jurisdiction for this claim was in the worker’s compensation system, not the
circuit court.
Plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred when it relied on Kewin. Instead, plaintiff argues that
this claim can be pursued in the circuit court under MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131). Pursuant to this
statute, an employee may seek damages for intentional torts caused by his or her employer outside of
the worker’s compensation system, which is normally the exclusive remedy for employees seeking
benefits. Relying on this provision, and on Broaddus v Ferndale Fastener Division, 84 Mich App
593; 269 NW2d 689 (1978), plaintiff further argues that defendants, standing in the stead of the
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employer, are liable for their intentional torts and that proper jurisdiction for these claims is within the
circuit court.
Although we find that the circuit court erred in granting summary disposition based on the
reasoning set forth above, contrary to plaintiff’s argument we affirm because such an order was
appropriate on the ground that plaintiff failed to state a claim. We will not reverse where the trial court
reached the right result for the wrong reason. Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App
185, 190; 600 NW2d 129 (1999).
The circuit court did not explicitly identify the technical basis for granting summary disposition on
the emotional distress claim. Nevertheless, it is clear that in referencing Kewin, supra, the court was
addressing that portion of defendants' motion which relied on MCR 2.116(C)(8). The grant or denial of
a motion for summary disposition based on the failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. Beaty v
Hertzberg & Golden, PC, 456 Mich 247, 253; 571 NW2d 716 (1997). Such a motion tests the legal
sufficiency of a claim to determine whether the opposing party's pleadings allege a prima facie case.
McIntosh v Dep't of Transportation, 234 Mich App 379, 381; 594 NW2d 103 (1999). We must
determine if the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could
establish the claim and justify recovery. Id.
Pursuant to Broaddus, supra at 599-600, a plaintiff may proceed in circuit court against his
employer and its compensation carrier if the plaintiff truly alleges a tort and damage identifiably separate
from any claims regarding the compensability of the plaintiff’s injuries. Compare Maglaughlin v
Liberty Mutual Ins Co, 82 Mich App 708, 710-711; 267 NW2d 160 (1978) (where this Court
identified the actual basis for the plaintiff’s purportedly similar claim as the failure of the defendant to pay
compensation benefits pending a compensation appeal, and concluded that pursuant to MCL 418.841;
MSA 17.237(841), resolution of all disputes related to the plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim were
properly vested in the bureau). We need not determine the true nature of plaintiff’s claim in this case,
however, because even assuming that the alleged emotional distress is identifiably separate from
plaintiff’s ongoing compensation action, plaintiff has failed to allege the element of extreme and
outrageous conduct necessary to establish a prima facie case. Atkinson v Farley, 171 Mich App 784,
788; 431 NW2d 95 (1988). Plaintiff does not allege facts evidencing a continuous pattern of
harassment, abuse and unethical conduct. Id. at 791. Rather, plaintiff merely alleges that his
compensation benefits were wrongfully terminated. Such an allegation is insufficient to sustain a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Lisecki v Taco Bell Restaurants, Inc, 150 Mich
App 749; 389 NW2d 173 (1986). Consequently, summary disposition was appropriate.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Janet T. Neff
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