IN RE GREGORY TREJO ET AL MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of GREGORY THOMAS TREJO, JR.,
TIMOTHY ROBERT TREJO, and SAMANTHA
LIBERTY TREJO, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY
UNPUBLISHED
June 12, 1998
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
LIBERTY A. TREJO, also known as LIBERTY A.
JABAK and GREGORY THOMAS TREJO, SR.,
Nos. 200486 & 200833
Oakland Juvenile Court
LC No. 95-059636 NA
Respondents-Appellants.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Markman and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Liberty Trejo appeals as of right and respondent Gregory Trejo appeals by
delayed leave granted from the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to three minor children
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g). We affirm.
Respondents are the parents of three children: Gregory Jr., born on March 25, 1990; Timothy,
born on February 11, 1992; and Samantha, born on September 27, 1993. Pursuant to a judgment of
divorce in November 1994, the mother, Liberty Trejo, was granted custody of all three children. By
April 1995, Liberty Trejo was unemployed and could not provide adequate housing for the children.
She arranged for Gregory Jr. to live with his maternal grandparents, then contacted the Family
Independence Agency (the agency) in late April 1995, asking that the other two children be taken from
her care. On May 2, 1995, Liberty Trejo left the two younger children with the father, Gregory Trejo,
who proved unable to take care of them due to lack of suitable housing and his working hours.
Consequently, a neglect petition was filed and the two younger children were placed in foster care,
although Gregory Jr. was temporarily permitted to remain with his maternal grandparents.
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At a May 15, 1995, pretrial hearing, respondents admitted the allegations in the neglect petition,
including that “[Liberty Trejo] was unable to care for her children and wanted the Department of Social
Services to take them temporarily.” All three children were temporarily placed with their paternal
grandparents, but were removed after an October 10, 1995, hearing at which the paternal grandparents
claimed that they were overwhelmed by the task of caring for the children. After several changes in
homes, the children eventually ended up together in a foster home.
In the beginning, it appeared that the intent of all parties was to return custody of the children to
the respondents, most probably to the mother, Liberty Trejo. A case service plan was established for
respondents in June 1995, delineating the efforts to be made by respondents and the agency to enable
such return of custody. As required by this agreement, Liberty Trejo attended all court hearings,
participated in psychological evaluations, completed a parenting class, and substantially complied with
the requirement to maintain contact with the foster care worker. However, she was unable to find
suitable housing for the children despite the agency’s offer to help her find low-cost housing, she was
unable to maintain steady employment and did not verify her employment with the foster care worker,
she was unable to control the children or accept constructive criticism regarding appropriate discipline
even after the parenting class, and she failed to participate in individual therapy as required. Between
September and October 1996, Liberty Trejo remarried, but did not disclose her marriage to the
agency, her therapist or her children until the termination hearings. Although her new husband
apparently owned a three-bedroom home, she testified that she planned to reside temporarily in a two
bedroom apartment and let the children get to know her husband before moving in with him.
Although Gregory Trejo maintained fairly regular contact with the foster care worker and
completed drug screening, he failed to provide proof of income as required, failed to obtain suitable
housing, failed to attend all court hearings, failed to participate in a psychological evaluation, failed to
complete parenting classes and failed to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings or individual therapy.
Neither parent used appropriate discipline with the children during visitation and as the children’s
aggressive behavior grew worse during visitations, visits were required to be supervised and less
frequent.
After more than one year, respondents failed to make any significant progress toward being able
to care for their children properly, and a petition to terminate their parental rights was filed. Liberty
Trejo’s attorney admitted during the termination hearings that she was still not yet able to care for the
children, but said that she believed that she would be ready in a few more months. After hearing
testimony, the trial court determined that two statutory grounds for termination, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g), were supported by clear and convincing evidence
and that it was in the best interests of the children that respondents’ parental rights be terminated.
The trial court’s decision regarding termination of parental rights is reviewed in its entirety for
clear error. In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 472; 564 NW2d 156 (1997). The court must
terminate the rights of a parent to a child if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that either of
the following circumstances exist, unless it finds that termination is clearly not in the child’s best interests.
MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5).
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1.
The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days
have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing
evidence, finds that the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the condition will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the age of
the child. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i).]
2.
The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and
there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within
a reasonable time considering the age of the child. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g).]
The respondent bears the burden of going forward with evidence that termination is clearly not in the
child’s best interests and, absent any evidence addressing this issue by the parent, termination of
parental rights is mandatory. Hall-Smith, supra at 473.
In this case, respondents argue that the court erred by terminating their parental rights. We find
that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the termination of respondents’ parental rights.
Although Liberty Trejo appears to love her children and desires an eventual return of custody, she was
not able to consistently or regularly abide by her obligations to her children under the plan, nor did she
demonstrate progress toward being able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time
through any other means. She voluntarily gave up her children because she was either unable or
unwilling to care for them, then failed to progress toward being able to meet the children’s emotional or
physical needs, both because of her own overwhelming problems and because of a seeming lack of
effort on her part toward providing proper discipline, attending therapy or cooperating with the agency.
The evidence shows that Gregory Trejo’s efforts toward the care and custody of his children
were considerably less than those of the mother, Liberty Trejo. Although he was apparently employed
and had sufficient income, he failed without explanation to obtain suitable housing for the children either
before or after they were placed in foster care. Further, there was undisputed evidence that he told a
foster care worker that he did not want custody of the children.
Although both respondents appeal this revocation of their parental rights, their children were at
an age where they needed a permanent and stable environment and neither parent made a sufficient
demonstration that they would be able to provide this in the near future. Even short visits with the
children proved extremely disruptive, culminating in aggressive and unusual behaviors. The trial court
did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and
convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Further, respondents failed to show that termination of their parental rights was not clearly in the
children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5). Respondent Liberty Trejo
argued that she would be able to provide a proper home for the children within three to six months, but
this was based only on her own opinion. Her counselor did not believe that she could sufficiently
address her own issues in that time. There was also suspicion regarding her motivation for remarrying,
since it appeared that she may have acted impulsively in order to make a better impression upon the trial
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court during the termination proceeding. Her arguments that the agency did not take sufficient action to
facilitate reunification were largely unpreserved, since she did not make them in the trial court, and this
Court will not review such arguments. McCready v Hoffius, 222 Mich App 210, 218; 564 NW2d
493 (1997). While she did preserve the argument that the agency failed to facilitate reunification by
referring the children for therapy earlier in the proceedings, this claim is not substantiated by the record.
The evidence showed that while earlier intervention might have been helpful, there was nothing in the
children’s early behavior to suggest that such intervention was needed. Although it is extremely difficult
for this Court to order the termination of parental rights where a parent shows an interest in the children,
as Liberty Trejo does here, she did not meet the burden of showing that she would be able to
reestablish a proper home for the children within a reasonable time and Gregory Trejo failed to present
any evidence that termination was not in the children’s best interests. Therefore, the trial court did not
clearly err in terminating respondents’ parental rights. In re Hall-Smith, 222 Mich App 470, 473; 564
NW2d 156 (1997).
Respondents next argue that the trial court improperly assumed jurisdiction over this case
because there was not sufficient testimony to support jurisdiction at the time that respondents entered
their pleas of admission. Although subject matter jurisdiction may be attacked at any time, the exercise
of discretion in applying that jurisdiction cannot be challenged in a collateral attack. In re Hatcher, 443
Mich 426, 438, 439-440; 505 NW2d 834 (1993). Similar to the case at hand, Fritts v Krugh, 354
Mich 97; 92 NW2d 604 (1958) involved a claim regarding the exercise of jurisdiction, i.e. that there
was insufficient evidence to support a neglect petition. The Court allowed this claim to be appealed
collaterally. However, Hatcher expressly overruled Fritts, and held that the court’s “jurisdiction is
established when the proceeding is of a class the court is authorized to adjudicate and the claim stated in
the complaint is not clearly frivolous.” Hatcher, supra at 444. Here, there is no dispute that the trial
court was authorized to hear neglect and termination cases, and the petition alleged sufficient information
that the court could find neglect and was not clearly frivolous. MCL 712A.2(b); MSA
27.3178(598.2)(b). Although respondents could have directly appealed the exercise of jurisdiction by
appealing the initial determination, they cannot now collaterally attack it on appeal from the termination
decision. Hatcher, supra at 436, 444.
Finally, respondents also raise other secondary issues, but none, in our judgement, warrant
reversal. These issues-- the constitutionality of the termination process, the alleged failure of the court to
fully resolve an issue regarding abuse by an unrelated party, and the fairness of an ex parte visitation
hearing-- are not preserved for appeal. They either were not raised before, and addressed by, the trial
court, McCready, supra at 218, or respondents have failed to provide supporting authority for their
arguments. Price v Long Realty, Inc, 199 Mich App 461, 467; 502 NW2d 337 (1993). We
therefore decline to review these issues.
For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s termination of respondents’ parental rights.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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