PEOPLE OF MI V MAXIMILLIAN L LLOYDAnnotate this Case
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
May 22, 1998
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-135670 FC
MAXIMILLIAN L. LLOYD,
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr. and Cavanagh, JJ.
A jury convicted defendant of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a; MSA
28.354(1), second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, assault with intent to rob while
armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).1 At the time of the offense, defendant was sixteen years
old and, therefore, he was tried as an adult pursuant to MCL 600.606; MSA 27A.606. After
conducting a juvenile sentencing hearing pursuant to MCL 769.1(3); MSA 28.1072(3) and MCR
6.931(A), the trial court determined that defendant should be sentenced as a juvenile. The prosecutor
now appeals that determination as of right. We affirm.
At a juvenile sentencing hearing, the prosecutor has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by sentencing the
juvenile as an adult offender. People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 475; 549 NW2d 584 (1996);
MCR 6.931(E)(2). At the time defendant was sentenced, MCL 769.1(3); MSA 28.1072(3) and
MCR 6.931(E)(3) required the court to consider six criteria in determining whether to sentence a
juvenile as a juvenile or adult offender. In making that determination, the court must “make complete,
detailed findings with respect to each of the requisite factors[.]” People v Hazzard, 206 Mich App
658, 660-661; 522 NW2d 910 (1994). The court must attempt to weigh the relevant factors in a
meaningful way and no single criterion, such as the seriousness of the offense, may be given
preeminence over the others. People v Perry, 218 Mich App 520, 542; 554 NW2d 362 (1996).
Review of a trial court’s decision to sentence a minor as a juvenile or as an adult is bifurcated.
First, the trial court’s factual findings supporting its determination regarding each individual factor are
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Factual findings are clearly erroneous if, after review of
the record, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Second,
the ultimate decision whether to sentence the minor as a juvenile or as an adult is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 362; 551 NW2d 460 (1996).
Here, the trial court stated that it reviewed the six statutory criteria and made specific findings of
fact with regard to the first three factors, MCR 6.931(E)(3)(a)-(c). The court found that defendant had
three prior misdemeanor adjudications and one prior felony adjudication as a juvenile, that defendant
had average intelligence, and that defendant was raised in a chaotic and dysfunctional home which,
according to the delinquency services worker’s report, caused him to turn to gang involvement. The
offenses were very serious and defendant, who was a willing participant, was armed with a weapon,
although the weapon was unloaded. The court further found that defendant did not shoot the deceased,
did not actively participate in the attempted robbery of the deceased’s son, and expressed remorse for
his actions. The court impliedly concluded that defendant was amenable to treatment, given that this
was his first time in residential placement and that he had functioned well at Children’s Village over the
past two years.2 These findings are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
The court did not make explicit findings as to the last three factors, MCR 6.931(E)(3)(d)-(f),
but instead emphasized the recommendations of the probation officer and delinquency services worker
and the endorsement thereof by the officer in charge. That evidence and the testimony weighed in favor
of the trial court’s decision to sentence defendant as a juvenile. The probation officer and delinquency
services worker determined that defendant was more likely to be rehabilitated by the treatment offered
by the juvenile system because it was compulsory, geared toward juveniles, and included family
involvement. Also, if defendant took advantage of that treatment, as he had been doing, and internalized
the changes that had already begun, he was unlikely to present a danger to the public if released at age
twenty-one. Given defendant’s potential for rehabilitation through the juvenile system, the probation
officer and delinquency services worker agreed that it was in the best interest of the public welfare and
protection of public security that he be sentenced as a juvenile. The evidence presented in support of
the prosecutor’s position was that the sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum adult sentence of
ten to twenty-five years, treatment programs were available in the adult system, and defendant would
present a risk to society if he were not rehabilitated by age twenty-one, in which case his incarceration
could be continued if he were in the adult system. Given that the court has the option of placing a minor
offender in the juvenile system even in cases where a particular sentence is mandated for an adult
offender convicted of the same crimes, People v Valentin, 220 Mich App 401, 411 n 5; 559 NW2d
396 (1996), aff’d ___ Mich ___ (Docket No. 108160, decided April 14, 1998), such evidence did not
preponderate in favor of sentencing defendant as an adult.
The purpose of requiring specific factual findings is to facilitate appellate review. People v
Johnson (On Rehearing), 208 Mich App 137, 141; 526 NW2d 617 (1994). Generally, where the
factual findings are insufficient, the appropriate remedy is to remand the cause to the trial court for
additional fact-finding. People v Armstrong, 175 Mich App 181, 184; 437 NW2d 343 (1989).
However, remand is unnecessary where it is manifest that the court was aware of the issues, resolved
the factual issues and correctly applied the law, and it would not facilitate appellate review to require
further explication of the path the court followed in reaching its result. Id. at 185; Johnson, supra at
In Hazzard, supra, this Court reversed and remanded because the trial court “engaged in a
rather lengthy diatribe at sentencing—comparing his own upbringing with defendant’s” and apparently
neglected to address any of the six factors, although he “made a number of piecemeal findings that were
potentially relevant to the statutory criteria.” Id. at 660. In the present case, by contrast, the trial court
was aware of the issues, considered the six criteria, and relied on the various sentencing reports in
reaching its decision. Those reports addressed all factors and concluded that they weighed in favor of
sentencing defendant as a juvenile. The preponderance of the evidence presented thus permitted but
one conclusion on the last three factors: that defendant be sentenced as a juvenile. Accordingly, we
find that remand for further fact-finding would serve no purpose in this case.
Although not raised on appeal, we note that the order of commitment erroneously indicates that
defendant was convicted of three counts of felony-firearm. Consequently, we remand this matter for the
limited purpose of correction of the order of commitment to reflect defendant’s conviction of two counts
Affirmed and remanded for correction of the order of commitment. Jurisdiction is not retained.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
The order of commitment erroneously indicates that defendant was convicted of three counts of
Although the court did not expressly find whether the instant offenses were part of a repetitive pattern
of offenses, that factor is relevant insofar as it bears on the defendant’s amenability to treatment in the
juvenile system. The evidence showed that defendant’s behavior was “almost exemplary” after initial
difficulties in adjustment and that he had excelled in his studies, thus indicating that he was amenable to