GEORGE COOK V NORMAN TOWNSHIP BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE FREDERICK COOK and
RONALD JEROME WEBBER,
UNPUBLISHED
May 22, 1998
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
NORMAN TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
No. 200473
Manistee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-008141 CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Griffin and Whitbeck, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order of the trial court denying their motion for a temporary
restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction. In their “Request for Temporary Restraining Order,”
plaintiffs challenged the rescheduling of the annual meeting of the electors of Norman Township. We
affirm the trial court’s order.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
Sections (1) and (2) of MCL 41.8; MSA 5.8 provide:
(1)
Except as otherwise provided in this section, an annual meeting of the
electors of each township shall be held on the last Saturday in the last month of each
fiscal year, at the time and place selected by the township board. However, the
annual meeting may be held on an alternate date if the alternate date is approved
by a majority of the township board and is in the last month of the township’s
fiscal year.
(2)
The business performed at a meeting of the electors of a township shall
be conducted at a public meeting held in compliance with the open meetings act, Act
No. 267 of the Public Acts of 1976, as amended, being sections 15.261 to 15.275 of
the Michigan Compiled Laws. Public notice of the time, date, and place of the
meeting shall be given by the township clerk in the manner required by Act No.
-1
267 of the Public Acts of 1976, as amended1, and as provided by section 2 of Act
No. 43 of the Public Acts of the Second Extra Session of 1963, being section
141.412 of the Michigan Compiled Laws2…. [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to this provision, the annual meeting of the electors of Norman Township was originally set for
June 29, 1996, the last Saturday in the last month of Norman Township’s fiscal year.
On June 12, 1996, however, the defendant Norman Township Board of Trustees (the
“Township Board”)3 held a public hearing regarding Norman Township’s 1996-1997 Fiscal Year
budget.4 Following the public hearing, the Township Board, at approximately 8:30 p.m., voted to
reschedule the annual meeting of electors from June 29, 1996, to June 15, 1996. The Township Board
rescheduled the meeting because neither Township Supervisor Sylvester Wood nor Township Clerk
Michele M. Wood could attend on June 29, 1996.5
The rescheduling of the annual meeting of the electors was the topic of a front page story in the
Manistee News Advocate on June 13, 1996. Notice was also posted on June 13, 1996 on both sides
of the time and temperature sign located on Highway M-55.6 On June 14, 1996, further notices, signed
by Township Clerk Weaver, were posted at the Wellston Post Office at approximately 8:55 a.m. and at
the Norman Township Fire Hall at 9:00 a.m.
On June 14, 1996, plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent the
rescheduled annual meeting of the electors. Plaintiffs further sought an order to hold the annual meeting
of electors on June 29, 1996, as originally scheduled. On June 14, 1996, the trial court entered an
order denying plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order. However, the trial court’s order also
required the Township Board to show cause on June 17, 1996, why any acts and actions that took
place at the rescheduled annual meeting of the electors on June 15, 1996 should not be declared null
and void and why another annual meeting of the electors should not be held.
The Township Board represents that the attendance at the rescheduled annual meeting of the
electors held on June 15, 1996 was between eighty to one hundred people, as opposed to at most
twenty people during previous years. The Township Board represents that the only action taken at the
rescheduled annual meeting of the electors was the approval of the minutes of the 1995 annual meeting.
The Township Board represents that no other action was proposed and no other actions were taken at
the rescheduled annual meeting of the electors and that the rescheduled annual meeting was adjourned
after approximately one-half hour. Plaintiffs were in attendance at the rescheduled annual meeting of the
electors.
The trial court held a show cause hearing on June 17, 1996, and at the conclusion of that
meeting ordered the parties to file briefs on the issue of whether the Township Clerk had given proper
notice of the rescheduled annual meeting of the electors. The parties filed such briefs and the trial court
held a hearing on December 5, 1996, on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the trial court rendered its opinion that the rescheduled annual meeting of the electors was
a regular meeting of the electors that was rescheduled more than eighteen hours in advance, in
conformity with the requirements of the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261-15.275; MSA 4.1800(11)
-2
4.1800(25). The trial court considered MCL 141.412; MSA 5.3328(2) to be in pari materia with the
Open Meetings Act and concluded that the six-day publication requirement of MCL 141.412; MSA
5.3328(2) applied only when there was a public hearing on the proposed budget. Since the
rescheduled annual meeting of the electors was not a hearing on the proposed budget, the trial court
determined that the six-day publication provisions of MCL 141.412; MSA 5.3328(2) regarding a
public hearing on the proposed budget did not apply.
On December 20, 1996, the trial court issued an order, incorporating its December 5, 1996
opinion by reference, that denied plaintiffs’ motions for a temporary restraining order and/or a
preliminary injunction. It is from this order that plaintiffs appeal as of right.
II. Standard of Review
The grant or denial of a temporary injunction by a trial court is discretionary. Hiers v Detroit
Superintendent of Schools, 376 Mich 225, 234; 136 NW2d 10 (1965). We review the grant or
denial of a temporary injunction for an abuse of discretion. Detroit Public Works Dep’t v Local 77,
AFSCME, 34 Mich App 159, 160; 190 NW2d 700 (1971). Statutory interpretation is a question of
law which we review de novo. People v Thomas, 438 Mich 448, 452; 475 NW2d 288 (1991).
III. Injunctive Relief
The three prerequisites to a grant of injunctive relief are that (1) justice must require that the
court grant the injunction; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; and (3) there is a real and imminent
danger of irreparable injury. Peninsula Sanitation, Inc v Manistique, 208 Mich App 34, 43; 526
NW2d 607 (1994).
With regard to a preliminary injunction, the four factors to be considered are (1) harm to the
public interest if an injunction is issued; (2) whether harm to the party seeking the preliminary injunction
outweighs the harm to the opposing party if the preliminary injunction is granted; (3) the strength of the
moving party’s showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits; and (4) a showing that the party seeking
a preliminary injunction will suffer irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction is not granted. MSEA v
Dep’t of Mental Health, 421 Mich 152, 157-158; 365 NW2d 93 (1984).
This Court has described the “irreparable injury” standard for injunctive relief as follows:
In order to establish irreparable injury, the moving party must demonstrate a
noncompensable injury for which there is no legal measurement of damages, or for
which damages cannot be determined with a sufficient degree of certainty. The injury
must be both certain and great, and it must be actual rather than theoretical. Economic
injuries are not irreparable because they can be remedied by damages at law. A
relative deterioration of competitive position does not in itself suffice to establish
irreparable injury. [
Thermatool Corp v Borzym, 227 Mich App 366, 377; ____
NW2d ____ (1998) (citations omitted).]
-3
Here, plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the rescheduled annual meeting of the electors and attended the
meeting. Further, plaintiffs offered no objection to the notice at the rescheduled annual meeting.
Clearly, plaintiffs suffered no irreparable injury and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
injunctive relief.
IV. Notice
A. “Regular” Versus “Annual” Meetings
Plaintiffs argue that statutory construction of the terms “annual,” “regular” and “special” as
applicable to the various township meetings shows that they are separate, distinct and mutually
exclusive. The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the Legislature. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 658; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Nothing
will be read into a statute which is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as gathered from
the act itself. In re Marlin, 198 Mich App 560, 564; 499 NW2d 400 (1993). The first criterion in
determining intent is the specific language of the statute. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd,
441 Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). The Legislature is presumed to have intended the
meaning it plainly expressed. Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc v Watersmeet Twp, 217 Mich
App 7, 12; 551 NW2d 199 (1996). Moreover, “[s]tatutes relating to the same subject or having a
common purpose are in pari materia and should be read ‘as together constituting one law, although
enacted at different times, and containing no reference one to the other.’” State Treasurer v Schuster,
456 Mich 408, 417; ___ NW2d ___ (1998) (citation omitted). The object of the in pari materia rule is
to give effect to the legislative purpose as found in harmonious statutes. Jennings v Southwood, 446
Mich 125, 137; 521 NW2d 230 (1994).
Here, the plain meaning of MCL 41.8(2); MSA 5.8(2), and the manifest intent of the
Legislature when providing for an annual meeting of electors of a township is that such a meeting shall be
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Open Meetings Act, including its notice
requirements, and the provisions of §2 of MCL 141.412; MSA 5.3328(2). Since MCL 41.8(2);
MSA 5.8(2) makes specific reference to the other two acts, these acts are clearly in pari materia. The
only way to give effect to the legislative purpose as found in these harmonious statutes is to apply the
reference to “regular meetings” in the Open Meetings Act to the “annual meeting” of electors of a
township referred to in MCL 41.8(1); MSA 5.8(1), even though the Open Meetings Act does not
make specific reference to an “annual meeting.” The trial court’s conclusion that the “annual meeting” in
MCL 41.8(1); MSA 5.8(1) has to be seen as a “regular meeting” under the Open Meetings Act is the
only possible logical one that leads to a harmonious interpretation of the statutes.
B. Notice Under the Open Meetings Act
If the annual meeting of the electors required by MCL 41.8(1); MSA 5.8(1) is a regular meeting
within the meaning of the Open Meetings Act, the next question to be addressed is whether a change in
the date of such an annual meeting is a change in the schedule of a regular meeting or a rescheduled
regular meeting. If such a change is a change in the schedule, then subparagraph (3) of Section 5 of the
Open Meetings Act applies, as follows:
-4
If there is a change in the schedule of regular meetings of a public body, there shall be
posted within 3 days after the meeting at which the change is made, a public notice
stating t e new dates, times, and places of its regular meetings. [MCL 15.265(3);
h
MSA 4.1800(15)(3); emphasis supplied.]
If such a change results in a rescheduled regular meeting, then subparagraph (4) of Section 5 of the
Open Meetings Act applies, as follows:
Except as provided in this subsection or in subsection 6, for a rescheduled regular or
a special meeting of a public body, a public notice stating the date, time, and place of
the meeting shall be posted at least 18 hours before the meeting…. [MCL 15.265(4);
MSA 4.1800(15)(4); emphasis supplied.]
We view the action of the Township Board on June 12, 1996 as resulting in a rescheduled annual
meeting. However, we need not resolve this precise issue as the posting in this case regarding the new
meeting date for the annual meeting complies with both subparagraph (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the
Open Meetings Act.7
C. Notice Under MCL 141.412; MSA 5.3328(2)
Plaintiffs argue that MCL 41.8; MSA 5.8, requires that both the notice requirements of the
Open Meetings Act and MCL 141.412; MSA 5.3328(2), be satisfied. If two statutes lend themselves
to a construction which avoids conflict, that construction should control. House Speaker, supra at
568-569. “The construction should give effect to each statute without repugnancy, absurdity, or
unreasonableness.” McCready v Hoffius, 222 Mich App 210, 217; 564 NW2d 493 (1997). In this
case, the use of the conjunctive “and” to enumerate two sets of notice requirements gives rise to an
ambiguity in the statute because it can be read as meaning that both sets of notice requirements have to
be satisfied in the case of an annual meeting of electors. However, the words “and” and “or” often
have double meanings, as discussed in Root v Ins Co of North America, 214 Mich App 106, 109;
542 NW2d 318 (1995):
The popular use of “or” and “and” is so loose and so frequently inaccurate that
it has infected statutory enactments. While they are not treated as interchangeable, and
should be followed when their accurate reading does not render the sense dubious, their
strict meaning is more readily departed from than that of other words, and one read in
place of the other in deference to the meaning of the context. [Citation omitted].
Accordingly, this Court must construe the word “and” to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. See
People v Humphreys, 221 Mich App 443, 452; 561 NW2d 868 (1997).
Since there is no statutory provision that requires that the public hearing on the proposed budget
of a township be held in conjunction with the annual meeting of electors, the trial court’s construction of
MCL 141.412; MSA 5.3328(2), and MCL 41.8; MSA 5.8 is the only possible one that can give effect
to each statute without repugnancy, absurdity or unreasonableness, McCready, supra at 217, and that
-5
avoids conflict between the respective statutes. House Speaker, supra at 568-569. Accordingly, the
strict meaning of the word “and” when it connects two sets of notice requirements in MCL 41.8(2);
MSA 5.8(2) should be departed from in deference to the meaning implied by the context. “And” in this
context cannot be construed to mean that the notice requirements of MCL 141.412; MSA 5.3328(2)
apply “together with” or “in addition to” the notice requirements of the Open Meetings Act. The only
way in which a harmonious construction of these statutes can be achieved is by holding, as the trial court
did, that the six-day notice requirement in MCL 141.412; MSA 5.3328(2) only applies when the
annual meeting of electors of a township also involves a hearing on the proposed budget. When the
annual meeting of electors does not involve a hearing on the budget, the notice requirements of the Open
Meetings Act control.
V. The Opportunity to Vote
Plaintiffs argue that the electors of a township must have the opportunity to vote regarding sums
of money for township business at various township meetings. Since the issue was not addressed in the
trial court, it is not preserved for appeal. Miller v Inglis, 223 Mich App 159, 168; 567 NW2d 253
(1997). We may review an unpreserved issue if it is a question of law and the facts necessary for the
resolution of the question have been presented. Westfield Cos v Grand Valley Health Plan, 224
Mich App 385, 387; 568 NW2d 854 (1997); Miller, supra at 168. Since the facts necessary for the
resolution of this question have not been presented, we decline to discuss it.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
1
Section 5 of the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.265; MSA 4.1800(15), provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
(1)
A meeting of a public body shall not be held unless public notice is given
as provided in this section by a person designated by the public body.
(2)
For regular meetings of a public body, there shall be posted within 10
days after the first meeting of the public body in each calendar or fiscal year a public
notice stating the dates, times, and places of its regular meetings.
(3)
If there is a change in the schedule of regular meetings of a public
body, there shall be posted within 3 days after the meeting at which the change is
made, a public notice stating the new dates, times, and places of its regular meetings.
(4)
Except as provided in this subsection or in subsection (6), for a
rescheduled regular or a special meeting of a public body, a public notice stating the
date, time, and place of the meeting shall be posted at least 18 hours before the
meeting…. [Emphasis supplied.]
-6
2
MCL 141.412, MSA 5.3328(2) provides:
A local unit shall hold a public hearing on its proposed budget. The local unit shall give
notice of the hearing by publication in a newspaper of general circulation within the local
unit at least 6 days before the hearing. The notice shall include the time and place of the
hearing and shall state the place where a copy of the budget is available for public
inspection. The notice shall also include the following statement printed in 11-point
boldfaced type: “The property tax millage rate proposed to be levied to support the
proposed budget will be a subject of this hearing.”
3
In the trial court pleadings, Township Board members Sylvester Wood, Michele Weaver, Mary Kay
St. John, Rita Crow and Judi Richards are the designated defendants, rather than the Township Board
itself.
4
Notice of this public hearing was given in the Manistee News Advocate on June 8, 1996.
5
Both Township Supervisor Wood and Township Clerk Weaver are also members of the Township
Board.
6
According to plaintiffs, this posting took place some time after 2:00 p.m. on June 13, 1996. The
Township Board alleged, however, that the notice was posted during the midmorning hours on June 13,
1996.
7
The posting by the Township Clerk of the notice of the rescheduled annual meeting occurred,
according to the Township Board, at 9:00 a.m. on June 14, 1996. The posting therefore occurred
within three days of the date of the change and more than 18 hours before the meeting, satisfying both
subparagraphs (3) and (4) of Section 5 of the Open Meetings Act.
-7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
