PEOPLE OF MI V ADAM KEITH CORNELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 2, 1999
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 211215
Roscommon Circuit Court
LC No. 96-003174 FH
ADAM KEITH CORNELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Jansen and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, MCL
750.110; MSA 28.305. The trial court sentenced defendant, as an habitual offender, to eight to twenty
years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
In mid-February, 1996, a house owned by Thomas Becker1 was completely destroyed in a fire.
A fire investigator determined that the fire was not accidental. Three sets of foot impressions were
found approximately thirty feet from the house, and tracking dogs led the police to a residence
approximately two miles away, where, among other people, defendant and his cousin Christopher
Cornell were present. The owner of the house informed the police that the person they should be
looking for was Cary Prescott. The police later stopped a vehicle with defendant, Christopher Cornell,
and Prescott inside, and all three men gave various statements to the police regarding the fire.
Christopher Cornell and Prescott testified against defendant pursuant to plea agreements.
Defendant gave two written statements to the police, that were both admitted into evidence. In
the first statement, defendant claimed that Prescott told defendant and Christopher Cornell that he
wanted to show them a place where he had outrun a police dog and that when they arrived at the house,
Prescott started punching windows out and started the house on fire. Defendant stated that neither he
nor Christopher Cornell did anything to the house. In defendant’s second statement, he claimed that the
three men were out walking when Prescott said that there was a house in the woods with items inside
and that they could make a lot of money. Defendant stated that Prescott kicked in the door and the men
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entered the house, but that “there was not anything in the house to take.” At that point, according to
defendant’s second statement, Prescott started punching windows out and set the curtains on fire.
Defendant denied setting anything on fire, and stated that he did not even want to be there.
Prescott testified that it was Christopher Cornell’s idea to break into the house and that they
had not intended to steal anything. Prescott stated, “Well, we hadn’t really planned on taking anything.
It was empty. We just went there to look around and see what kind of a house Charleton Heston lived
in.” Later during his testimony, however, Prescott stated that he did not plan to steal anything but
probably would have, and that he wanted to see what was inside and maybe “get a little souvenir.” He
also testified that he could not state whether he had intended to steal anything because he did not
remember. Prescott also stated that he tried unsuccessfully to set the curtains on fire and that he did not
see either defendant or Christopher Cornell actually set anything on fire.
Christopher Cornell testified that the three men had been drinking that night2 and that their intent
was to look for items to steal inside the house. He stated that they did not find anything of value to
steal, however, and that Prescott then set the curtains on fire and defendant set a mattress on fire.
Defendant did not testify and did not present any witnesses. The trial court refused to give
defendant’s requested instruction on the misdemeanor offense of breaking and entering without
permission, holding that the issue whether there was an intent to commit larceny was “squarely framed
for the jury.” Specifically, the trial court held:
The Court would note for the record entering without permission is a
misdemeanor. The Court takes note of the record that the defendant asserts and it was
his position that there was no intent to commit a larceny and I think that the issue is
squarely framed for the jury. Either there was a B and E with intent or the crime did not
occur. I would not give the entering without owner’s permission instruction under the
circumstances of this case.
II. Preservation Of Issues And Standard Of Review
A. Jury Instructions
Defendant requested an instruction on the lesser offense of breaking and entering without
permission, and the trial court refused to give this instruction. Therefore, this issue has been properly
preserved for appellate review. See People v Schmitz, 231 Mich App 521, 527-528; 586 NW2d
766 (1998). This Court reviews a trial court’s decision whether to grant a requested lesser included
misdemeanor instruction for an abuse of discretion. People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252, 265; 330
NW2d 675 (1982). The failure to grant an appropriate instruction is an abuse of discretion “if a
reasonable person would find no justification or excuse for the ruling made.” People v Malach, 202
Mich App 266, 276; 507 NW2d 834 (1993).
B. 180 Day Rule
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Defendant moved to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial, but the trial court denied
the motion. Defendant later moved to dismiss for violation of the 180-day rule. The trial court denied
this motion, as well. Therefore, this issue has been properly preserved for appellate review. In any
event, a defendant need not object to the delay in order to allow appellate review of a claim that the
180-day rule has been violated. People v Hewitt, 176 Mich App 680, 681-682; 439 NW2d 913
(1989). Whether the 180-day rule applies is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. See
People v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 423; 531 NW2d 734 (1995) (holding that whether the 180
day rule applied to habitual offender informations was a question of law reviewed de novo). “We
review the trial court’s attributions of delay for clear error.” People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608,
612; 591 NW2d 669 (1998).
III. Jury Instructions
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included
misdemeanor offense of breaking and entering without permission, MCL 750.115; MSA 28.310. We
disagree.
A requested instruction on an appropriate lesser misdemeanor offense must be given where it is
supported by a rational view of the evidence, unless to do so would result in undue confusion or some
other injustice. Stephens, supra at 255. The evidence must not only justify a conviction of the
misdemeanor, but proof of the element differentiating the charged offense and the misdemeanor must be
sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may rationally reject the charged offense and convict on the
misdemeanor. People v Steele, 429 Mich 13, 21; 412 NW2d 206 (1987). Here, the only
differentiating element was the intent to commit larceny. Defendant gave a written statement to the
police indicating that Prescott told him that there was a house in the woods with items inside and that
they could make a lot of money there. Defendant also stated that the men entered the house, but that
there was not anything to take. Additionally, Cornell testified that the purpose of breaking into the
house was to look for items to steal. Prescott testified that they had not planned to steal anything, but
also stated that he wanted to possibly take a souvenir from inside the house. When directly asked
whether he had an intent to steal, Prescott stated that he could not be sure because he could not
remember. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the jury could not have rationally found that
defendant lacked the intent to commit larceny when he entered the house. The requested jury
instruction was not supported by a rational view of the evidence, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to grant the instruction.
IV. The 180 Day Rule
Defendant argues that the 180-day rule was violated by the delay in bringing him to trial. We
again disagree.
The 180-day rule, MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1), provides that a prison inmate must be
brought to trial for other untried pending charges within 180 days of the Department of Corrections
providing notice to the prosecutor of the place where the inmate is imprisoned. Generally, the untried
charges must be “dismissed with prejudice if the prosecutor fails to make a good-faith effort to bring the
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charge to trial within the 180-day period.” MCR 6.004(D)(2). However, the 180-day rule did not
apply to defendant because he was a parolee whose parole had not been revoked. People v Chavies,
234 Mich App 274, 279; ___ NW2d ___ (1999). Additionally, defendant committed the instant
offense while on parole. He was therefore subject to consecutive sentencing under MCL 768.7a(2);
MSA 28.1030(1)(2). The purpose of the 180-day rule is to resolve untried charges against prison
inmates to allow sentences to run concurrently. Connor, supra at 425. This purpose is not served
where mandatory consecutive sentencing applies. People v McCullum, 201 Mich App 463, 465; 507
NW2d 3 (1993). We conclude that the 180-day rule did not apply to defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
The house was known locally as the “Heston house” because it was once lived in by Charleton
Heston.
2
Defendant does not argue that he lacked the intent to commit larceny due to intoxication.
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