PEOPLE OF MI V KELVIN LITTLEJOHN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 11, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 195286
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 96-011683 FH
KELVIN LITTLEJOHN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Jansen and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury conviction for (1) possession with intent to deliver
under fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), (2) felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6), and (3) two counts of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). The
court sentenced defendant to five- to twenty-years’ imprisonment for the possession with intent to
deliver conviction, two and one-half to five-years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession conviction,
and the mandatory two-year consecutive term for the felony-firearm convictions. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence statements that he had
made to a parole officer who failed to advise him of his Miranda warnings. Miranda v Arizona, 384
US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). The trial court conducted a Walker1 hearing prior to
trial and concluded that the statements were admissible. This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress evidence on legal grounds for clear error. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App
269, 273; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). The trial court’s findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly
erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id.
Prior to interrogating an individual who is in custody, police officers must inform him of his right
to remain silent and to consult an attorney. The officer must secure a knowing and intelligent waiver of
those rights. Miranda, supra at 478-479. Miranda rights are triggered when: (1) the defendant is in
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custody; (2) there is interrogation; and (3) the questioning is conducted by a law enforcement officer.
Miranda, supra at 444.
Defendant’s Miranda claim fails for two reasons. One, there was no interrogation.
Interrogation “refers to express questioning and to any words or actions on the part of the police that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.”
People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 532-533; 631 NW2d 780 (1995) (citation omitted). The
parole officer testified that “in response to the [information she gave him regarding the parole violation],
[defendant] just started talking, he started telling me all this stuff.” Because on the present record it
appears that defendant’s statements were volunteered and were not the result of questioning or of
behavior calculated to elicit an incriminating response, we hold that the statements were admissible
because he was not subjected to interrogation.
Two, the "questioning" was not done by a police officer. “A person who is not a police officer
and is not acting in concert with or at the request of the police is not required to give Miranda warnings
before eliciting a statement.” Anderson, supra, 533. This Court has previously held that neither a
Department of Social Services caseworker, People v Porterfield, 166 Mich App 562, 567; 420
NW2d 853 (1988), nor a juvenile corrections officer, Anderson, supra, 533-534, are law enforcement
officials for the purposes of Miranda. Without directly ruling on this question, in Minnesota v Murphy,
465 US 420; 104 S Ct 1136; 79 L Ed 2d 409 (1984), the United States Supreme Court upheld the
admission of a defendant’s statements to a probation officer at a subsequent trial on charges unrelated
to the statements.
At defendant's Walker hearing, the parole officer testified that she was not a police officer or a
certified law enforcement official, and that she was not defendant’s regular parole officer, but was
interviewing defendant at the request of his regular parole officer who was in Detroit. She said that she
was acting independently from the police, and that her only reason for speaking to defendant was to
advise him of parole violation charges, to advise him of his right to a preliminary hearing on those
charges, and to determine if he would a
gree to waive the hearing. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that the parole officer was not a law enforcement official.
Defendant also claims that the trial court clearly erred in admitting his confession to the police
because the police failed to readvise him of his Miranda rights before taking his taped confession. This
Court reviews the entire record de novo to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, whether a
suspect has validly waived his Miranda rights. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 27-30; 551 NW2d
355 (1996). This Court will give deference to a trial court’s findings of fact at a suppression hearing,
and will not disturb those factual findings unless the trial court’s ruling is determined to be clearly
erroneous. Id.
A police detective testified that defendant was given his Miranda warnings at the scene when he
was arrested. Subsequently, the detective testified, he readvised defendant of his rights at the jail and
obtained a waiver before conducting an initial interview. Prior to the next interview, which was tape
recorded, the detective asked defendant if he remembered being advised of his rights, if he had
understood them, and if he remembered being read the waiver. Defendant responded affirmatively.
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Defendant testified that he was never given the Miranda warnings and claimed that his responses in the
taped interview resulted from his belief that the detective was referring to information about a search
warrant that he had been given at the scene of the arrest. The trial court concluded that defendant’s
testimony was not credible and ruled that defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights. This
Court cannot conclude that this finding was clearly erroneous.
This Court has previously held in People v Littlejohn, 197 Mich App 220, 223; 495 NW2d
171 (1992), and People v Godboldo, 158 Mich App 603, 605-607; 405 NW2d 114 (1986), that
where there had been an initial advisement and waiver of rights, the police were not required to readvise
a defendant of his rights prior to each successive interview. Instead, a factual question is presented as
to whether the statements were voluntary. Id. at 607. As to the voluntary nature of the statement, this
Court stated in People v Peerenboom, 224 Mich App 195, 198; 568 NW2d 153 (1997):
With regard to the voluntariness of defendant’s statements to the police officers,
we examine the entire record and make an independent determination of voluntariness.
However, we also defer to the trial court’s superior ability to view the evidence and
witnesses and will not disturb its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
People v Krause, 206 Mich App 421, 423; 522 NW2d 667 (1994). Use of an
involuntary statement in a criminal trial violates due process. People v Cipriano, 431
Mich 315, 331; 429 NW2d 781 (1988). The test of voluntariness is whether
“considering the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, the confession is ‘the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,’ or whether the
accused’s ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired.’” [Id. at 333-334 (citations omitted).]
Our Supreme Court in Cipriano, supra at 334 detailed the factors to be considered in
determining whether a statement is voluntary:
. . . the age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his
previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in
question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there
was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the
confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health
when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or
medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect
was threatened with abuse. [Citations omitted.]
Here, the trial court assessed some, but not all, of these factors. The court found that defendant
was twenty-six years old and that he had obtained a ninth grade education. The court further found that
defendant had a prior conviction for delivery of cocaine. The trial court also determined that defendant
had been advised of his constitutional rights. The record indicates that prior to the tape-recorded
interview, defendant had been incarcerated for approximately twelve hours. Defendant was questioned
once prior to the tape-recorded interview; that prior questioning had taken approximately ten minutes.
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There is no testimony regarding when defendant was taken before a magistrate. In any event, it does
not appear that whatever delay occurred was used as a device to obtain the statements.2 The detective
testified that defendant was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs, that he had not been physically
abused or threatened with physical abuse, and that he did not complain of illness, lack of sleep, hunger,
or thirst. Defendant never disputed this testimony or offered any contrary evidence. Considering these
factors in totality, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant’s statements to the police
were voluntary.
Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in scoring the sentencing guidelines. Our
Supreme Court held in People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 176-177; 560 NW2d 600 (1997), that a
trial court’s scoring of the sentencing guidelines does not present an appealable issue. See also People
v Raby, 456 Mich 487, 499; 575 NW2d 644 (1998). Accordingly, we decline to review this issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
1
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
2
The tape-recorded statement was taken within twelve hours of defendant’s incarceration. This is well
within the forty-eight hour limit established by the United States Supreme Court in Riverside v
McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56-57; 111 S Ct 1661; 114 L Ed 2d 49 (1991). Defendant thus bore the
burden of establishing that the delay was unreasonable. Defendant failed to present any evidence on this
point other than his own claim that “it was three days before we was tooken [sic] upstairs and booked.”
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