PEOPLE OF MI V TRACY LAMAR HAGEWOOD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 25, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 200549
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-054341 FC
TRACY LAMAR HAGEWOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and MacKenzie and R. P. Griffin*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of three counts of armed robbery,
MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b;
MSA 28.788(2). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of forty to sixty years’
imprisonment on each count. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.
I
Defendant first challenges the process by which the jury was selected. He argues that the trial
court’s method of rotating the exercise of peremptory challenges violated MCR 2.511(E)(3)(a), which
provides:
First the plaintiff and then the defendant may exercise one or more peremptory
challenges until each party successively waives further peremptory challenges or all the
challenges have been exercised, at which point jury selection is complete.
Defendant was tried with a codefendant, and each was allotted ten peremptory challenges,
pursuant to MCR 6.412(E)(1). Although the record is not clear regarding the number of peremptory
challenges the trial court allowed the prosecutor, the same court rule provides that the prosecutor is
entitled to “the total number of peremptory challenges to which all the defendants are entitled.” During
the jury selection process, the trial court first gave the
* Former Supreme Court justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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prosecutor an opportunity to exercise a peremptory challenge. After replacing the eliminated juror, the
court then allowed the codefendant to exercise a peremptory challenge and replaced the juror thus
eliminated. When the court called on defendant for a peremptory challenge, defendant’s counsel
objected and noted that he believed that the prosecutor should next exercise his second peremptory
challenge because “otherwise I believe he’d have an unfair advantage based upon the number that he
has versus what I have.” The trial court overruled the objection and continued the described pattern of
rotation until a jury was selected.
After defendant had exhausted his peremptory challenges, the court specifically asked if his
counsel was satisfied with the jury, and counsel responded, “Yes, Judge, we’re satisfied.” The
prosecutor passed on the next round and used no more peremptory challenges. Because the
codefendant had passed on an earlier round, he then used his last peremptory challenge. There
followed no challenges for cause and the jury selection process stood completed. At that point, the trial
court again asked defendant’s counsel if he was satisfied with the jury, and defendant’s counsel
responded affirmatively regarding the jury panel that then was sworn. In the process, defendant and the
codefendant each had exhausted all ten of their peremptory challenges, and the prosecutor had
exercised six challenges.
Defendant now argues that the trial court did not adhere to MCR 2.511(E)(3)(a) and that this
failure constitutes reversible error. In support of his argument, defendant cites People v Miller, 411
Mich 321; 307 NW2d 335 (1981), in which three defendants were tried together. The applicable
court rule in effect at the time, GCR 1963, 511.6, required that “[a]fter a challenge for cause is
sustained or a peremptory challenge exercised, another juror shall be selected and examined before
further challenges are made.” Id. at 324. Five weeks before the trial was scheduled to start, the trial
court had entered an order indicating that the “struck” jury method would be employed for jury
selection. Using this method, a replacement was not immediately called when a potential juror was
removed for cause or by peremptory challenge. Instead, the prosecutor and three defense attorneys
exercised peremptory challenges until only eleven jurors out of an original pool of seventy-three
potential jurors remained. Then thirty-seven replacements were called and questioned, and the
peremptory challenge process continued. Id. at 323-324. Because the procedure employed by the
trial court did not comply with the court rule, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction
and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 326.
In People v Russell, 182 Mich App 314; 451 NW2d 625, rev 434 Mich 922; 456 NW2d 83
(1990), this Court reversed a defendant’s conviction because he was required to use three peremptory
challenges at once during the jury selection process in violation of the court rules. Id. at 318-320. The
dissenting opinion noted that the trial court had recognized its error and changed the procedure early in
the jury selection process, and the defendant had demonstrated his satisfaction with the jury by not
exercising all of his peremptory challenges and explicitly stating to the trial court that he was satisfied
with the impaneled jury. Moreover, concluded the dissent, the evidence presented established the
defendant’s guilt and defendant “announced that he was satisfied with the jury which was selected. . . .
I am satisfied that defendant’s guilt was determined by a fair and impartial jury.” Id. at 326. The
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Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the defendant’s conviction “for the
reasons stated in the dissenting opinion.” Russell, supra, 434 Mich 922.
Like the present case, People v Finney, 113 Mich App 638; 318 NW2d 519 (1982),
involved multiple defendants and a challenge to the trial court’s method of rotating peremptory
challenges. The trial court first called on the prosecutor for a peremptory challenge and then on each
defendant in turn before returning to the prosecutor. Id. at 640. On appeal, the defendant argued that
the trial court should have allowed one of the defendants to exercise a peremptory challenge “and then
the prosecutor would have to exercise one of his, and go back and forth with each defendant in that
manner.” Id. at 641. In affirming the defendant’s conviction, this Court held that GCR 1963, 511.5,
which contained essentially the same language as MCR 2.511(E)(3), did not require the trial court to
rotate peremptory challenges in the manner suggested by the defendant. Id. at 641.1
In the present case, defendant’s counsel objected to the rotation method employed by the trial
court and utilized all of the available peremptory challenges. However, he twice expressed to the trial
court his satisfaction with the impaneled jury, which we believe waived any further objection to the trial
court’s method of rotating the exercise of peremptory challenges. More importantly, we agree with this
Court’s ruling in Finney, supra regarding the rotation of peremptory challenges in cases involving
multiple defendants. We find that the method employed by the trial court of rotating the exercise of
peremptory challenges from the prosecutor to each defendant in turn before returning to the prosecutor
did not offend MCR 2.511(E)(3)(a) but was instead a reasonable interpretation of the rule. As in
Russell, supra, the evidence established defendant’s guilt of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable
doubt, and defendant twice expressed satisfaction with the jury. We are satisfied that defendant was
convicted by a fair and impartial jury. See Russell, supra at 326.
II
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion for
directed verdicts on the armed robbery counts. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for directed
verdict to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would
permit a rational factfinder to find that the essential elements of the charged offense had been
established. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).
The evidence presented at trial established that defendant drove an automobile into a vehicle
owned by one of the victims and left his automobile carrying a beer bottle. All three victims testified that
a beer bottle was thrown through the back window of the vehicle in which they were sitting with
sufficient force to break the window and shatter the beer bottle. Following the shattering of the
window, defendant and his two companions opened the doors of the victims’ automobile and
demanded that the victims empty their pockets. The victims gave defendant and his companions their
possessions. After the robbery, the female victim was ordered to disrobe and forced to engage in
sexual acts with the three perpetrators. Defendant penetrated the victim at least twice vaginally and
forced her to perform oral sex on him. He also facilitated further assaults on the victim by driving her to
a more secluded location.
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For an offense to constitute armed robbery, “the robber must be armed with an article which is
in fact a dangerous weapon—a gun, knife, bludgeon, etc., or some article harmless in itself, but used or
fashioned in a manner to induce the reasonable belief that the article is a dangerous weapon.” People v
Banks, 454 Mich 469, 473; 563 NW2d 200 (1997), quoting People v Parker, 417 Mich 556, 565;
339 NW2d 455 (1983). Defendant contends that no weapon was displayed when items were taken
from the victims, and therefore the “armed” element of armed robbery was not established. Although
Michigan courts have upheld many items to be dangerous weapons in the context of an armed robbery,
including bottles, People v Bart (On Remand), 220 Mich App 1, 14; 558 NW2d 449 (1996), and
automobiles, People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 17; 472 NW2d 289 (1991), defendant argues
that the use of the automobile and bottle in the present case preceded the taking of the victims’
property, and therefore the theft offenses were at most unarmed robberies or larcenies. We disagree.
This Court has previously recognized that the assault portion of a robbery sometimes occurs
prior to taking the victim’s property or after the taking is accomplished. People v LeFlore, 96 Mich
App 557, 561-562; 293 NW2d 628 (1980). When an assault precedes the taking of a victim’s
property, the key factor for finding a robbery is analyzing the events as a transaction in order to
determine whether “larcenous intent” was present throughout the events comprising the robbery. Id. at
562. For example, in People v Yarbrough, 107 Mich App 332; 309 NW2d 602 (1981), this Court
determined that an assault with a gun that occurred prior to the actual taking of property was part of the
offense of armed robbery because the defendant’s intent throughout the entire transaction was to steal
the victim’s purse. Id. at 335-336. The requisite intent to commit armed robbery may be inferred by
the jury from circumstantial evidence. Jolly, supra at 466, citing People v Sharp, 57 Mich App 624,
626; 226 NW2d 590 (1975).
In the present case, defendant utilized both an automobile and a bottle as dangerous weapons
during the assaults that preceded the actual taking of the victims’ property. We hold that a reasonable
factfinder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could conclude that the
ramming of the victims’ automobile with the defendants’ vehicle, the smashing of the victims’ rear
window with a bottle, and the taking of the victims’ property comprised a single transaction during
which defendant displayed the intent to steal from the victims. As such, the takings were punishable as
armed robberies, and the trial court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict
on the armed robbery charges.
III
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court’s sentences were disproportionate because the
court failed to consider the fact that he did not have “a serious prior record,” that he was “remorseful
and cooperative after the offense,” and that he was a high school graduate with military experience. The
trial court exceeded the minimum recommended sentence for each of defendant’s convictions. The
sentencing guidelines’ recommended range for each count was 180 months to 360 months or life
imprisonment. The trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years (480 months) to 60 years (720 months).
We review a trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. People v Milbourn,
435 Mich 630, 654; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). The sentencing judge must take into account the nature of
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the offense and the background of the offender. Id. at 651. Where the sentencing guidelines’
recommended range differs from the trial court’s intended sentence, the judge is alerted that the
sentence falls outside a normative range and should be evaluated to assure that it is not unfairly
disparate, has a rational basis, and is not disproportionate. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 177;
560 NW2d 600 (1997). A sentencing court may depart from the guidelines when the ranges are an
“inadequate reflection of the proportional seriousness of the matter at hand.” Milbourne, supra at 661.
When imposing a sentence that reflects an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines, the
sentencing court must place its reasons for doing so on the record at the time of sentencing. People v
Fleming, 428 Mich 408, 417-419; 410 NW2d 266 (1987).
In the present case, the trial court stated its reasons for departure in the sentencing information
report departure evaluation, in which the court wrote: “The horrible nightmare deserves this
punishment. The sexual assault described in detail at the time of sentencing gives more than adequate
reason for this departure.” At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reiterated the facts of the crime,
announced the sentence, and stated that the circumstances of the offense justified an upward departure
from the guidelines. We agree and find that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion because the
sentence imposed was proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and to this offender.
Affirmed.
/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Robert P. Griffin
1
In People v American Medical Centers of Michigan, Ltd, 118 Mich App 135, 147-148; 324
NW2d 782 (1982), this Court again held that the rotation of peremptory challenges from the prosecutor
to each of multiple defendants before returning to the prosecutor did not violate GCR 1963, 511.5.
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