GREAT AMERICAN INS COMPANIES V GARAN LUCOW MILLER SEWARD COOPER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANIES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 4, 1998
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
GARAN, LUCOW, MILLER, SEWARD, COOPER
& BECKER, P.C. and THOMAS F. MYERS,
No. 203014
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-504656 NM
Defendants-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Hood and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order of summary disposition in favor of defendants. We
affirm.
Defendants were retained by plaintiff to represent plaintiff’ s insured, the J.F. Cavanaugh Co.
(Cavanaugh), in a personal injury action brought by Thomas Tricoff. At trial, during a discussion about
the proposed jury instructions, defendant Myers indicated that the parties had agreed that they would
not be “doing any present values or any of that.” The jury returned a verdict in favor of Tricoff and
found damages in the amount of $8.6 million, with a lump sum of $5 million attributable to future
damages. Defendant Myers did not request that the jury be instructed to allocate Tricoff’s future
damages by year, and the jury was not given the year-by-year verdict form described in SJI 66.01A.
After the verdict, the court indicated several times, at various hearings, that it understood the parties to
have agreed that the court would reduce the award of future damages to present value. However, in its
final opinion and order, the court reconsidered its original ruling and held that the award of future
damages would not be reduced to present value. In so ruling, the court explained that, contrary to its
original understanding, defendant Myers had waived the present value jury instructions in exchange for
Tricoff’s waiver of the interest and inflation jury instructions, and that it could not fairly reduce the
verdict to present value without the use of the year-by-year verdict form described in SJI 66.01A.
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Cavanaugh then filed a claim of appeal and the case eventually settled for $6.1 million before this Court
could hear the appeal.
After Cavanaugh’s appeal was dismissed, plaintiff brought this legal malpractice action against
defendants under an equitable subrogation1 theory. Plaintiff alleged that defendant Myers was negligent
for agreeing to waive the reduction to present value. Plaintiff moved for partial summary disposition,
seeking a determination that the court in the underlying case had properly held that defendant Myers
waived the reduction to present value. In response, defendants filed a cross motion for summary
disposition and then later filed two additional motions for summary disposition asserting various grounds
for dismissal. Ultimately, the trial court issued an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants. The trial court explained that plaintiff had forfeited its claim against defendants when
Cavanaugh abandoned its appeal in the underlying case.
Plaintiff first argues on appeal that the trial court erred in “denying” its motion for partial
summary disposition. Although the trial court never specifically ruled on plaintiff’ s motion for partial
summary disposition, plaintiff preserved the issue by raising it below and pursuing it on appeal. See
Caron Fisher Potts v Hyman, 220 Mich App 116, 119; 559 NW2d 54 (1996). However, given our
resolution of the other issue before us, we need not address this issue.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition. Although we agree with plaintiff’ s contention that the instant legal malpractice action was
not foreclosed by Cavanaugh’s eventual settlement with Tricoff, cf. Lowman v Karp, 190 Mich App
448, 453; 476 NW2d 428 (1991), we nevertheless conclude that defendants were entitled to summary
disposition.2 Instead of granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7), the trial court should have granted the motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).3 A trial
court’s decision to grant a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Pinckney Community
Schools v Continental Casualty Co, 213 Mich App 521, 525; 540 NW2d 748 (1995). Summary
disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Foster v Cone-Blanchard Machine
Co, 221 Mich App 43, 48; 560 NW2d 664 (1997).
In an action for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish the existence of an attorney-client
relationship, negligence in the legal representation of the plaintiff, that the negligence was a proximate
cause of the injury, and the fact and extent of the injury alleged. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 655;
532 NW2d 842 (1995). In this case, it is essentially undisputed that, based on the record, one of two
things transpired in the underlying case. Either (1) the court was correct in its original understanding that
there had been an agreement between the parties and the court at trial that it, rather than the jury, would
be responsible for reducing the award of future damages to present value, or (2) the court was correct
in its final understanding that defendant Myers agreed to waive reduction to present value in exchange
for Tricoff’s waiver of the inflation and interest instructions. Defendants contend that the court was
correct in its original understanding of the situation, and plaintiff contends that the court was correct in its
final determination.
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To preclude a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the
disputed factual matter must be material to the issue in dispute. See State Farm & Casualty Co v
Johnson, 187 Mich App 264, 267; 466 NW2d 287 (1991). Here, under either understanding of the
facts, plaintiff cannot show that defendant Myers engaged in legal malpractice, because plaintiff cannot
show “the fact and extent of the injury alleged.” Simko, supra at 655. If defendant Myers correctly
understood that the court, rather than the jury, was to reduce the award of future damages to present
value, the alleged injury would have been a result the court’s decision to reverse its prior ruling, rather
than attorney malpractice. Certainly, defendant Myers was entitled to rely on such an agreement with
the court. Moreover, both parties to this appeal agree that it is possible for a court to reduce future
damages to present value without a verdict specifically allocating future damages by year. On the other
hand, if defendant Myers waived reduction to present value in exchange for a waiver of the instructions
on interest and inflation, it would be impossible to determine whether there was any injury without
engaging in improper speculation. See Stockler v Rose, 174 Mich App 14, 33; 436 NW2d 70 (1989)
(explaining that recovery in tort is not permitted for remote, contingent, or speculative damages). This is
so, because no trier of fact could determine what effect instructions on interest and inflation, if given,
would have had on the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we hold that because summary disposition should
have been granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), Foster, supra at 48, plaintiff is not entitled to relief
on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
1
See Beaty v Hertzberg & Golden, PC, 456 Mich 247, 254-255; 571 NW2d 716 (1997).
2
On cross appeal, defendants argue that the trial court could have granted their motion(s) for summary
disposition on several additional grounds. Cross appeal is not necessary to urge an alternative ground
for affirmance. Middlebrooks v Wayne Co, 446 Mich 151, 166 n 41; 521 NW2d 774 (1994). In
analyzing this issue, we have considered together all of the parties’ various arguments regarding the trial
court’s decision to grant defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
3
In granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court explained that MCR
2.116(C)(7) provides that a claim may be summarily dismissed if there was some other disposition of
the claim before the commencement of the action. Although we disagree with the trial court’s
characterization of Tricoff’s action against Cavanaugh as a prior disposition of plaintiff’ s claim against
defendants, we will not reverse where the correct result is reached for the wrong reason. See, e.g.,
Glazer v Lamkin, 201 Mich App 432, 437; 506 NW2d 570 (1993).
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